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Abstract
The ubiquity of the Internet has led to increased resource sharing between large
numbers of users in widely-disparate administrative domains. Unfortunately, tra-
ditional identity-based solutions to the authorization problem do not allow for
the dynamic establishment of trust, and thus cannot be used to facilitate interac-
tions between previously-unacquainted parties. Furthermore, the management of
identity-based systems becomes burdensome as the number of users in the system
increases. To address this gap between the needs of open computing systems and
existing authorization infrastructures, researchers have begun to investigate novel
attribute-based access control (ABAC) systems based on techniques such as trust
negotiation and other forms of distributed proving.
To date, research in these areas has been largely theoretical and has producedmany
important foundational results. However, if these techniques are to be safely de-
ployed in practice, the systems-level barriers hindering their adoption must be
overcome. In this thesis, we show that safely and securely adopting decentral-
ized ABAC approaches to authorization is not simply a matter of implementation
and deployment, but requires careful consideration of both formal properties and
practical issues. To this end, we investigate a progression of important questions
regarding the safety analysis, deployment, implementation, and optimization of
these types of systems.
We first show that existing ABAC theory does not properly account for the asyn-
chronous nature of open systems, which allows attackers to subvert these systems
by forcing decisions to be made using inconsistent system states. To address this,
we develop provably-secure and lightweight consistency enforcementmechanisms
suitable for use in trust negotiation and distributed proof systems. We next focus
on deployment issues, and investigate how user interactions can be audited in the
absence of concrete user identities. We develop the technique of virtual fingerprint-
ing, which accomplishes this task without adversely affecting the scalability of au-
dit systems. Lastly, we present TrustBuilder2, which is the first fully-configurable
framework for trust negotiation. Within this framework, we examine availability
problems associated with the trust negotiation process and develop a novel ap-
proach to policy compliance checking that leverages an efficient pattern-matching
approach to outperform existing techniques by orders of magnitude.
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1 Introduction
On the Internet, nobody knows you’re a dog.
—Peter Steiner
In theory, there is no difference between theory and practice.
In practice, there is.
—Yogi Berra
The secure operation of a distributed computing system requires an effectivemeans
of determining whether a given user is authorized to access the resources to which
access is requested. Traditional solutions to the authorization problem for dis-
tributed systems have made implicit use of a closed world model, in which users
and resources have a priori knowledge of one another. Under such an assump-
tion, the problem of authorization reduces to that of authentication, since resource
owners can simply maintain access control lists (ACLs) identifying the users that
are authorized to access the resources that they manage. If a user Alice wishes to
access some resource, she must first prove her identity to the resource owner, e.g.,
by using a username/password pair, X.509 identity certificate [61], or Kerberos
ticket [99]. If Alice can be authenticated by the resource owner and she appears on
the ACL for the resource, then she will be granted access to the resource.
An example identity-based authorization check is illustrated in Figure 1.1. In this
example, Alice discloses her username and secret password to a resource provider
at login time. The resource provider first checks to see that the password pro-
vided is actually the password assigned to Alice’s user account. Since this check
succeeds—and it is assumed that no one else knows Alice’s password—a new ses-
sion is started for the user that has authenticated as Alice. After successfully log-
ging into the system, Alice issues a request to download the file secret note.txt.
The resource provider then checks the ACL for secret note.txt. Since Alice ap-
pears on the ACL, a copy of the file is returned to her. This type of authorization
system is elegant in its simplicity, and provides a very intuitive means of protecting
resources in systems that fit this closed world model.
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User: “Alice”, Password: “isSmart”
OK
GET secret_note.txt
ACL
• Alice
• Bob
• Charlie
CHECK: Valid user?
CHECK: Alice on 
secret_note.txt ACL?
Figure 1.1: An access control list example.
While the closed-world assumption was reasonable to make in the early days of
distributed computing, today’s Internet is far from a closed world. Recent years
have seen Internet technologies mature considerably, which provides a means for
increasing numbers of traditionally “offline” services to establish themselves in the
networked world. Furthermore, economic pressures, legislative requirements, and
user demands for greater functionality and flexibility have provided impetus for
the Internet to evolve from a network of closed systems into a more grassroots
open system. The defining characteristics of such a system are that users have a
need or desire to access resources outside of their own administrative domain, and
resources have economic or other incentives to cater to these previously-unknown
users. Examples of open systems include supply chainmanagement networks, grid
computing systems, pervasive computing environments, peer to peer networks,
critical infrastructure and disaster management networks, electronic government
services, and the diversity of “Web 2.0” applications that have become manifest in
recent years. Although existing centralized and identity-based approaches to au-
thorization have been used to support early incarnations of these types of services,
this is a fundamentally flawed approach that cannot work in the long run.
The justification of the above statement is threefold. First, to a large extent, a user
identity loses much of its significance outside of the domain in which it was issued.
For example, a resource provider can probably determine that the user whose iden-
tity is chris@uiuc.edu is, in some way, affiliated with the University of Illinois.
However, the resource provider cannot infer whether the user is male or female,
let alone whether they are a student, faculty member, or staff member. Second,
the trust established using legacy approaches is unilateral. That is, resources are
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implicitly trusted and the burden of proof lies with the user to prove that he or
she should have access to a given resource. In an open system, users may not
have trust in previously-unknown resources that they discover, and thus there is
a very real need for bilateral trust establishment during the authorization process.
Lastly, identity-based approaches do not scale well in large open systems: manag-
ing lengthy ACLs is an error prone process and requiring users to safely manage a
different username and/or password for each resource that they access is unreal-
istic. Even identity-based systems that allow the definition of user groups or roles
to simplify access policy specification require centralized administration, which
makes their use in decentralized open systems problematic.
To address the above limitations of identity-based access control approaches, re-
searchers have investigated a number of decentralized attribute-based access con-
trol (ABAC) systems that retire the closed world assumption in favor of more real-
istic models of trust. Two popular decentralized ABAC approaches are distributed
proof and trust negotiation, both of which will be described in detail in Chapter 2.
Rather than relying on explicit access control lists, these types of authorization sys-
tems protect resources by using attribute-based access policies that describe the
required context of the system and the characteristics of authorized users. These
policies can be satisfied through the disclosure of cryptographic credentials issued
by third-party attribute certifiers (e.g., professional organizations, employers, or
government bodies) or other attestations made by devices within the system. Since
both types of systems allow resource administrators to specify the intension of a
policy, rather than its logical extension (i.e., an access control list), authorized enti-
ties can gain access to available resources without requiring that their identity be
known a priori.
Distributed proof systems typically use a goal-oriented proof decomposition ap-
proach to find answers to authorization queries. For instance, in a pervasive com-
puting space, a user might be allowed to turn on a digital projector if and only if a
location service says that the user is located in the same room as the projector and
a role service says that the user is allowed to assume the role “presenter.” The me-
dia controller responsible for granting access to the projector can then collaborate
with these other services to determine whether its access conditions are met. Trust
negotiation systems allow the disclosure of sensitive attributes to be protected by
release policies that place constraints on the resource owners to whom they can be
disclosed. As such, a trust negotiation session evolves into a bilateral and itera-
tive exchange of policies and credentials with the end goal of developing new trust
relationships on-the-fly. This process is illustrated graphically in Figure 1.2 when
Alice’s reluctance to disclose her driver’s license credential forces the negotiation
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Request purchase discount.
Policy: Student ID? Illinois resident?
Student ID credential.
Policy: BBB member?
BBB Credential.
Illinois driver’s license.
Discount granted
Figure 1.2: A trust negotiation session in which a user negotiates for a student
discount at a bookstore.
into a second round, during which the bookstore must disclose its Better Business
Bureau membership credential in an effort to “unlock” Alice’s driver’s license cre-
dential.
Recent research in decentralized ABAC systems has focused primarily on the the-
oretical aspects of these systems, producing foundational results on topics such as
languages for expressing resource access policies (e.g., [17; 19; 57; 83]), strategies
and tactics for constructing proofs of authorization (e.g., [12; 20; 68; 69; 90; 122]),
logics for reasoning about the outcomes of distributed ABAC protocols (e.g., [24;
113; 119]), and formal treatments of the information leakages that can occur as a
result of these types of protocols (e.g., [62; 116; 122]). Results such as these are ab-
solutely essential to the development of satisfactory decentralized ABAC mecha-
nisms. In fact, these and other results have established a very firm foundation upon
which highly-expressive—yet rigorously understood—authorization systems can
be built. However, this level of theoretical treatment does not address the myriad
systems-level problems that can arise as these approaches are deployed in existing
distributed computing environments.
In this thesis, we will show that safely and securely adopting decentralized ABAC
approaches to authorization is not simply a matter of implementation and deploy-
ment, but requires careful consideration of both formal properties and practical is-
sues. Our goal in this work is to provide sufficient evidence to justify the following
thesis statement:
It is possible to develop extensible and efficient decentralized
attribute-based access control systems that can be safely deployed in
large-scale asynchronous distributed environments.
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Successfully justifying the above claim will effectively bridge the gap between the
theory and practice of decentralized ABAC approaches to authorization. To ac-
complish this goal, we will answer a progression of important questions related to
the safety analysis, deployment, implementation, and optimization of these types
of systems.
We begin by asking, “Do existing theoretical models of trust negotiation and distributed
proof protocols faithfully model asynchronous open systems, such as the Internet?” With-
out such a guarantee, existing proofs regarding the soundness of these systems
and possible avenues of information leakage may not hold in reality. In fact, we
show that when the asynchronous nature of the Internet is combined with the au-
tonomy granted to participants in these types of protocols, attackers can subvert
existing decentralized ABAC systems in ways not captured by the existing theory.
In particular, we show that an attacker can force a resource provider to sample in-
consistent system states during protocol execution, thereby leading the resource
provider to make unsafe decisions based upon a corrupted “view” of the system.
The implication of this result is that existing decentralized ABAC protocols will,
under certain circumstances, grant accesses to resources that would be denied by
any centralized authorization mechanism. Although these problems are unsettling,
we identify their root causes and develop lightweight concurrency control and con-
sistency enforcement algorithms that eliminate this class of threats entirely.
After showing that existing decentralizedABACprotocols can be deployed in asyn-
chronous environments without compromising their security properties, we turn
our attention to more practical matters. Specifically, we ask, “How can users be held
accountable for their actions in a system without concrete user identities?” Decentralized
ABAC approaches represent a significant departure from the status quo, which im-
plies that a transition from the centralized and identity-based method of securing
and operating distributed systems may be problematic. Without a user identifier
to bind to actions in the system, tasks such as auditing user behavior and establish-
ing reputations become difficult. To address this problem, we propose a technique
called virtual fingerprinting. A virtual fingerprint is an opaque pseudo-identifier
derived from some subset of a user’s digital credentials. Administrators can use
virtual fingerprints to audit the actions of users in the system and can even share
virtual fingerprints across security domains without leaking a user’s sensitive at-
tribute information. We show that virtual fingerprints can be used as a privacy-
preserving basis for distributed audit systems, black lists, and reputation services
in open systems lacking more traditional user identities.
The remainder of this thesis then focuses more directly on the specific case of trust
negotiation systems. We ask, “What are the key systems and architectural character-
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istics of the trust negotiation process, and what are their impacts on the performance of
an organization’s authorization infrastructure?” To date, implementations of trust
negotiation systems have been largely unoptimized proofs of concept created to
demonstrate the feasibility of specific protocol constructs. While they have per-
formed admirably in this capacity, they were not designed for long-term use. As
a result, these implementations do not interoperate with one another, nor do they
provide a suitable framework for analyzing the performance characteristics of the
trust negotiation process or attacks against these types of systems. To enable this
type of analysis, we developed the TrustBuilder2 framework for trust negotiation.
TrustBuilder2 is user-extensible by means of a dynamic type hierarchy and plug-
in based architecture, meaning that support for new protocols, strategies, policy
languages, and the like can be added with very little programmer overhead. Fur-
thermore, it provides a framework within which the differences between various
approaches can be quantitatively analyzed. Within this framework, we study the
performance characteristics of the trust negotiation process, which leads us to iden-
tify its major bottlenecks and discover a new class of attacks against these systems.
The analysis that we conduct using TrustBuilder2 shows that checking compliance
with ABAC policies is the most expensive portion of the trust negotiation process.
This leads us to pose the question, “Is it possible to increase the efficiency of the com-
pliance checking process without altering its completeness or correctness properties?” We
show that the inefficiencies of this process stem from the fact that, for historical
reasons, the policy compliance checking problem is often formulated as a theorem
proving problem. While this is very logical, it carries with it undesirable overheads.
To address these overheads, we show that it is possible to instead cast the policy
compliance checking problem as a pattern matching problem. This enables the use
of very efficient algorithms to determine all of the ways in which a user can satisfy
a given policy. In addition to demonstrating that our approach is orders of magni-
tude faster than existing techniques, we formally prove that it provides exactly the
same functionality as a theorem-proving approach to compliance checking, thereby
ensuring the completeness and correctness of our improved process.
The research presented in this thesis makes a number of contributions to both the
theory and practice of distributed authorization. In examining whether existing
decentralized ABAC theory faithfully models asynchronous distributed systems,
we make the following contributions:
• We present the first formalization of the view consistency problem for decen-
tralized ABAC systems and show how the use of inconsistent views can lead
to the permission of undesirable accesses.
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• We formally characterize the causes of these types of problems and develop
several levels of view consistency, each of which provides different guaran-
tees regarding the types of undesirable accesses that can be prevented.
• We develop lightweight distributed algorithms that can be used to enforce
each of our view consistency levels in practice. We then prove the sound-
ness of these algorithms when used in asynchronous and adversarial envi-
ronments.
• We demonstrate several other interesting properties of these algorithms in-
cluding that they embody various privacy-preservation characteristics, have
low computational and communication overheads, and can be used in con-
junction with existing decentralized ABAC proposals.
While investigating the effects of decentralized ABAC approaches to authorization
on user identifiability, we make the following contributions:
• We develop the notion of virtual fingerprints and show that they can be used
in lieu of more traditional user identities as a basis for security support ser-
vices such as audit logs, black lists, and reputation systems.
• We show that virtual fingerprints can be used in applications spanning mul-
tiple domains without leaking sensitive attribute information.
• To demonstrate the scalability of services based on virtual fingerprints, we
develop Xiphos, a reputation system that is keyed on virtual fingerprints in-
stead of traditional user identities. We carry out a simulation study to show
that Xiphos performs well even in very large systems.
During our study of the systems and architectural properties of trust negotiation
systems, we make the following contributions:
• Wedevelop TrustBuilder2, which is the first fully-configurable framework for
the design, deployment, and analysis of trust negotiation protocols. Trust-
Builder2 demonstrates that a large number of trust negotiation proposals in
the research literature can be unified under a single system architecture.
• We demonstrate that introducing a high degree of flexibility into advanced
authorization frameworks does not necessarily incur high runtime overheads.
• Studies conducted using TrustBuilder2 lead us to identify the primary bottle-
necks in the trust negotiation process and uncover a novel class of denial of
service attacks that exploits the time required to check compliance with trust
negotiation policies.
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Lastly, we make the following contributions while studying ways to improve the
performance of trust negotiation policy compliance checkers:
• Wedevelop CLOUSEAU, a policy compliance checker that uses a patternmatch-
ing formalism to efficiently find all ways in which a policy can be satisfied.
This approach outperforms existing theorem-proving approaches to compli-
ance checking by orders of magnitude. As a concrete point of comparison, the
compliance checker analyzed in [108] takes over 10 seconds to find two over-
lapping satisfying sets containing a total of 20 credentials, while CLOUSEAU
finds the same satisfying sets in approximately 40 ms.
• CLOUSEAU improves not only the efficiency of the trust negotiation process,
but also its utility. By determining all satisfying sets for a given policy,
CLOUSEAU uncovers the entire “next-step” state space for any given nego-
tiation. This allows negotiation strategies to make more intelligent decisions
regarding how to proceed.
• We demonstrate that existing policy languages—such as RT 0, RT 1, and WS-
SecurityPolicy—can be compiled into a format suitable for analysis by
CLOUSEAU. This implies that policy writers can take advantage of the ex-
isting policy languages that best meet their needs without negatively influ-
encing the runtime characteristics of trust negotiation implementations.
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 sets the stage for the re-
mainder of the thesis by rigorously discussing trust negotiation and distributed
proof construction approaches to authorization for open systems. Chapters 3 and 4
investigate the consistency and concurrency control issues that must be consid-
eredwhen deploying decentralized ABAC systems in asynchronous environments.
Chapter 5 discusses how virtual fingerprinting can be used to enable the types of
security support services that typically rely on more traditional notions of user
identity. Chapter 6 presents the TrustBuilder2 framework for trust negotiation and
investigates the systems and architectural characteristics of trust negotiation ap-
proaches to authorization. In Chapter 7, we explore a pattern matching approach
to policy compliance checking that outperforms existing approaches by orders of
magnitude. We then discuss related work in Chapter 8 and present our conclusions
and directions for future work in Chapter 9.
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2 Background
The ball is round, the game lasts 90 minutes, everything else is pure theory.
—Sepp Herberger
In this section, we set the stage for the rest of this thesis by describing two impor-
tant decentralized ABAC approaches to authorization: distributed proof construction
and trust negotiation. Section 2.1 focuses on distributed proof construction tech-
niques. We first show how these types of systems evolved out of earlier trust
management systems, and then examine the more advanced features supported
by recent distributed proof systems. Section 2.2 then explains trust negotiation
approaches to authorization, comparing and contrasting this approach with the
distributed proof techniques discussed in Section 2.1.
2.1 Distributed Proof Construction
Modern distributed proof construction systems can be seen as direct descendants
of earlier trust management systems. In 1996, Blaze, Feigenbaum, and Lacy coined
the term trust management to refer to the study of the interplay between security
policies, security credentials, and trust relationships [22]. In a trust management
system—such as the PolicyMaker system described by Blaze et al.—credentials is-
sued by principals in the system are converted into statements in some language
of authorization. The policy derived from a collection of credentials is then ana-
lyzed in the context of a given service request to determine whether that request
should be granted. A request is granted if and only if it is in compliance with the
policy defined by the resource owner and the extensions to this policy entailed by
the collection of credentials accompanying the request. As a result, the set of cre-
dentials accompanying a given request provides a formal proof of authorization in
the event that the request is granted.
In some sense, trust management systems support a form of distributed proof,
since the credentials provided as input to the system can be issued by any set of
principals. However, early trust management systems—such as PolicyMaker [22;
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23], KeyNote [21], SPKI/SDSI [49], and PCA [3; 15]—provided no mechanism for
supporting the discovery of security credentials. Rather, the focus of these systems
wasmore on policy representation and checking compliancewith a policy after a set
of credentials had been gathered. While this certainly provides a more distributed
flavor of authorization than simple identity-based approaches, it is not the type of
fully-distributed approach that is the subject of this thesis.
More recently, however, a number of distributed proof construction systems that
support the runtime discovery of credentials have appeared in the research litera-
ture. For example, systems such as QCM [55], SD3 [64], Binder [44], Cassandra [17],
the proof system developed by Minami and Kotz [90], and Grey [12] each allow
security credentials to be collected at runtime and incorporated into the proof con-
struction process. The specific mechanisms used by each of these proposals differ;
however, this is largely immaterial to the discussion in this thesis. Rather than dis-
cussing the specifics of each of these systems, we will instead describe the salient
features of the distributed proof construction process by means of an example pro-
tocol execution. When the details of a specific proof construction system or tech-
nique become relevant to this thesis, they will be described at that point.
2.1.1 An Example
In a distributed proof system, each principal maintains a local knowledge base that
encapsulates its own view of the system. One portion of a principal’s knowledge
base is the set of facts that are currently known by the principal, which may include
both local facts as well as digitally-signed quoted facts asserted by other principals.
This set of facts is known as the principal’s extensional knowledge base. A prin-
cipal’s knowledge base also contains a set of derivation rules that can be used to
derive new facts from existing local facts and facts stored in the knowledge bases
of other principals. The set of facts that can be derived using these derivation rules
is known as the principal’s intensional knowledge base. The decentralized nature of
the distributed proof process makes it particularly well-suited for use in open sys-
tems, as the incomplete (and often complementary) views of many principals can
be used to make decisions involving knowledge spread across multiple adminis-
trative domains.
To provide a better understanding of the distributed proof process, we will now
examine the scenario depicted in Figure 2.1, which illustrates how the distributed
proof process can be used to control access to resources in a pervasive computing
environment. In this example, there are four principals whose knowledge bases
are shown: amedia controller that acts as a reference monitor protecting resources in
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grant(U, projector2124) :-
  “ls says location(U, 2124)” !
  “rs says role(U, presenter)”
Media Controller (mc)
location(pda12, 2124)
location(U, R) :- location(D, R) !
  “is says owns(U, D)”
Location Server (ls)
role(bob, presenter)
Role Server (rs)
owns(bob, pda12)
Inventory Server (is)
?grant(bob,projector2124)
?loc
ation
(bob
, 212
4)
?role(bob, presenter)
?owns(bob, pda12)
Figure 2.1: An example distributed proof system.
the system, a location server that monitors device locations, an inventory server that
keeps track of bindings between devices and their human owners, and a role server
that identifies the roles that can be assumed by specific users in the system. The
knowledge bases of these principals need not necessarily contain both facts and
rules.
Although the specific language used to express derivation rules varies from system
to system, there are many similarities between these languages. For the purpose
of the discussion in this section, derivation rules are expressed using a language
similar to that used by the Binder proof system [44]. In the Binder system, deriva-
tion rules are written as Horn clauses that can refer to facts in a principal’s local
knowledge base and quoted facts in another principal’s knowledge base. For in-
stance, consider the following derivation rule taken from the knowledge base of
the location server in Figure 2.1:
location(U,R) :- location(D,R) ∧ “is says owns(U,D)”
This rule allows the location service to conclude that a user U is located in room R
if the location server knows that some deviceD is currently located in room R and
the inventory server says that user U is the owner of device D.
In the scenario depicted in Figure 2.1, a user named Bob wishes to use a digital pro-
jector located in room 2124 of the pervasive computing space. To decide whether
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location(pda12, 2124)
?grant(bob, projector2124)
grant(U, projector2124) :-  “ls says location(U, 2124)” !
                                           “rs says role(U, presenter)”
mc says…
location(U, R) :-  location(D, R) !
                           “is says owns(U, D)”
ls says…
role(bob, presenter)
rs says…
owns(bob, pda12)
is says…
Figure 2.2: The proof tree generated during the example distributed proof.
to permit this request, the projector issues the query ?grant(bob, projector2124) to
the media controller. This query matches the head of the media controller’s rule
protecting access to room 2124’s projector via the substitution {U/bob}. As such,
the media controller recursively issues two sub-queries to determine whether this
derivation rule is satisfied: the query ?location(bob, 2124) is issued to the location
server to determine whether Bob is currently located in room 2124 and the query
?role(bob, presenter) is issued to the role server to determine whether Bob is autho-
rized to assume the “presenter” role in the pervasive computing space.
The query ?role(bob, presenter) is easily answered in the affirmative, since the fact
role(bob, presenter) is part of the role server’s extensional knowledge base. Un-
fortunately, the query ?location(bob, 2124) does not match any fact in the location
server’s extensional knowledge base, as the location server tracks the location of de-
vices in the system, not users. However, this query does match the location server’s
only derivation rule via the substitution {U/bob,R/2124}. As a result, the loca-
tion server checks to see which devices are currently located in room 2124. The
fact location(pda12, 2124) reveals that the device pda12 is located in room 2124, so
the location server recursively issues the query ?owns(bob, pda12) to the inventory
server to determine whether Bob is the owner of pda12. This query succeeds be-
cause the fact owns(bob, pda12) is in the inventory server’s extensional knowledge
base. As a result, the location server informs the media controller that Bob is in-
deed located in room 2124. When combined with the role server’s earlier assertion
regarding Bob’s ability to assume the “presenter” role, this implies that Bob should
be granted access to the projector in room 2124.
It is important to note that the format of the final proof returned to the querier
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varies between distributed proof systems. In most systems, each principal par-
ticipating in the proof construction process digitally signs the collection of rules
and facts from its own knowledge base that were used to answer a given query,
and returns them to the querier. In the event that the proof construction process in-
volved recursive invocations of the protocol, these signed statements are passed up
through each intermediate principal. The original querier can then verify that each
digital signature is valid and that the collection of statements forms a valid proof
tree whose leaves are facts and whose intermediate nodes are derivation rules. Fig-
ure 2.2 shows the proof tree that would be generated during the example proof
execution discussed above.
Note, however, that recursively disclosing the above types of digitally-signed at-
testations requires the assumption that principals are willing to disclose the facts
and rules in their knowledge bases to all other principals in the system. To ad-
dress this problem, other proof systems—such as the Minami-Kotz system that
we will discuss in Chapter 4—simply return the Boolean result of a given query.
This allows portions of a proof tree to be hidden from the querier, provided that
the querier trusts intermediate nodes to correctly execute sub-proofs on their be-
half. In the future, other proof systems might allow for an intermediate approach
in which principals could make a non-repudiable claim regarding a fact’s status
without disclosing the complete proof tree justifying their claim. The PeerAccess
logical framework [119] can be used to reason about such a proof system, but to
date, no such proof system has been implemented.
2.1.2 Research to Date
The majority of research concerning the use of distributed proof construction as
an authorization approach has focused on languages for expressing access con-
trol policies or the design of proof construction tactics. However, several recent
research efforts have begun to explore a number of other interesting facets of the
distributed proof construction process. In [90], Minami and Kotz explore the de-
sign of an efficient distributed proof construction system (henceforth referred to as
the MK system) for use in pervasive computing environments. One of the main
differences between the MK system and other distributed proof systems is that the
MK system permits principals to define access control lists (ACLs) protecting the
disclosure of sensitive facts stored in their knowledge bases. This is important, as
pervasive computing spaces have the ability to record large amounts of sensitive
information regarding the users of the space. For instance, in the above example,
the location server might opt to preserve users’ location privacy by defining an
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ACL permitting the disclosure of location data to the media controller, but not to
any other principal in the system. In addition to this privacy preservation feature,
the MK system supports the use of trusted intermediate caches with efficient revo-
cation to speed up the proof construction and invalidation processes [91].
The MK system also allows the disclosure of encrypted facts. This allows proofs to
be constructed even if certain participants in the proof process are not authorized to
learn intermediate results. For example, consider the case in which the inventory
server is willing to disclose facts of the form owns(U,D) to the media controller,
but not to the location service. In this case, the MK system would allow the inven-
tory server to encrypt the value true using the public key of the media controller
and then disclose this encrypted result to the location service. Since the truth value
of the statement location(bob, 2124) depends exclusively on this encrypted fact, the
location server returns only this encrypted fact to the media controller. The me-
dia controller will ultimately decrypt the value true and determine that Bob is lo-
cated in room 2124 without leaking the fact owns(bob, pda12) to the location service.
In [27], Borisov and Minami refine the use of encrypted facts to eliminate covert
channel attacks against the MK proof system.
Researchers at Carnegie Mellon University have designed and deployed the Grey
distributed proof system in an effort to study the interplay between distributed
proof systems, users, and physical environments [11]. Within the Grey system,
Bauer et al. have explored a number of interesting research topics including effi-
cient tactics for constructing distributed proofs [12; 13], the usage of consumable
credentials and one-time authorizations [28; 54], and using data mining techniques
on access control logs to detect policy misconfigurations [14]. These researchers
have also leveraged the user base of the Grey system to examine important issues
surrounding the usability of distributed proof systems [10] and the facilitation of
the policy creation process [9].
One issue that has not been considered by the above research efforts is that of tem-
poral consistency. More specifically, existing proof systems do not ensure that the
pieces of evidence collected to justify a given distributed proof are all true simulta-
neously. This is especially problematic in pervasive computing systems, since the
context of a system—and thus the set of facts that are true at any given time—can
change rapidly. The work presented in Chapters 3 and 4 of this thesis contributes
to the distributed proof construction field by investigating efficient algorithms for
ensuring the consistency of proofs generated during the distributed proof construc-
tion process. In Chapter 4, our techniques are applied to the MK proof system with
minimal performance overheads.
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2.2 Trust Negotiation
Trust negotiation [117] is an authorization approach in which resources are pro-
tected by attribute-based access policies, rather than explicit access control lists.
For example, access to a particular computing cluster might be made available to
graduate students studying computer science at an accredited university. Further-
more, each principal maintains some collection of digital credentials (e.g., X.509
certificates [61]) that attest to various attributes of the user or the context of his or
her surrounding environment. These credentials are issued by third-party attribute
certifiers, such as professional organizations, employers, or government bodies.
For example, a typical graduate student might have a student ID credential issued
by her university, a driver’s license credential issued by the DMV, membership
credentials issued by professional organizations such as the ACM and IEEE, and a
host of project affiliation credentials issued by professors or funding organizations.
This collection of credentials could then be used to grant her access to resources
protected by ABAC policies, such as the computing cluster mentioned above.
At first glance, trust negotiation seems to be a simple distributed proof protocol in
which all attributes relevant to a given user are managed by that user, rather than
spread across the system. However, unlike in other distributed proof systems—
such as those discussed in Section 2.1—a user’s credentials are treated as first class
resources that can be protected by release policies of their own. For example, the
student discussed abovemay onlywish to disclose her driver’s license credential to
principals who have a TRUSTe-certified privacy policy in place. Note that this is in
contrast to most other distributed proof systems, which offer little or no protection
for the facts used during the proof construction process. This flexibility to define
attribute-based release policies for individual credentials gives users fine-grained,
yet flexible, control over the disclosure of their potentially-sensitive attribute data.
Furthermore, this allows for the incremental establishment of trust.
2.2.1 An Example
To better explain the details of the trust negotiation process, we will discuss the
example trust negotiation session depicted in Figure 2.3. In this scenario, a stu-
dent named Alice wishes to access a digital library portal on the World Wide Web.
Upon requesting access to the digital library, Alice is returned a policy stating that
she must be a graduate student at an accredited university and must be willing to
disclose her permanent address (in the form of a driver’s license or passport). Alice
is willing to disclose her university affiliation to anyone, but for privacy reasons,
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Request access.
Policy: Student at Accredited University?
Passport or Driver’s License?
Student ID credential.  ABET credential.
Policy: BBB member?
BBB credential.
Driver’s License credential.
Access granted
Figure 2.3: Using trust negotiation to access a digital library.
she is only willing to disclose her driver’s license to members of the Better Business
Bureau (BBB). As a result, Alice sends her student ID credential and a copy of her
university’s ABET certification to the digital library, along with a policy indicating
that the digital library must be a BBB member. The digital library responds by re-
turning a copy of its BBB membership credential, which satisfies Alice’s policy. In
response, Alice discloses a copy of her driver’s license credential and is granted
access to the digital library.
The trust negotiation process has a number of important benefits. First, it allows
for the establishment of bilateral trust between the participants in the protocol. That
is, either participant can request credentials from the other participant; this is in
contrast to more traditional authorization systems in which the onus is on the user
to prove that they are authorized to access the resource. Second, trust is established
incrementally. In the above example, Alice released her attribute certificates to the
digital library gradually, rather than all at once. Lastly, the trust negotiation process
is automated. That is, policies can be verified and disclosures can be made by an
agent process acting on a user’s behalf.
A principal must not only disclose credentials during the trust negotiation process,
but must also prove ownership of these credentials. For example, consider the case
in which Alice’s student ID credential is encoded as an X.509 certificate. In addi-
tion to disclosing this certificate to the digital library, Alice would digitally sign a
challenge and disclose the result to the digital library. The digital library could use
Alice’s student ID credential to verify this challenge, which proves that the princi-
pal who disclosed the credential is in fact the owner of the credential. This proof of
ownership mechanism prevents a malicious principal from attempting to pass off
other principals’ credentials as their own and thus plays an important role in the
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trust negotiation process.
The above example trust negotiation session alludes to two important connections
between trust negotiation and the types of distributed proof protocols discussed
in Section 2.1. First and foremost, the end result of a trust negotiation session is a
formal proof of authorization. Each resource is protected by a policy that identi-
fies the attribute credentials that must be disclosed in order to access the resource,
along with the trusted certifiers of those attributes. The collection of credentials
that is eventually used to satisfy a policy is thus a formal proof of authorization,
since the validity of these credentials can be checked by verifying that the issuer
signature on each credential is correct. Second, the above example illustrates that
new credentials may need to be obtained at runtime. Specifically, Alice is unlikely
to have her university’s ABET certification in her collection of local credentials.
However, such credentials can be discovered at runtime and incorporated into the
trust negotiation process by using certificate chain discovery techniques, such as
those discussed in [55; 84].
2.2.2 Research to Date
Recent research in the trust negotiation area has been primarily of a theoretical
nature, and has focused on a number of important issues that provide a strong
formal foundation for the study of decentralized ABAC systems. A number of
researchers have investigated the design of access control policy languages sup-
porting a range of interesting features, including tunable constraint domains that
can be used to adjust the expressiveness/efficiency trade-off [17], flexible role def-
initions and support for concepts such as separation of duty [83], the ability to
represent both credentials and policies [19], and support for the credential chain
discovery process [57; 84]. While the syntax of these languages can vary widely,
most languages have a formal semantics based on either Datalog or constraint Dat-
alog. As a result, the specific choice of policy language does not impact the facets
of the trust negotiation process explored in this thesis.
Trust negotiation is an inherently strategy-driven process, since the choices made
by participants in these protocols control the speed with which a negotiation takes
place, as well as the amount of private information that is released. Therefore, the
design and analysis of trust negotiation strategies and protocols is an area that has
been pursued by a number of researchers with great success (e.g., see [20; 68; 69; 82;
115; 117; 122]). Analyzing the potential outcomes of the trust negotiation process is
an important part of understanding the state of an open system. By understanding
the initial states of users in the system, logics such as those presented in [24; 119]
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allow administrators to reason with certainty about the outcome of a given access
control protocol. The above results provide a strong theoretical foundation upon
which provably-secure authorization systems can be designed, built, and verified.
Some of the techniques discussed in the trust negotiation literature have also been
shown to be viable solutions for real-world systems through a series of implemen-
tations (such as those presented in [20; 58; 67; 118]) that demonstrate the feasibility
of using these theoretical advances. However, after several years of research, trust
negotiation protocols have yet to make their way into the mainstream. In the re-
mainder of this thesis, we seek to facilitate the design, implementation, analysis,
and optimization of trust negotiation systems. Specifically, we will address gaps
that exist between the theoretical models of trust negotiation systems and real-life
asynchronous distributed systems (Chapter 3), provide a means of auditing de-
centralized ABAC systems in the absence of concrete user identifiers (Chapter 5),
develop a framework for investigating the systems issues associated with trust ne-
gotiation (Chapter 6), and show how the most expensive portion of the trust ne-
gotiation process can be greatly optimized without sacrificing correctness or com-
pleteness (Chapter 7).
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3 Safety and Consistency in
Certificate-Based ABAC Systems
It’s not what you look at that matters, it’s what you see.
—Henry David Thoreau
As discussed in Chapter 2, decentralized ABAC approaches are characterized by
networked entities cooperating to form proofs of authorization that are justified by
collections of certified attributes. These attributes may be obtained through inter-
actions with any number of external entities and are collected and validated over
a variable-length window of time. Though the collections of credentials in some
ways resemble partial system snapshots, current trust negotiation and distributed
proof systems lack the notion of a consistent global state in which the satisfaction
of authorization policies should be checked.
In this chapter, we argue that unlike the notions of consistency studied in other
areas of distributed computing, the level of consistency required during policy
evaluation is predicated solely upon the security requirements of the policy eval-
uator. As such, there is little incentive for entities to participate in complicated
consistency preservation schemes like those used in distributed computing, dis-
tributed databases, and distributed shared memory. We go on to show that the
most intuitive notion of consistency fails to provide basic safety guarantees un-
der certain circumstances and then propose several more refined notions of consis-
tency providing increasingly-stringent safety guarantees. We provide algorithms
that allow each of these refined notions of consistency to be attained in practice
with minimal overheads and formally prove several security and privacy proper-
ties of these algorithms. Lastly, we explore the notion of strategic design trade-offs
in the consistency enforcement algorithm space and propose several modifications
to the core algorithms presented in this chapter. These modifications enhance the
privacy-preservation or completeness properties of our algorithms without alter-
ing the consistency constraints that they enforce.1
1The material presented in this chapter was originally published as [73] and [77].
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3.1 Introduction
It is difficult to design flexible and secure authorization systems for environments
in which trust relationships cannot be determined a priori. Two proposed autho-
rization techniques for these types of environments are trust negotiation [17; 20; 69;
82; 83; 115; 118; 122] and distributed proof [12; 91; 119]. In these types of systems,
participants collect certified credentials that describe their attributes, environmen-
tal conditions, and other state information from any number of external entities.
These credentials can then be used when attempting to satisfy the authorization
policies protecting sensitive resources in the system.
To some extent, the collection of credentials used to satisfy a given authorization
policy acts as a partial snapshot of the systemwithin which the policy is evaluated.
This is an abuse of terminology, however, as this “snapshot” is collected over a
variable-length window of time and thus may not actually represent a system state
that ever existed. In the remainder of this thesis we will refer to the collections of
credentials gathered during decentralized ABAC protocols as views. Clearly, the
correctness of an authorization decision depends on the validity and stability of
the view used during policy evaluation. If we assume that each credential is stable
(i.e., that the assertion stated in the credential remains true until its pre-ordained
expiration time) then policy evaluation can be reduced to the problem of stable
predicate evaluation on distributed snapshots [32]. However, because it is possible
for credentials to become invalidated prematurely, this somewhat naive model of
policy evaluation can erode the safety guarantees of the underlying authorization
system. That is, the satisfaction of a policy in a naive decentralized authorization
model does not necessarily imply that all credentials used as evidence to satisfy
the policy were ever simultaneously valid, let alone simultaneously valid at the
time when the policy was determined to be satisfied. This is in stark contrast to
centralized authorization systems in which a more transactional semantics for pol-
icy evaluation can be easily enforced. This relaxation of the semantics of policy
satisfaction is especially worrisome in trust negotiation and distributed proof pro-
tocols, as interactions in these types of systems typically involve multiple rounds
of interaction and credential exchange. Consider the following two examples of
the problems that can be caused by unstable credentials.
Example 1 Figure 3.1 illustrates one case in which inconsistent credential state
can cause undesirable decisions to be made. In this scenario, Bob works in the Fi-
nance department of Acme Petroleum Corporation (APeC), though he also spends
part of his time “on loan” to the PetroleumOperations group helping manage their
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Bob GeoTech
PetrolOps group credential issued
Access request
OilCorp? PetrolOps?
Purchase > $10k?
PetrolOps and OilCorp credentials.
BBB?
PetrolOps and OilCorp credentials
validated
BBB credential
PetrolOps group credential revoked
Finance credential issued
Purchase > $10k credential issued
Purchase > $10k credential
Purchase credential validated
Access granted
Figure 3.1: A graphical representation of Bob’s interaction with GeoTech.
operational budget. While consulting for the operations group, Bob is given a
PetrolOps group credential to allow him basic access to the operations group’s re-
sources. To speed up some of his research, Bobwishes to access an online geological
database provided by GeoTech, a third-party vendor. GeoTech allows operations
groupmembers at Department of Energy certified Oil Companies trial access to the
database, provided that their company authorizes them to make purchases of over
$10,000 (the cost of a department subscription to the database). Bob submits his
PetrolOps group credential and APeC’s OilCorp credential to GeoTech along with
a policy stating that it must provide proof of membership in the Better Business
Bureau to see his purchase authorization. GeoTech verifies Bob’s PetrolOps cre-
dential and APeC’s OilCorp credential and then sends Bob its BBB credential. As
a consultant to the operations group, Bob is not authorized to make purchases of
more than $200, so he should not be able to satisfy this policy. However, Bob can
make purchases of this size for the Finance group. Bob then activates his Finance
group credential (which invalidates his PetrolOps credential) and obtains a certi-
fied Purchase attestation authorizing him to make purchases of up to $10,000 dol-
lars, which he then submits to GeoTech. GeoTech verifies this credential and grants
Bob access to the database. The inconsistent system view used by the database
leads to the permission of an undesirable access.
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Alice CDC
Access request
Student? U.S. Citizen? NSF-
sponsored project?
Student and ProjectSpread
credentials.  Privacy Policy?
Student and ProjectSpread
credentials validated
Privacy Policy
Privacy policy
reviewed
U.S. citizen credential
U.S. citizen credential validated
Access granted
ProjectSpread credential
revoked
Figure 3.2: A graphical representation of Alice’s interaction with the CDC.
Example 2 Figure 3.2 shows how premature credential revocations can lead to
inconsistencies that alter the expected semantics of policy satisfaction. Alice is a
Ph.D. student studying infectious diseases at State University. As part of her re-
search, Alice wishes to access an outbreak incident database hosted by the Center
for Disease Control. The CDC requires that academic users of this data be US cit-
izens and members of an NSF-sponsored epidemiology project. To this end, Alice
discloses her Student credential issued by State University and her ProjectSpread
credential issued by the NSF. Alice considers her citizenship private, however, and
requires that she first receive a certified privacy policy that she manually reviews
prior to releasing her citizenship credential. Alice submits a policy to this effect
to the CDC. The CDC verifies Alice’s Student and ProjectSpread credentials and
then discloses its certified PrivacyPolicy to Alice. Just then, Alice’s research adviser
calls and notifies her that effective immediately, she will no longer be supported by
the Spread project; the NSF then revokes her ProjectSpread credential. Alice then
reviews the PrivacyPolicy submitted by the CDC and decides that it is safe to dis-
close her USCitizen credential. The CDC verifies this credential and permits Alice
to access the requested data, as it did not detect that her project membership had
been revoked prior to policy satisfaction.
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The problems that emerged in the above examples occur because credentials are
collected over a non-instantaneous window of time. In general, credential and pol-
icy instabilities can arise from one or more of the following four causes. First, the
natural expiration of a credential can cause problems if a previously-valid credential
expires before other required credentials can be validated. Second, inter-credential
dependencies can give rise to problems if, for example, the activation of a new role
causes the revocation of a previously activated role (as in Example 1). Third, an ex-
ternal eventmight cause the invalidation of a certain credential after it is validated,
but prior to the entire policy being satisfied. For example, the removal of Alice
from the Spread project in Example 2 caused credential revocation. Lastly, an un-
stable environment could cause policy instability if the policy is predicated on some
aspect of the environment, such as the time of day or occupancy status of a room.
Since access control policies encode safety properties that must be preserved by the
system, we refer to the above types of problems as safety problems. The rest of this
chapter focuses on developing efficient and provably correct methods for verifying
that consistent views of the system are used during policy evaluation (i.e., views
encoding combinations of credential states that actually existed), thereby ensuring
that no unsafe accesses are granted.
To the best of our knowledge, the problem of enforcing view consistency in trust
negotiation and distributed proof systems has not been discussed elsewhere in the
literature. Though similar to the consistency problems studied in distributed sys-
tems [110], distributed databases [31], and distributed shared memory [1], it is in
many ways their dual. In these previous works, ensuring a consistent global state
has been the concern of both data providers and users, as many entities can update
the values of data fields replicated at a number of sites; this provides all parties
with the incentive to cooperate. However, since a credential revocation can be
made only by the issuer of that credential (and thus consistent update sequences
can be attained trivially), the problem studied in this chapter becomes the concern
only of data consumers. In fact, the degree to which each data consumer is con-
cerned with this problemmay even vary based on the criticality of the policy being
evaluated. For instance, a hardware store offering a discount to students of a partic-
ular university will probably not be concerned if a student ID credential is revoked
after it has been issued for the semester, much less if it is revoked during a policy
evaluation; an electronic door lock protecting access to expensive laboratory equip-
ment at the university should care, however. Heavy-weight solutions that require
the cooperation of groups of certificate authorities (CAs) and users are not suitable,
as the consistency property required will vary from user to user and preserving the
autonomy of entities in the open system is of the utmost importance.
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In this chapter, we make several contributions regarding the level of safety attain-
able when evaluating policies in authorization systems that employ trust nego-
tiation or other forms of distributed proof. We present the first formalization of
the view consistency problem for trust negotiation and distributed proof systems
and show how naive approaches to policy evaluation can lead to the permission
of undesirable accesses to system resources in the face of prematurely invalidated
credentials (Section 3.2). We then define several levels of credential view consis-
tency, each of which provides different guarantees on the types of inappropriate
access conditions that can be prevented (Section 3.3). We provide algorithms that
can be incorporated into existing trust negotiation and distributed proof systems to
attain these levels of consistency and prove the correctness of each algorithm (Sec-
tion 3.4). We also demonstrate other desirable characteristics of these algorithms,
including the fact that they require only minimal cooperation between the users
engaged in the the trust negotiation or distributed proof protocol and no cooper-
ation between groups of CAs or other users (Section 3.5). Finally, we summarize
this contributions of this chapter (Section 3.6).
3.2 System Assumptions and Problem Definition
In this section, we present our assumptions regarding the open systems in which
trust negotiation and distributed proof protocols are used. We then formally de-
scribe the problem of determining the consistency level of a system view used to
evaluate an authorization policy.
3.2.1 SystemModel
An open system consists of a possibly infinite set E of entities, each of which is a
resource provider, client, or both. Resource providers are entities who wish to offer
resources or services to other entities in the system, while clients are entities that
access the functionality offered by resource providers. Resource providers may
wish to enforce authorization checks on the resources or services that they pro-
vide; trust negotiation or distributed proof will be used for this purpose, as the
lack of pre-existing trust relationships in the system prevents the use of traditional
identity-based authorization mechanisms.
We place no limitations on the temporal duration of a trust negotiation or dis-
tributed proof session other than those imposed by the underlying protocol. For
example, many trust negotiation protocols halt if no measurable progress is made
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during a particular round of the negotiation [82; 122]; we do not prevent this, nor
do we require any such constraints be in place. Unless explicitly stated to the con-
trary, we assume that the credentials used by an entity during the execution of
one of these protocols may be obtained dynamically at runtime. This assump-
tion allows portions of a distributed proof to be “outsourced” to other entities (as
in [12; 91; 119]) and permits entities to acquire new attribute certificates while a
trust negotiation session is in progress. These assumptions indicate that the col-
lection of credentials used as the view in which an authorization policy is satisfied
may be composed of the observations of an arbitrary number of entities and be
collected over a variable-width window of time.
We assume that the certified attribute and environmental state information used
to satisfy trust negotiation policies or form distributed proofs will be issued by an
arbitrary number of CAs that exist in the system. All credentials issuedwill have an
expiration time but may also be revoked prematurely by the issuing CA (as was the
case with Alice’s ProjectSpread credential in Section 3.1). In the remainder of this
chapter, we will denote the set of all credentials by C. Given a credential c ∈ C, we
denote by α(c) the earliest time at which the issuing CA would possibly consider c
to be valid. In the case of X.509 certificates [61], α(c)would be the time indicated in
the “Not Before” field of the certificate; if no such field exists, then α(c) indicates the
issue time of the credential. Similarly, we denote the expiration time of a credential
c by ω(c). We assume that once a credential is revoked, it will never again become
valid. Since only the issuing CA may revoke a credential, each CA can ensure that
all inter-credential dependency constraints existing between credentials that it has
issued are respected at all times. We assume that each CA offers an online method
that allows any entity to check the current status of a particular credential issued by
the CA (i.e., whether the credential is valid or revoked). This functionality could
be provided through the Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) [94] or by an
online CA such as COCA [123].
3.2.2 Problem Definition
Prior to accepting a given credential as evidence that can be used to satisfy some
portion of an authorization policy, the policy evaluator must first verify that the
credential is valid. In this thesis, we are concerned with two types of credential
validity: syntactic and semantic.
DEFINITION 3.2.1 (Syntactic Validity). A credential c is syntactically valid if the fol-
lowing conditions hold: (i) it is formatted properly, (ii) it has a valid digital signature, (iii)
the time α(c) has passed, and (iv) the time ω(c) has not yet passed.
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DEFINITION 3.2.2 (Semantic Validity). A credential c is semantically valid at time t
if an online method of verifying c’s status indicates that c was not revoked at time t′ and
α(c) ≤ t ≤ t′.
Informally, if a credential is syntactically valid, then it is well-formed. The seman-
tic validity of a credential at a given time means that the credential has not been
revoked by its issuer prior to that time; that is, the credential issuer asserts that the
meaning of the statements encoded in the credential are still valid. To ground these
definitions with a real-world example, in the case of credit card validation, verify-
ing syntactic validity involves checking that the signature on the back of the card
matches the signature on the charge slip, the card has an appropriate issuer logo
on the front, and the expiration date has not passed. Semantic validation occurs
when the credit card clearinghouse authorizes a transaction. Note that for a cre-
dential that contains a stable assertion, syntactic validity implies semantic validity.
We now define the more general concept of validity and derive two propositions
and a corollary that will be useful later in the chapter.
DEFINITION 3.2.3 (Validity). A credential c is valid at time t if it is syntactically and
semantically valid at time t.
PROPOSITION 3.2.4. If a credential c is found to be syntactically valid at a time t′ such
that α(c) ≤ t′ < ω(c), then c is syntactically valid at all times t where α(c) ≤ t < ω(c).
PROPOSITION 3.2.5. If a credential c is semantically valid at a time t′ ≥ α(c), then c is
semantically valid at all times t where α(c) ≤ t ≤ t′.
COROLLARY 3.2.6. If a credential c is valid at a time t′ such that α(c) ≤ t′ < ω(c), then
c is valid at all times t where α(t) ≤ t ≤ t′.
As observed earlier, each credential collected by an entity during a trust negotia-
tion or distributed proof protocol constitutes a piece of evidence attesting to a small
portion of the global state of the network. During a trust negotiation or the con-
struction of a distributed proof, these pieces of evidence are collected over time and
used to incrementally satisfy a given authorization policy. We now more precisely
define one entity’s view of the system in terms of the credentials acquired during a
particular trust negotiation or distributed proof session.
DEFINITION 3.2.7 (Credential State). Let the set T contain all possible timestamps
and the null value ⊥. The state of a credential c as observed by an entity e is defined
as sec = 〈c, r, syn, semv , semi〉 ∈ C × (T \ {⊥})× B× T × T . The value r indicates the
local time at which c was received by e. The Boolean value syn is true if c is syntactically
valid, false otherwise. The values semv and semi denote the most recent time that c was
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verified to be semantically valid and the first time that c was found to be semantically
invalid, respectively. If the semantic validity of c has not yet been checked, both semv and
semi will be set to⊥, otherwise at least one of these fields will contain a non-null timestamp
from the set T \ {⊥}. We use S to denote the set of all possible credential state tuples.
Throughout this thesis, we will use dot notation to access fields of these state tu-
ples. For example, sec.r represents the receipt time of the credential whose state is
stored in the tuple sec.
DEFINITION 3.2.8 (View). A set of credential states observed by an entity e is called
one of e’s views of the system. A view contains at most one credential state tuple for any
particular credential c.
Given the above definitions, we now have a precise vocabulary for describing an
entity’s knowledge about the state of the system. Since this state information is
gathered over time, it cannot be considered to be a precise snapshot of the global
state and thus the consistency of an entity’s view of the system becomes important
to consider.
DEFINITION 3.2.9 (Relevance). A credential c is considered relevant to a policy P by
entity e at time t if e has received c and considers the satisfaction of P in some way depen-
dent on c at time t. Given a view Ve, V
P,t
e is the subset of Ve containing state information
for credentials that e considers to be relevant to P at time t.
DEFINITION 3.2.10 (View Consistency). A view V P,te is φ-consistent if V P,te satisfies a
predicate φ that places temporal constraints on the times at which e observes the validity of
each credential c whose state information is stored in V P,te .
Definition 3.2.9 is very subtle, as the concept of relevance can vary from user to
user. For instance, a naive user might consider every credential that she has ever
received to be relevant to a policy P , while another user might only consider cre-
dentials explicitly mentioned in P to be relevant. Further, the set of credentials
considered relevant to a policy P by a single user might change over time. For
example, if Alice is evaluating the policy P = c1 ∧ (c2 ∨ c3), she may initially
consider c1 and c2 relevant to P and determine whether a consistent view can be
constructed using these credentials. If this fails, then she may decide that c1 and
c3 are relevant to P and again attempt to construct a consistent view. Consistency
is fundamentally tied to the concept of relevance by Definition 3.2.10 and can thus
be undermined by a faulty interpretation of relevance (for instance, by assuming
that nothing is relevant to P ). At a minimum, entities should consider the set of
credentials used to satisfy P to be relevant to P and may also include other cre-
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dentials in this set (for instance, credentials used to satisfy the release policies pro-
tecting credentials disclosed during the authorization protocol invoked to satisfy
P ). Resource providers have the autonomy and local knowledge necessary to de-
cide which credentials are relevant at each moment and should thus be subjected
to consistency requirements.
3.2.3 Practical Considerations for Consistency Enforcement
In this chapter, we focus on limiting the unexpected behaviors that trust negotia-
tion and distributed proof systems can manifest as a result of inconsistent views.
To this end, we define several enforceable notions of view consistency, discuss the
guarantees provided by each, and provide algorithms to attain these levels of view
consistency in practice. In proposing practical mechanisms for view consistency
enforcement, we will keep several high-level requirements in mind.
Loose clock synchronization A minimal level of clock synchronization is neces-
sary, as otherwise the expiration times stored in credentials could not be re-
liably interpreted. However, we cannot assume that clocks are closely syn-
chronized (e.g., seconds).
Minimal cooperation View consistency is a concern only for the policy evaluator.
We cannot assume that groups of CAs, groups of CAs and users, or large
groups of users will be willing to cooperate, as there is no incentive for this.
Minimal impact to existing protocols Trust negotiation and distributed proof have
been active areas of research over the course of the last several years. To en-
sure that the work done in these areas remains usable, view consistency en-
forcement should require minimal changes to existing trust negotiation and
distributed proof protocols.
We will bear these requirements in mind throughout the remainder of this chapter;
in Section 3.5 we will discuss the ways in which our solutions for enforcing view
consistency satisfy these requirements.
3.3 Levels of Consistency
In this section, we present four increasingly more powerful levels of view consis-
tency. We show that the guarantees afforded by each of these consistency levels
can be strengthened if assumptions can (safely) be made about which of the four
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reasons for credential invalidation described in Section 3.1 can be expected to ap-
ply during the course of the authorization protocol. This indicates that like many
other aspects of trust negotiation and distributed proof, the choice of consistency
level required is likely to be a strategic choice made independently by each proto-
col participant. We defer all discussion pertaining to unstable environments until
Section 3.5.
3.3.1 Incremental Consistency
Most people have an intuitive understanding of how to satisfy a policy: present ev-
idence that each clause of the policy is satisfied. For instance, if Alice wishes to cash
a check and is asked for two forms of ID, she could, for example, produce a driver’s
license and a passport during her transaction with the bank teller. The teller can
verify that both IDs show Alice’s picture and list the same home address and thus
be reasonably satisfied that Alice is indeed who she says that she is. The teller is
convinced that her view of the “system” is consistent because Alice could produce
valid instances of the required documents during the course of their interaction.
We call this intuitive notion of consistency incremental consistency. To formally de-
fine incremental consistency, we first define the predicates checked : S → B and
φinc : 2S → B.
checked(s) ≡ (s.syn = true) ∧ (s.semv 6= ⊥) (3.1)
φinc(V ) ≡ ∀s ∈ V : checked(s) ∧ (α(s.c) ≤ s.r ≤ s.semv ) (3.2)
The predicate checked(s) is satisfied if and only if the syntactic validity of s.c has
been verified and s.c was ever observed to be semantically valid. The predicate
φinc(Ve) is satisfied if and only if each credential in the view Ve was valid at the
point that it was received by e. Note that Corollary 3.2.6 is used when comput-
ing the endpoints of each credential’s observed validity period. Thus, the formal
definition of incremental consistency is as follows.
DEFINITION 3.3.1 (Incremental Consistency). A view V P,te is incrementally consis-
tent if and only if φinc(V
P,t
e ) is true.
Incremental consistency works for Alice and the bank teller, as it is exceedingly
unlikely that Alice’s driver’s license or passport will be revoked or become in-
valid during their transaction. In addition to being intuitively useful, incremental
consistency is also widely used in practice. Current trust negotiation prototypes
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Figure 3.3: An incrementally consis-
tent view.
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Figure 3.4: An internally consistent
view.
(e.g., [17; 20; 69; 118]) implement incremental consistency by validating credentials
as they are received. This approach to credential validation is also discussed in
many papers that present protocols and strategies for trust negotiations and dis-
tributed proof that, to the best of our knowledge, have not yet been implemented
(e.g., [24; 82; 115; 119], to name a few).
Incremental consistency works especially well when authorization policies are sta-
ble predicates, such as “Alice has paid her 2005 income taxes” or “process X has
terminated.” If all relevant user attributes and environmental conditions are sta-
ble, then incremental consistency allows us to conclude that all credentials used to
satisfy a given policy were simultaneously valid at the time of policy satisfaction.
This, of course, assumes that we verify that no credential expired naturally before
the final decision was made.
If policy predicates are not stable, however, incremental consistency cannot guar-
antee that all relevant credentials were ever valid simultaneously. For example,
recall Example 1 presented in Section 3.1. Figure 3.3 shows GeoTech’s view of
Bob’s credentials in this system, where the validity periods of each credential are
indicated with horizontal lines. GeoTech never observed Bob’s PetrolOps and Pur-
chase credentials to be valid simultaneously. With inter-credential dependencies,
such as that between Bob’s PetrolOps and Finance credentials, incremental consis-
tency is not always a good choice.
Although incremental consistency is the only form of view consistency supported
by existing trust negotiation prototypes, we believe that this is only because un-
til now, the issue of view consistency has not received any attention. The trust
negotiation and distributed proof literature is full of examples motivating the use
of these systems in grid computing, dynamic coalitions, and ubiquitous comput-
ing environments. These environments are all highly dynamic and, in some cases,
could involve the use of mutually-exclusive roles and access rights; under these
conditions incremental consistency is likely to be unsatisfactory. We now present
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three stronger notions of view consistency that are easily enforceable in practice
and discuss the guarantees that each provides.
3.3.2 Internal Consistency
In this section, we define and discuss a stronger notion of view consistency that
we will call internal consistency. Informally, if an authorization decision is made
using an internally consistent view, then all credentials relevant to the authoriza-
tion decision were valid simultaneously at some point in time during the authoriza-
tion protocol. To formally define internal consistency, we first define the functions
start : 2S → T and end : 2S → T , and the predicate φint : 2S → B.
start(V ) = min({s.r | s ∈ V }) (3.3)
end(V ) = max ({s.r | s ∈ V }) (3.4)
φint(V ) ≡ (∀s ∈ V : checked(s))
∧(max ({α(s) | s ∈ V }) < min({s.semi | s ∈ V }))
∧(max ({α(s) | s ∈ V }) < end(V ))
∧(min({ω(s) | s ∈ V }) > start(V ))
(3.5)
The function start(V ) is the earliest local time at which a credential in V was re-
ceived; similarly, end(V ) is the latest local time at which a credential in V was
received. For a given view, V , these functions effectively bound the duration of
the interactive portion of the associated authorization protocol. The predicate φint
holds true if and only if (i) each credential in the view was at one point observed to
be valid, (ii) the last credential to become valid does so before the minimum known
endpoint of any credential’s validity period, (iii) the last credential to become valid
does so before the end of the authorization protocol, and (iv) the minimum known
endpoint of any credential’s validity period occurs after the start of the authoriza-
tion protocol.
DEFINITION 3.3.2 (Internal Consistency). A view V P,te is internally consistent if and
only if φint(V
P,t
e ) is true.
Internal consistency does not imply that all relevant credentials used to satisfy a
policy are valid simultaneously at the moment the policy is decided to be satisfied.
Rather, it implies that all relevant credentials are valid simultaneously at some point
during the authorization protocol. Given a graphic representation of an internally
consistent view, one should be able to draw at least one vertical line that intersects
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Figure 3.5: An endpoint consistent
view.
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Figure 3.6: An interval consistent
view.
each credential’s validity interval (see Figure 3.4). If external events cannot cause
the revocation of a credential, then all credentials in an internally consistent view
can be shown to be valid at the time of policy satisfaction. However, should an
external revocation occur, this is not the case. Recall Example 2, in which all of
Alice’s credentials were valid at the start of the authorization protocol, but due to
the NSF’s revocation of her ProjectSpread credential, they were not all valid at the
time that the decision was made.
3.3.3 Stronger Levels of Consistency
In some cases, it might be desirable not only to have the guarantee that each rele-
vant credential in a given view was valid simultaneously at some point during the
authorization protocol, but also that they were all valid simultaneously at the end-
point of the authorization protocol. In others, perhaps it is required that each rele-
vant credential is valid from the time that it is received until the decision point of
the authorization protocol, as this may imply some level of stability in the system.
We will call these levels of consistency endpoint consistency and interval consistency,
respectively (see Figures 3.5 and 3.6). These consistency levels are defined in terms
of the φend : 2S → B and φinterval : 2S → B predicates.
φend(V ) ≡ ∀s ∈ V : checked(s) ∧ (α(s.c) ≤ end(V ) ≤ s.semv ) (3.6)
φinterval(V ) ≡ ∀s ∈ V : checked(s) ∧ (α(s.c) ≤ s.r ≤ end(V ) ≤ s.semv ) (3.7)
DEFINITION 3.3.3 (Endpoint Consistency). A view V P,te is endpoint consistent if and
only if φend(V
P,t
e ) is true at the decision point t.
DEFINITION 3.3.4 (Interval Consistency). A view V P,te is interval consistent if and
only if φinterval(V
P,t
e ) is true at the decision point t.
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Interval consistency clearly affords the policy evaluator a high level of confidence
in the outcome of the authorization decision. In Sections 3.3.1 and 3.3.2, we showed
that if certain assumptions could be made about the likelihood of inter-credential
dependencies and external causes of revocation, then incrementally consistent and
internally consistent views can actually become endpoint consistent. Given the
above definitions, it should be clear that the following proposition holds.
PROPOSITION 3.3.5. An interval consistent view is also endpoint and incrementally con-
sistent, and an endpoint consistent view is also internally consistent.
One could imagine an extension of interval consistency requiring that all relevant
credentials remain valid from the time that they are received until the end of the in-
teraction between the two parties participating in the authorization protocol. That
is, if Bob negotiates with GeoTech to gain access to their database (as in Example
1), GeoTech might want to guarantee that it could detect if any of Bob’s creden-
tials were revoked after the end of the authorization protocol and consequently
prevent Bob from further accessing their database. In [91], the authors propose
an authorization system for pervasive computing environments that accomplishes
this under the assumption that credential issuers will proactively push revocation
information to endpoints in the system. As discussed in Section 3.2.1, there is no
incentive for CAs to maintain the local state necessary to do this in a large open
system. In fact, the soundness of algorithms requiring these types of assumptions
depends on the reliability with which revocation information is propagated. En-
forcement algorithms for the consistency levels discussed in this chapter can be
proven sound without making such assumptions.
3.4 Algorithms for Consistency Enforcement
In this section, we discuss the enforcement of the view consistency levels previ-
ously presented. We first enumerate the characteristics of an ideal algorithm for
consistent view construction and argue that such an algorithm is likely to be im-
possible to construct in practice. We then discuss two practical algorithms for con-
sistent view construction and use these algorithms to define two extreme points on
a multidimensional spectrum of trade-offs affecting view consistency algorithms.
We evaluate the costs associated with each of these algorithms and analyze the
“distance” from these practical algorithms from the idealized case.
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3.4.1 Comments on the Ideal Case
Each algorithm that we present in this chapter, and in fact the entire notion of
view consistency, is based on the conclusions that can be drawn from the observa-
tions of a single entity. As such, the soundness of an algorithm designed to create
φ-consistent views is only one concern of interest to entities wishing to use that
algorithm. Another important goal is quantifying the completeness of this algo-
rithm when compared to an algorithm run by an omniscient entity with complete
knowledge of the state of all credentials at all times; we will refer to this as ideal
completeness. Since entities in any realistic system cannot know the global state of
the system at any given time, ideal completeness provides an interesting best case
to which the algorithms that we develop can be compared. As we develop the
algorithms in this section, we will quantify the shortcomings of these algorithms
with respect to ideal completeness. Since incremental consistency is easily imple-
mentable, we begin our discussion with an algorithm for constructing internally
consistent views.
3.4.2 Internal Consistency
Algorithm 3.1 ensures that the views used for authorization policy evaluation are
internally consistent. We make the following assumptions in Algorithm 3.1 (and
later algorithms):
• The notation←r denotes random assignment from a set. For example, s ←r
{0, 1}m assigns to s a random salt value chosen from the set of all length-m
binary strings.
• Each entity e ∈ E has a set of credentials Ce = {c1, . . . , cne}.
• There exists a globally agreed-upon cryptographic hash function h : {0, 1}∗ →
{0, 1}l where l is the (fixed) output length of h(·).
• Each entity e chooses a parameter ke used to hide the number of credentials
that she possesses.
• Each entity maintains a hash table, EntityInfo, mapping entity names to state
information. The function EntityInfo.store : E×(T \{⊥})×{0, 1}m×2{0,1}l →
⊥ stores state information. The function EntityInfo.lookup : E → (T \ {⊥})×
{0, 1}m × 2{0,1}l retrieves state information.
• Each entity maintains a hash table, View , mapping credential identifiers to
credential state information. The function View .store : C × S → ⊥ stores
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Algorithm 3.1 Internal Consistency
1: // Initialize a connection with entity e′
2: Function INIT(e′ ∈ E) = COMMIT(e′)
3:
4: // Commit credentials to entity e′
5: Function COMMIT(e′ ∈ E) =
6: s←r {0, 1}m // create a salt
7: k ← ke − |Ce| // need k fake credentials
8: for i = 1 to k do
9: ri ←r {0, 1}m // generate fake credentials
10: CCe ← {h(s | c1), . . . , h(s | cn), h(r1), . . . , h(rk)}
11: Shuffle CCe randomly
12: Send 〈e, s, CCe〉 to e′
13:
14: // Receive committed credentials from entity e′
15: Function RCV(e′ ∈ E, s′ ∈ {0, 1}m, CCe′ ∈ 2{0,1}
l
) =
16: if EntityInfo.lookup(e′) 6= ⊥ then
17: for all 〈c, r, syn, semv , semi 〉 ∈ View do
18: t← NOW
19: if c is semantically valid then
20: View .store(c, 〈c, r, true, t, semi 〉)
21: else
22: View .delete(c)
23: EntityInfo.store(e′, 〈NOW, s′, CCe′ 〉)
24:
25: // Receive a credential c from entity e′
26: Function RCV(e′ ∈ E, c ∈ C) =
27: t← NOW
28: 〈rcv , s′, CCe′ 〉 = EntityInfo.lookup(e′)
29: if h(s′ | c) /∈ CCe′ then
30: Reject c
31: else if ((c is syntactically valid) and (α(c) ≤ rcv ) and (c is semantically valid)) then
32: View .store(c, 〈c, t, true, t,⊥〉)
33: else
34: Reject c
credential state information, while View .delete : C → ⊥ deletes state infor-
mation.
• The current local time is accessible via the local variable NOW .
• Each entity detects the failure of other participants in the algorithm by using
timeouts. If the initiator of an algorithm detects such a failure, the algorithm
can be aborted and restarted. To simplify the presentation of our algorithms,
further details of this process are omitted.
Algorithm 3.1 works as follows. At the start of the authorization protocol, each
entity calls the INIT method to commit her credentials and a strategically-chosen
amount of random noise to the remote party. Each entity then stores her remote
partner’s set of committed credentials in the EntityInfo hash table. As creden-
tials are received from the remote party during the authorization protocol, the re-
ceiver checks to see if the credential was previously committed. If so, the credential
state information for this credential is created and stored; if not, the credential is
removed from View . Should one entity acquire new credentials at runtime, she
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can recommit her credential set to the remote party by directly using the COMMIT
method. If this occurs, the remote party must immediately recheck the semantic
validity of each credential stored in the current view and update its associated cre-
dential state information (lines 17–23).
This credential recommit process involves fairly high communication overheads
for the recipient, as it must contact up to |View | servers to revalidate all potentially
relevant credentials. To mitigate denial of service attacks against implementations
of this algorithm, entities should require that a recommit message be accompanied
by a credential that (i) is relevant at the moment it is received, (ii) was not included
in the previous credential set commitment, and (iii) was issued within some fixed
window of the time of the last negotiation round. This will ensure that unless par-
ties receive legitimate new credentials, they cannot force excess semantic validity
checks. We now highlight several interesting properties of Algorithm 3.1.
PROPOSITION 3.4.1. Any view created using Algorithm 3.1 is incrementally consistent.
Proof. Lines 31–34 of Algorithm 3.1 ensure that each credential used during the
execution of an authorization protocol is valid when it is received. This satisfies
Definition 3.3.1 and thus any view created using Algorithm 3.1 is incrementally
consistent.
PROPOSITION 3.4.2. All credentials accepted by Algorithm 3.1 were held by their bearer
at the time of the most recent credential recommit.
Proof. For Algorithm 3.1 to accept some credential ci from entity e, it must be the
case that e committed ci at the last credential recommit (i.e., cci ∈ CCe ). The preim-
age resistance property of cryptographic hash functions implies that to generate
some cci ∈ CCe , e is required to know ci. This means that either (i) ci was issued
to e prior to the last credential recommit or (ii) e correctly guessed the contents of
ci before it was issued. For case (i), the proposition is true by definition. For case
(ii), e must have correctly guessed the signature value that would be placed on ci
by its issuer; this is generally thought to be impossible without knowledge of the
issuer’s private key. Thus, all credentials accepted by Algorithm 3.1 were held by
their bearer at the time of the most recent credential recommit.
THEOREM 3.4.3. If e’s execution of a trust negotiation or distributed proof protocol for
target policy P succeeds at time t while using Algorithm 3.1 to enforce view consistency,
then the view V P,te is internally consistent.
Proof. We proceed by induction on the number of times the COMMIT method is in-
voked by the remote party. The base case involves one invocation of the COMMIT
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method; in this case, we will show that all credentials received during the protocol
were valid at the time that the credential set was committed. Assume that some
credential c such that 〈c, r, synv, syni, semv, semi〉 ∈ V P,te is invalid at the start of
the authorization protocol. By Proposition 3.4.1, c later becomes valid. This con-
tradicts our assumption that once a credential becomes invalid, it cannot again
become valid and thus c was valid at the time that the credential set was commit-
ted. This implies that all credentials relevant to the satisfaction of P were valid at
the time that the credential set was committed. Assume the claim is true for trust
negotiation or distributed proof sessions requiring up to n − 1 invocations of the
COMMIT method. If the trust negotiation or distributed proof session requires n
invocations of the COMMIT method, at the time of the nth recommit, lines 17–23
ensure that any previously valid credentials are still valid. By an argument similar
to that used in the base case, we know that any credentials accepted after the nth
recommit were also valid at the time of the nth recommit. Since all credentials were
valid simultaneously at the time of the nth recommit, Definition 3.3.2 is satisfied
and V P,te is internally consistent.
PROPOSITION 3.4.4. Algorithm 3.1 does not disclose credential contents (e.g., creden-
tial types or attribute values) to the remote party. Further, if h(·) approximates a random
oracle, then no entity can guess the exact number of credentials held by their communica-
tion partner during a given run of the algorithm, nor can they guess the number of new
credentials committed during a recommit.
Proof. The first property follows from the preimage resistance property of cryp-
tographic hash functions. If h(·) approximates a random oracle, then its output
distribution should appear the same regardless of whether its input is a structured
credential or a random value. This implies that an adversary cannot determine
howmany of the committed values correspond to actual credentials versus random
noise and therefore the second property holds. To prove the third property, note
that because credentials are committed using a different salt for each recommit,
unused credentials and random commitments cannot be tracked from recommit to
recommit. Note also that newly acquired credentials replace either a previously
unused credential or a random commitment. Clearly if a new credential is used,
the remote party can tell that it was in the new set of committed credentials, but
not the old set. However, by an argument similar to that used to prove the sec-
ond property, the adversary cannot tell how many newly acquired, but unused,
credentials may be in a commitment set, so the third property holds.
Although Theorem 3.4.3 asserts the soundness of Algorithm 3.1, this algorithm is
not ideally complete as defined in Section 3.4.1. That is, it is possible for all cre-
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Algorithm 3.2 Endpoint and Interval Consistency
1: // Receive a credential c from entity e′
2: Function RCV(e′ ∈ E, c ∈ C) =
3: if c is syntactically valid then
4: View .store(c, 〈c,NOW , true,⊥,⊥〉)
5: else
6: Reject c
7:
8: // Invoked at the end of the access control protocol
9: Function VALIDATEALL(RelevantCreds ∈ 2C) =
10: for all 〈c, r, syn, semv , semi 〉 ∈ View do
11: if c ∈ RelevantCreds then
12: t← NOW
13: if (ω(c) > NOW ) and (c is semantically valid) then
14: View .store(c, 〈c, r, true, t,⊥〉)
15: else
16: Fail and report that c is invalid
dentials to be valid simultaneously at the time of the last recommit even if Algo-
rithm 3.1 fails. Consider the case where Bob commits several credentials to Alice,
all of which are valid at the moment the committed credential set is sent to Alice.
However, before Alice can verify some credential c that was committed by Bob, c’s
issuing CA revokes the credential. Alice thus cannot tell that cwas valid at the time
that the credential set was committed, though an omniscient entity could. In Sec-
tion 3.5.5, we propose an online credential status protocol that allows Algorithm 3.1
to more closely approximate ideal completeness.
3.4.3 Endpoint and Interval Consistency
Algorithm 3.2 guarantees that all executions of an authorization protocol that suc-
ceed do so using interval consistent views. In general, the strategy adopted by
this algorithm is similar to that taken in optimistic concurrency control algorithms
for transaction management [31]. That is, credentials are syntactically validated as
they arrive, as this can be done without external interaction, but are assumed to be
semantically valid. When a decision point is reached, the VALIDATEALL method
is invoked to check the semantic validity of each relevant credential in the view
and terminate the protocol if any credentials are found to be invalid. Because e has
reached the decision point, it will have the clearest idea yet as to which submitted
credentials are actually relevant. If one of these credentials is invalid, however,
e can continue to search for another set that satisfies the policy; this new set can
then be checked for validity, and so on. If only endpoint consistent views are re-
quired, then both the semantic and syntactic validity checks can be delayed until
the VALIDATEALL method.
THEOREM 3.4.5. If an execution of a trust negotiation or distributed proof protocol for a
target policy P succeeds at time t while using Algorithm 3.2 to enforce view consistency,
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then the view V P,te is interval, endpoint, internally and incrementally consistent.
Proof. Line 3 ensures that for each 〈c, r, synv , syni , semv , semi〉 ∈ V P,te , the credential
c was syntactically valid at time ti ≤ r. Line 13 ensures that each ci was seman-
tically valid at some time t′i ≥ end(V P,te ) and thus V P,te is interval consistent by
Corollary 3.2.6. It is therefore endpoint, internally, and incrementally consistent,
by Proposition 3.3.5.
Although Algorithm 3.2 is sound (by Theorem 3.4.5) it is not ideally complete.
Since the VALIDATEALL method takes some finite, but non-instantaneous, amount
of time to check the semantic validity of each ci whose state is stored in V , it is en-
tirely possible that each ciwas valid at end(V ), but one such credential was revoked
before its semantic validity could be checked by the algorithm. An omniscient en-
tity could detect this event, even though it would go undetected by Algorithm 3.2.
Thewell-known limitations of causal orderings and virtual clocks [36; 70] lead us to
the following assertion regarding the ideal completeness of endpoint and interval
consistency algorithms.
THEOREM 3.4.6. Sound and ideally complete endpoint and interval consistency algo-
rithms can exist if and only if the entity e constructing the view V P,te can synchronize
clocks with the issuer of each credential c whose state information is stored in V P,te .
Proof. We first show that clock synchronization is a necessary condition for defin-
ing sound and ideally complete endpoint and interval consistency algorithms. The
definitions of φend and φinterval require that each credential c whose state infor-
mation is stored in V P,te be semantically valid at the exact time end(V
P,t
e ), where
end(V P,te ) is defined by Equation 3.4 as the moment that the last credential rele-
vant to the satisfaction of P was received by e. This implies that e and each CA
that issued a credential ci whose state information is stored in V
P,t
e must be able
to agree on the precise instant end(V P,te ) to correctly check the validity of each ci
at end(V P,te ). Since end(V
P,t
e ) depends on delays in both the network and e’s local
processing queues, causal relationships cannot be used to facilitate this agreement
and thus emust be able to synchronize clocks with each CA that issued a credential
whose state information is stored in V P,te .
We demonstrate that the ability to synchronize clocks with credential issuers is a
sufficient condition for defining sound and ideally complete endpoint and interval
consistent views by sketching a protocol that accomplishes this task. Figure 3.7
illustrates an online credential status protocol that tells the requester, e, not only
whether the credential c whose status was requested is still valid (via the valid
field), but also the most recent instant in time the credential was observed valid
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Client Service
c ∈ C -
{c, valid ∈ B, tend ∈ (T \ ⊥)}K−1Sﬀ
Figure 3.7: An online credential status protocol leveraging synchronized clocks.
by the CA (via the tend field). In the event that valid is false, then tend represents
the time at which c expired or was revoked; if valid is true, then tend is the time at
which the CA responded to e’s request.
Clock synchronization allows tend to be translated to be relative to e’s local clock;
this field can be combined with a similarly translated value of α(c) to give e an
accurate view of c’s validity interval. If the protocol presented in Figure 3.7 is
used to make the semantic validity check that occurs on line 13 of Algorithm 3.2,
e can accurately establish the concurrent validity of all credentials that make up
V P,te . This is in contrast to a version of Algorithm 3.2 relying on a certificate vali-
dation protocol like the Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) [94]. In this case,
the algorithm can fail to recognize an endpoint or interval consistent view if some
credential c is valid at end(V P,te ) but becomes revoked prior to having its validity
checked. This can occur because no causal relationship can be established between
end(V P,te ) and the validity of c; the ability to synchronize clocks removes the need
for this type of causal relationship. Since the version of Algorithm 3.2 using the
protocol presented in Figure 3.7 is still sound (by Theorem 3.4.5), this shows that
clock synchronization is a sufficient condition for constructing a sound and ideally
complete endpoint or interval consistency enforcement algorithm.
3.4.4 Trade-offs in Consistency Enforcement
In examining Algorithms 1 and 2, a clear trade-off emerges. By deferring semantic
validation checks until the end of the protocol, Algorithm 3.2 reduces the work for
the verifier by allowing her to semantically validate only the credentials that were
ultimately determined to be relevant to the satisfaction of the policy. This reduction
in work comes at a price, however. In the case that the policy being satisfied uses
guard conditions to protect the disclosure of more sensitive portions of the policy
(e.g., as in [24; 82]), optimistically assuming that credentials are semantically valid
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could leak sensitive policy information to unauthorized viewers. To correct this
problem, each set of guard conditions must be viewed as a sub-negotiation in its
own right, so that the semantic validity of the credentials satisfying the guard con-
ditions is checked before access is granted to the remaining policy. Alternatively,
Algorithm 3.1 can be modified to call the VALIDATEALL method at its conclusion.
However, Algorithm 3.1 incurs much higher overheads for the verifier, as each cre-
dential received must be validated throughout the protocol, as its relevance cannot
be fully determined until the end of the protocol.
These algorithms are two extreme points on the spectrum of possible consistency
enforcement algorithms. In some cases, an entity may prefer to aggressively mon-
itor the validity of some credentials received over the course of the authorization
protocol, while deferring checks on other credentials. For instance, for a policy
P = c1 ∧ (c2 ∨ c3), it is clear that c1 is relevant to the satisfaction of P . Thus c1
could be monitored more aggressively (using a scheme like that in Algorithm 3.1),
while checks on the validity of credentials c2 and c3 could be delayed until the end
of the protocol. Designing consistency enforcement algorithms that balance this
trade-off between relevance, work for the verifier, and information leakage will be
an interesting challenge.
3.5 Discussion
In this section, we discuss several interesting facets of view consistency. In particu-
lar, we show that the algorithms presented in this chapter satisfy the requirements
presented in Section 3.2.3, consider the effects of an unstable environment on view
consistency, and introduce the notion of strategic algorithms for view consistency
enforcement. We then comment on the effects of poorly synchronized CA clocks
and propose a novel online credential status protocol that allows Algorithm 3.1 to
very closely approach ideal completeness.
3.5.1 Requirements Revisited
In Section 3.2.3 we presented three requirements that view consistency algorithms
should satisfy: loose clock synchronization, minimal cooperation, and minimal im-
pact on existing protocols. Each algorithm presented in this chapter relies only on
its local perception of time and causal event orderings; no synchronization with
external sources is necessary. Further, only a small amount of cooperation between
entities is required for these algorithms to function correctly. Specifically, in Al-
gorithm 3.1, only the two parties engaged in the authorization protocol need to
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cooperate to form a consistent view. The only way that the remote party can fail
to cooperate in these algorithms is to incorrectly commit her credential values; this
failure can only deny her access to the requested resource. Algorithm 3.2 requires
no cooperation between entities in the system to succeed. Lastly, the algorithms
presented in this chapter have virtually no impact on existing trust negotiation
and distributed proof protocols, as they were designed to wrap the functionality
already provided by existing protocols and systems. By disabling credential ver-
ification in existing systems and using wrapper code that implements the consis-
tency checking algorithms presented in this chapter, existing systems can enforce
stronger levels of view consistency.
3.5.2 Dynamic Environments
In context-rich environments like smart buildings and grid computing systems, it
is entirely possible for authorization policies to be predicated on the state of the
surrounding environment. For instance, authorization policies may consider the
time of day or the occupancy status of a room. A malicious client can attempt
to alter the state of its surrounding environment in unexpected ways to twist the
outcome of an authorization protocol.
The environmental inputs to an authorization protocol can consist of either cer-
tified environmental information collected by the client (or some agent acting on
his behalf) or observations made by the resource provider. In the event that only
certified environmental information is used, then the endpoint and interval consis-
tency algorithms presented in this chapter can ensure that all environmental asser-
tions remain true throughout the duration of the authorization protocol. However,
ensuring that observational data regarding system context does not become invali-
dated is a more difficult task. The resource provider must either continuously mon-
itor the pertinent state information or register to be alerted should its value change.
Periodically checking the state is insufficient, as fluctuations of the value between
checks cannot be detected. If the resource provider has the capability to register
such alerts, then this mechanism combined with one of the algorithms presented
in this chapter can ensure that the consistency of their view can be protected from
the effects of unstable environmental conditions that are either naturally occurring
or maliciously induced.
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3.5.3 Strategic Algorithm Design
Trust negotiation and distributed proof are dynamic processes, the properties of
which depend on the strategies or tactics adopted by their participants [12; 116;
122]. Similarly, the level of view consistency required by a given entity is to some
extent also a strategic decision (this is a further extension of the trade-off noted
in Section 3.4.4). The levels of view consistency presented in this chapter were
designed to enforce various levels of safety, and thus our algorithms focused on
satisfying only this criterion. However, safety may not always be the only concern
for some resource providers. Rather, they may wish to enforce some level of safety
but require algorithms with stronger guarantees regarding the availability of their
services (i.e., they require an algorithm that closely approaches ideal completeness)
or privacy preservation than those provided by the algorithms in this chapter.
For instance, recall that Algorithm 3.1 allows an entity Alice to hide her creden-
tials in a set of credentials and fake commitments of size ke. To do this, however,
requires that she compute and disclose the results of ke hashes; the overhead of
this process quickly becomes burdensome as ke increases. As a more efficient op-
tion, we can use Merkle trees [88] to allow Alice to hide her n credentials in a
set of ke = 2s fake credentials with minimal overheads. Specifically, Alice need
only compute and disclose a single commitment value to hide her n credentials
and her negotiation partner need only compute s hashes to determine whether a
given credential is contained in a particular commitment. We now briefly present
this scheme, describe the upper bound on its running time, and compare it to the
commitment scheme presented as part of Algorithm 3.1.
If Alice wishes to create a commitment hiding her n credentials in a set of ke = 2s
possible credentials, she first assigns each of her credentials a random identifier
from the set {0, 1}s and then creates a binary tree with 2s leaves, where each leaf
corresponds to exactly one identifier in the set {0, 1}s. Alice then hashes each of
her credentials and places each credential’s hash value at the leaf of the tree corre-
sponding to its identifier. Each unused subtree of the binary tree is then removed
and replaced with a random string from {0, 1}l, henceforth referred to as a fake
subtree; recall from Section 3.4.2 that l is the output bit length of the agreed-upon
hash function, h(·). At this point, Alice computes the Merkle hash of this modified
binary tree and discloses this single l-bit value as her commitment.
PROPOSITION 3.5.1. In the worst case, the Merkle tree commitment algorithm requires
O(ns) hash computations to produce a commitment value for n credentials in a set of
ke = 2s possible credentials.
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Figure 3.8: An example worst-case pruned binary tree for an instance of the Merkle
commitment scheme in which an entity is committing four real credentials. Fake
subtrees are denoted by the × symbol.
Proof. The Merkle commitment algorithm achieves its worst running time when
the number of fake subtrees is maximized, as this maximizes the number of hash
operations required to combine all real credentials and fake subtrees. In practice,
the number of fake subtrees is maximized when the identifiers assigned to an en-
tity’s actual credentials are uniformly distributed across the identifier space {0, 1}s.
For ease of exposition, assume that the number of credentials held by a given en-
tity is a power of 2. In this case, the resulting pruned binary tree constructed by the
commitment algorithmwill consist of n “tendrils” of length log ke−log n = s−log n
containing s− log n fake subtrees and the hash of one real credential; these tendrils
join the leaves of a complete binary tree of depth log n (see Figure 3.8). Computing
the Merkle hash of this pruned tree then requires n(s+1)− n log n− 1 hash opera-
tions: s− log n hashes for each of the n tendrils and n− 1 hashes to combine these
n tendrils when hashing the complete binary tree of depth log n.
For Alice to enable her partner in the authorization protocol to verify that a partic-
ular credential c is incorporated in her commitment value, she discloses the hash
values of the s nodes along the path from c to the root of the Merkle tree and the
hash values representing the s subtrees connected to this path. Her partner in the
protocol can then recompute the value of the root of the Merkle tree, thereby veri-
fying that c is incorporated in this tree; this process requires s hash computations.
PROPOSITION 3.5.2. The Merkle tree commitment algorithm does not disclose credential
contents (e.g., credential types or attribute values) to the remote party. Further, if h(·)
approximates a random oracle, then no entity can guess the exact number of credentials
held by their commitment partner during a given run of the algorithm, nor can they guess
the number of new credentials committed during a recommit.
Proof. As in the proof of Proposition 3.4.4, the preimage resistance property of h(·)
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Number of actual credentials
ke 16 32 64 128 256
216 207 (0.5 ms) 383 (0.6 ms) 703 (1.8 ms) 1279 (3.4 ms) 2303 (6.3 ms)
232 463 (1.2 ms) 895 (2.8 ms) 1727 (4.7 ms) 3327 (8.9 ms) 6399 (16.8 ms)
264 975 (2.8 ms) 1919 (5.2 ms) 3775 (10.3 ms) 7423 (19.8 ms) 14591 (38.9 ms)
2128 1999 (5.4 ms) 3967 (10.5 ms) 7871 (20.9 ms) 15615 (45.0 ms) 30975 (83.0 ms)
Table 3.1: Required numbers of hashes and corresponding hash computation times
for various configurations of the Merkle commitment algorithm.
and the fact that h(·) approximates a random oracle prevent the remote party from
distinguishing between real and fake leaves of the Merkle tree. By induction, this
prevents the remote party from distinguishing between real and fake subtrees of
the Merkle tree. This implies that the remote party cannot determine the number
of real credentials committed in a particular value, aside from knowing that it is at
least the number of credentials disclosed and verified during the execution of the
protocol and less than or equal to 2s. The third property follows directly from this
fact.
Table 3.1 contains the number of hash operations required to generate Merkle com-
mitments for between 16 and 256 actual credentials hidden in sets containing be-
tween 216 and 2128 potential credentials, along with the times required to compute
these numbers of hashes. Timings were calculated using a Java implementation
executed on a 2.5 GHz Pentium 4 with 512MB RAM running Linux. All times re-
ported are averages over 10 repeated trials. The resulting running times indicate
that entities can easily commit their credentials into extremely large anonymity sets
with only minimal computational and data transmission overheads, compared to
those that would be imposed by the commitment scheme used in Algorithm 3.1.
When combined with Propositions 3.5.1 and 3.5.2, this shows that changing only
the commitment scheme used by Algorithm 3.1 allows us to tune both the perfor-
mance and privacy guarantees of the algorithm without affecting the consistency
property that it enforces. This suggests that further analysis of these types of strate-
gic trade-offs in view consistency algorithms may be an interesting area of future
research.
3.5.4 A Note of Caution Regarding CA Clock Skew
The algorithms in this chapter assume that the times α(c) and ω(c) are interpreted
relative to the local clock, as is done in commodity software like web browsers.
That is, if the local clock indicates that ω(c) not yet passed, then c is accepted as
syntactically valid. While in many cases this is a safe assumption to make, es-
pecially if online semantic validity checks are made, it can in some cases lead to
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troubles if CA clocks are poorly synchronized. For example, consider the case in
which an entity receives credentials c1 (issued by CA 1 and expiring at time t1) and
c2 (pre-issued by CA 2 and becoming valid at time t2 ≤ t1) as part of an authoriza-
tion protocol. Based on the local interpretation of t1 and t2, the validity period of
these credentials overlaps. However, if the clock at CA 2 is slower than the clock at
CA 1 by at least t1 − t2, then despite appearing to overlap, the validity intervals of
c1 and c2 never actually overlap.
Fortunately, the use of time synchronization protocols such as NTP [89] by service
providers reduces the likelihood of this type of error randomly occurring between
unrelated credentials. It is vital that CAs closely synchronize their clocks if they
issue mutually-exclusive certificates, so that no misleading apparent overlaps can
occur. Such apparent overlaps are not introduced by the algorithms developed in
this chapter, but rather by the widespread notion of using a local interpretation of
certificate expiration times. Fortunately, there is no way for an attacker to exploit
this type of error without altering the clock of at least one CA before it issues a
certificate that is subsequently used in the negotiation that the attacker wishes to
disrupt.
3.5.5 Towards Completeness for Internal Consistency Algorithms
Wenow propose an online credential status verification protocol that, when used in
conjunction with Algorithm 3.1, allows the modified Algorithm 3.1 to more closely
approach ideal completeness. Figure 3.9 illustrates this two message protocol. In
this protocol, a client provides the verification service with a credential whose sta-
tus she wishes to verify and a nonce value whose length is chosen by the client. The
service then determines the current validity status of the provided credential and
returns the credential, the nonce, and the current status of the credential signed
with its private key, K−1S , whose public counterpart, KS , is assumed to be well-
known.
Recall that Algorithm 3.1’s shortcomings with respect to ideal completeness arise
when all of Bob’s credentials are valid when they are committed to Alice, but some
credential is revoked before Alice validates it. Now, assume that each CA runs the
online credential status verification service implementing the protocol presented in
Figure 3.9. If Alice chooses a random nonce and sends it to Bob prior to Bob com-
mitting his credential set to Alice, Bob can obtain certified validity statements for
each of his credentials from their respective issuing CAs, each of which includes
Alice’s nonce. Bob can then commit these validity statements along with each of
his credentials to Alice. As Bob discloses a credential to Alice during the autho-
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Client Service
c ∈ C,nonce ∈ {0, 1}b -
{c,nonce, status}K−1Sﬀ
Figure 3.9: An online credential status protocol leveraging causal orderings.
rization protocol, he must also disclose its associated certified validity statement to
Alice. Figure 3.10 illustrates how this protocol extends the commitment phase of
Algorithm 3.1 to become a four-step process. Note that although only the initial
commitment of Algorithm 3.1 is shown in Figure 3.10, this protocol can be used for
all commitments made during an execution of the algorithm. Alice can now verify
that the credential was valid at the time that it was committed by Bob.
PROPOSITION 3.5.3. If a credential c and its associated certified validity statement
cvs = {c,nonce, true}K−1S are contained in the commitment set received by Alice, then c
was valid at the time that Alice disclosed her b-bit nonce to Bob with probability 1 − 2−b,
provided that Alice chose her nonce value at random.
Proof. Assume that Bob obtained cvs prior to the time that Alice disclosed nonce .
This implies that Bob correctly guessed nonce , which he can do only with probabil-
ity 2−b if Alice chose nonce at random. Thus, with probability 1−2−b, Bob obtained
cvs after Alice disclosed nonce . As long as Alice ensures that α(c) is less than or
equal to the time that she sent Bob nonce , then she can conclude that cwas valid at
the time that she disclosed nonce to Bob (by Proposition 3.2.5).
The above proposition allows Alice to conclude that all credentials used during
the authorization protocol were valid at the time of the most recent recommit, pro-
vided that she chooses a new nonce for each recommit. This credential status pro-
tocol allows a modified version of Algorithm 3.1 to more closely approximate ideal
completeness. An added benefit of this protocol is that it allows Alice to shift the
responsibility of verifying the semantic validity of Bob’s credentials to Bob; if Alice
is a very busy resource provider, this could allow her to increase the number of
trust negotiation sessions that she can complete per unit time. However, this mod-
ified Algorithm 3.1 is still incomplete, as each of Bob’s credentials may be valid
when he receives Alice’s nonce, but one of them might be revoked prior to his ob-
taining a certified credential validity statement from its issuing CA. This is similar
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Figure 3.10: An illustration of how the protocol presented in Figure 3.9 can be
integrated with the commitment phase of Algorithm 3.1.
to the problem discussed in Section 3.4.3 in which Algorithm 3.2 could fail because
validating all relevant credentials takes a non-zero amount of time. As in that case,
it is unlikely that ideal completeness could be reached without the assumption of
synchronized clocks.
3.6 Summary
In this chapter, we presented the notion of view consistency in decentralized ABAC
systems. We showed that failing to consider the consistency of the system views
used during executions of these protocols can cause amarked decrease in the safety
of the decisions made by the underlying authorization system. We then defined the
incremental, internal, endpoint, and interval consistency levels and demonstrated
algorithms to attain these consistency levels in practice. We proved the soundness
of each of these algorithms and commented on their completeness when compared
to an ideal algorithm run by an omniscient entity. These algorithms require at most
the cooperation of the two parties involved in the authorization process; should
any entity not cooperate, the algorithms will fail rather than violate the consis-
tency conditions that they were designed to enforce. We then explored the notion
of strategic design trade-offs for consistency enforcement algorithms. This led us
to propose several modifications to the algorithms presented in Section 3.4 that en-
hance the privacy-preservation properties of these algorithms or their closeness to
ideal completeness without altering the consistency constraints that they enforce.
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4 Generalized Safety and
Consistency Models
It is one of the commonest of mistakes to consider that the limit of our power of
perception is also the limit of all there is to perceive.
—C.W. Leadbeater
In distributed proof construction systems, information release policies can make
it unlikely that any single node in the system is aware of the complete structure
of any particular proof tree. This property makes it difficult for queriers to deter-
mine whether the proofs constructed using these protocols sampled a consistent
snapshot of the system state; in Chapter 3, we showed that this can have unde-
sirable consequences in decentralized authorization systems. Unfortunately, the
consistency enforcement solutions that we developed in Chapter 3 were designed
for systems in which only information encoded in certificates issued by certificate
authorities is used during the decision-making process. Further, we made the as-
sumption that each piece of certified evidence used during proof construction is
available to the decision-making node at runtime.
In this chapter, we generalize our previous results and present lightweight mecha-
nisms through which consistency constraints can be enforced in distributed proof
systems in which the full details of a proof may be unavailable to the querier and
the existence of certificate authorities for certifying evidence is unlikely; these types
of distributed proof systems are likely candidates for use in pervasive comput-
ing and sensor network environments. We present modifications to one such dis-
tributed proof system that enable three types of consistency constraints to be en-
forced while still respecting the same confidentiality and integrity policies as the
original proof system. Further, we detail a performance analysis that illustrates the
modest overheads of our consistency enforcement schemes.1
1The material presented in this chapter was originally published as [71] and [72].
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4.1 Introduction
The process of making informed authorization decisions in dynamic environments
where trust relationships cannot be determined a priori is widely accepted as a dif-
ficult task. This is particularly true in context-rich environments such as pervasive
computing spaces, as the set of permissible actions may depend on the physical
context of the space. This context can be sampled through the use of sensors de-
ployed throughout the environment. To address this complexity, several rule-based
systems have been designed for specifying and checking authorization policies in
pervasive computing environments (e.g., see Al-Muhtadi et al. [2], Bacon et al. [5],
Covington et al. [41], and Myles et al. [95]). Recently, frameworks for constructing
and validating distributed proofs have been proposed to address the limitations of
using centralized knowledge bases formaking authorization decisions [12; 90; 119].
In authorization systems based on distributed proving, resource access requests are
permitted if a resource owner can construct a well-formed proof tree whose root is
a logical statement granting the requester access to the resource. The topology of
a proof tree shows the logical dependencies among the facts in the tree; that is, the
leaves of this tree represent base facts, while intermediate nodes represent infer-
ences made using these facts. Such a proof tree need not be formed solely from
facts in the resource owner’s local knowledge base; subtrees of a proof may be pro-
duced by other entities in the network provided that the resource owner trusts the
integrity of information provided by these entities (e.g., see Bauer et al. [12], Mi-
nami and Kotz [90], andWinslett et al. [119]). In some systems, information release
policies may prevent portions of a subproof from being revealed to certain nodes
in the proof tree [90]. An important observation is that the logical leaves of a dis-
tributed proof tree form one possible view of the state of the environment in which
the proof was constructed. Resource access is granted because, in that view of the
system, it was possible to construct a proof tree justifying the access request. If the
facts making up a proof tree represent stable assertions (i.e., facts whose validity
will not change), then this view is actually a snapshot of the system and the seman-
tics of policy satisfaction remain the same as in centralized proof systems. How-
ever, if any facts in the proof tree are not constant, then in some circumstances, it
is possible to form a proof tree justifying access to a particular resource that would
have been denied in any centralized system. That is, an inconsistent view can lead
a prover to think that certain logical facts were true simultaneously when, in fact,
they were not. Clearly, this can lead to the permission of undesirable accesses to
system resources.
For example, consider a hospital wired with sensors such as occupancy detectors,
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location tracking devices, and door lock sensors. Now, a clinician, Alice, decides
to use the projector located in her office to review the medical records of several
patients that she is working with. In order for the system to permit the use of the
projector to view medical records, it must be the case that the occupancy of Alice’s
office is one, Alice is located in her office, and the door to her office is locked. When
Alice requests this access, the system might first check that the occupancy of her
office is one and then proceed to check that Alice is currently located in her office.
As this check is being made, Bob enters the room and closes the door behind him,
which automatically locks. The system determines that Alice is located in her office
and then checks that the door is locked; since the door is locked themedical records
are displayed on the projector. This is a clear violation of the policy protecting
patient records that might have legal ramifications, as Bob may not be authorized
to view the records being projected. In addition to this type of accidental violation
of system view consistency, intentional attacks on the system are also possible.
The adverse effects of inconsistent views on authorization systems were previously
examined in Chapter 3. In that chapter, we focused on studying the properties
of systems in which all attestations used during proof construction were encoded
in certificates issued by one or more trusted Certificate Authorities (CAs). The
solutions for enforcing the use of consistent states presented in Chapter 3 relied
on the timing and sequencing of checks for certificate revocation that can be made
using protocols such as OCSP [94] or COCA [123]. Unfortunately, the effectiveness
of these solutions hinges directly on this supporting infrastructure for checking
credential validity. As a result, these solutions cannot be used in proof construction
frameworks that rely on simple digital signatures or keyed MACs to authenticate
proof facts, including many of those designed to be used in pervasive computing
or sensor network environments.
In this chapter, we build upon these previous consistency enforcement results and
show how to ensure that distributed proofs constructed using these more gen-
eral forms of trusted information can be formed by sampling consistent system
states without impeding on the autonomy of nodes in the system (e.g., by requir-
ing participation in a wide-scale transaction-management protocol). Further, we
present solutions to the consistency problem that work even if some details of a
proof tree are hidden from the query issuer by information flow policies; recall that
the solutions presented in Chapter 3 assumed that the policy evaluator had com-
plete knowledge of the proof tree formed during the protocol. Although we focus
our presentation on authorization systems based on distributed proving, the tech-
niques described in this chapter are applicable to any system in which autonomous
entities wish to leverage decentralized information to make decisions in a poten-
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Figure 4.1: Structure of an authoriza-
tion server.
grant(Bob):- role(Bob, doctor), location(Bob, hospital)
role(Bob, doctor) location(Bob, hospital)
Figure 4.2: An example distributed
proof tree.
tially adversarial environment.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.2, we overview back-
ground material regarding the distributed proof construction protocol that we will
modify to enforce view consistency constraints. Section 4.3 formally defines our
system model and the levels of view consistency that we wish to enforce in this
Chapter. In Section 4.4, we present modifications to an existing distributed proof
construction protocol to enable the use of three types of consistent views when
making authorization decisions. Further, we present proofs that the security and
privacy properties of the underlying proof system have not been altered by our
modifications. We quantitatively evaluate the performance impact of our consis-
tency enforcement schemes in Section 4.5, and then summarize this chapter in Sec-
tion 4.6.
4.2 Background
In this section, we discuss the distributed proof construction protocol presented
by Minami and Kotz [90], as later sections of this chapter focus on modifying this
protocol to ensure that authorization decisions are made using consistent states.
Rather than presenting this proof system in its entirety, we discuss several exam-
ples that illustrate the key features of this system; interested readers can refer to [90]
for a more in-depth treatment of this proof construction system. We chose to ex-
plore the consistency problem within the context of this protocol as it allows por-
tions of a proof tree to be hidden from certain entities participating in the construc-
tion of the proof tree, including the node issuing the query, whereas most other
distributed proof frameworks assume that the querying node gathers all support-
ing evidence locally prior to making a decision. The techniques developed in this
chapter for use in the Minami-Kotz proof construction system can also be applied
to other distributed proof systems with less restrictive properties.
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4.2.1 Structure of the Authorization Server
Figure 4.1 shows the structure of an authorization server consisting of a knowledge
base and an inference engine. The knowledge base stores both authorization poli-
cies and facts including context information. The context server publishes context
events and updates facts in the knowledge base dynamically. The inference engine
receives authorization queries from remote servers, such as resource servers pro-
cessing users’ access requests. The inference engine then attempts to derive logical
proofs justifying these queries using the facts in its local knowledge base and pos-
sibly even interactions with remote parties. If the inference engine cannot construct
a proof, it returns a proof that contains a false value. In the open environment of
pervasive computing, each server could belong to a different administrative do-
main.
Rules and facts in a knowledge base are represented as a set of Horn clauses in
Prolog. For example, a medical database may define an authorization policy that
requires a requester P to hold a role membership “doctor” and to be physically
located at the “hospital” as follows.
grant(P ) :- role(P, doctor), location(P, hospital)
The atoms role(P, doctor) and location(P, hospital) on the right side of the clause
are the conditions that must be satisfied to derive the granting decision grant(P )
on the left. If a user Bob issues a request to read a medical database, the proof tree
in Figure 4.2 could be constructed based on the above rule. The root node in the
tree represents the rule and the two leaf nodes represent the facts. Notice that the
variable P in the rule is replaced with a constant Bob. A user’s location, which is
expressed with the location predicate, is a dynamic fact; i.e., the second variable of
the predicate location should be updated dynamically as Bob changes his location.
4.2.2 Proof Decomposition
Multiple authorization servers in different administrative domains can cooperate
to handle authorization queries in a peer-to-peer manner. These peer-to-peer inter-
actions are guided by each entity’s integrity policies, which specify sets of entities
trusted to handle particular types of queries. For example, if Alice specifies the
integrity policy trust(location(P,L)) = {Bob}, then she trusts Bob to accurately an-
swer queries regarding the location of other entities. In the most basic case, the
principal who issues a query trusts the principal who handles this query in terms
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grant(P, projector):- location(P, room112)
location(P,L):- owner(P,D), location(D,L)
trust(location(P,L)) = {Bob} acl(location(P,L)) = {Alice}
location(pda15, room112)
owner(Dave, pda15)
?grant(Dave, projector)
?location(Dave, room112)
(location(Dave, room112),TRUE)
Figure 4.3: Remote query between two principals. Alice is a principal who main-
tains a projector, and Bob is a principal who runs a location server.
of the integrity of the query result. As such, the handler principal need not disclose
the entire proof tree that she generates; she needs only to return a proof that states
whether the fact in the query was true. In general, however, the querier may not
completely trust the query handler and thus her integrity policies might place con-
straints on the rules used by the handler to generate the proof tree. In this case, a
more complete proof tree, whose intermediate nodes are digitally signed, would
need to be returned by the handler. This way, the querier can verify that her in-
tegrity policies were respected.
Figure 4.3 describes one possible collaboration between a querier and handler. Sup-
pose that host A run by principal Alice, who owns a projector, receives an au-
thorization query ?grant(Dave, projector) that asks whether Dave is granted ac-
cess to that projector. Since Alice’s authorization policy in her knowledge base
refers to a requester’s location (i.e., location(P, room112 )), Alice issues a query
?location(Dave, room112 ) to host B run by Bob. Alice chooses Bob, because Bob
satisfies Alice’s integrity policies for queries of the type location(P,L). Bob pro-
cesses the query from Alice, because Alice satisfies Bob’s confidentiality policies
for queries of the type location(P,L) as defined in Bob’s policy acl(location(P,L)) =
{Alice}. Bob derives the fact that Dave is in room112 from the location of his de-
vice using the facts location(pda15 , room112 ) and owner(Bob, pda15 ). However,
he only needs to return a proof that contains a single root node that states that
location(Dave, room112 ) is true, because Alice believes Bob’s statement about peo-
ple’s locations (i.e., location(P,L)), according to her integrity policies. The proof of
the query is thus decomposed into two subproofs maintained by Alice and Bob.
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Figure 4.4: Enforcement of confidentiality policies. The first item in a proof tu-
ple is a receiver principal, and the second item is a proof tree encrypted with the
receiver’s public key.
4.2.3 Enforcement of Confidentiality Policies
Each fact provider maintains a set of confidentiality policies that determine which
entities are authorized to receive the facts that she provides. These policies are en-
forced by encrypting a query result (along with a querier-provided nonce to ensure
freshness) using the public key of an authorized receiver. Each query is accompa-
nied by a list of upstream principals who could possibly receive the answer of the
query; this enables the handler to choose an authorized recipient from the list of up-
stream principals that satisfies her confidentiality policies. It is therefore possible
to obtain an answer for some initial query even when some number of intermedi-
ate principals in the distributed proof do not satisfy the confidentiality policies of a
fact provider. Figure 4.4 shows an example collaboration among principals p0, p1,
p2, and p3. When principal p0 issues an authorization query q0 to principal p1, p1
issues a subsequent query q1, which causes principal p2’s queries q2 and q3. Since
a receiver principal of a proof might not be the principal who issued the query, a
reply for a query is a tuple (pi, (pf )Ki)where pi is an identity of a receiver principal
and (pf )Ki is a proof encrypted with the receiver’s public key. We associate a re-
ceiver principal identity with an encrypted proof so that a principal who receives
an encrypted fact can decide whether to attempt to decrypt that encrypted fact. We
assume that, in this example, each principal who issues a query trusts the integrity
of the principal who receives that query in terms of the correctness of whether the
fact in the query is true or not. For example, p0’s integrity policies contain a policy
trust(q0) = {p1}.
Suppose that query q1’s result (i.e., true or false) depends on the results of queries
q2 and q3, which are handled by principals p3 and p4, respectively, and that p3 and
p4 choose principals p0 and p1, respectively, as receivers since p2 does not satisfy
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their confidentiality policies. Because principal p2 cannot decrypt the results from
principals p3 and p4, p2 encrypts those results with the public key of principal p1,
which p2 chose as a receiver. Principal p2 forwards the encrypted results from p3
and p4 because the query result of q1 is the conjunction of those results. Principal p1
decrypts the encrypted result from p2 and obtains the encrypted results originally
sent from principals p3 and p4. Since p1 is a receiver of the proof from p4, p1 decrypts
the proof that contains a true value. Since a query result for q0 depends on the
encrypted proof from p3, principal p1 forwards it in the same way. The principal p0
finally decrypts it and obtains an answer for query q0. The key observation here is
that principal p0 is not aware of the fact that the query result is originally produced
by principal p3.
This proof system applies public-key operations only to a randomly generated
symmetric key and uses that symmetric key to encrypt and decrypt a proof; that
is, a proof consists of a new symmetric key encrypted with a receiver’s public key
and a proof encrypted with that symmetric key. In addition to the public-key en-
cryption, the querier and handler principals use another shared symmetric key
to protect other data fields (e.g., a receiver identity) in a query and a proof from
eavesdroppers. We assume that the two principals share the symmetric key via a
protocol using public-key operations when the querier and handler principal au-
thenticate with each other for the first time.
4.3 Definitions
We begin this section by describing the system model within which the Minami-
Kotz distributed proof construction protocol discussed in Section 4.2 was designed
to be used. We then show that existing solutions to the view consistency problem
are not applicable due to fundamental differences between system models. Lastly,
we formally define the view consistency problem within the context of the system
model presented in this section and then define four important view consistency
levels.
4.3.1 SystemModel
Distributed proof construction protocols were designed to be used in open-system
environments consisting of a possibly infinite set of autonomous entities, E . Each
entity e ∈ E possesses one or more public key certificates that can be used to
authenticate messages signed by e or to encrypt messages that are to be sent to
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e. These certificates are made publicly available by one or more key servers or
through the use of decentralized peer-to-peer protocols. Without loss of generality,
we will assume that each node uses only one public key certificate during the con-
struction of any single distributed proof. We place no limitations on the temporal
duration of executions of the proof construction protocol, nor do we assume any
level of clock synchronization between entities in E .
All evidence used during the construction of a distributed proof takes the form
of assertions signed with the providing entity’s private key. As described in Sec-
tion 4.2, the proof construction process is assumed to be policy-directed. Each en-
tity maintains a collection of integrity policies that indicate which other entities are
trusted to answer different types of queries; adherence to these integrity policies
can be checked by verifying the signatures on responses to any issued subqueries.
Each entity e also maintains a collection of confidentiality policies that control the
release of subproofs generated by e. This interplay between integrity policies and
confidentiality policies implies that the complete details of a proof tree may not
be available to entities in the system. In particular, the querying entity will not
learn any details of the proof tree beyond those specified by his or her integrity
policies. Further, intermediate nodes in a proof tree may not learn whether the
proof construction protocol was successful, as the results of subqueries issued by
these nodes may be hidden from them by the query target’s confidentiality poli-
cies (see Section 4.2.3 for an example of this behavior). These assumptions imply
that the view consistency solutions developed in Chapter 3 cannot be used in this
environment.
4.3.2 Problem Definition
As observed in Section 4.1, the use of inconsistent views of a system during policy
evaluation can lead to situations in which a policy evaluator believes that certain
facts were true simultaneouslywhen, in fact, theywere not. We nowmore precisely
define this problem.
DEFINITION 4.3.1 (Validity). An entity e can determine that some proof fact f is valid
at time t if either (i) f is in e’s local knowledge base at time t, or (ii) f is considered valid at
time t by a remote entity who is trusted to provide information regarding f .
Asserting the validity of some fact f at a particular time t by invoking case (ii) of
the above definition is not a straightforward task. Consider the case where some
entity e issues a query for fact f to another entity e′ at time tiss. Due to delays in
the network and processing delays at e and e′, it is likely that e′ will not receive
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the query until some time t′ > tiss. Similarly, e is unlikely to receive e′’s response
to his query until some time trcv > t′. Therefore, e cannot conclude that f was
valid at either tiss or trcv; he can only infer that f was valid at some time t where
tiss ≤ t ≤ trcv. We will discuss methods for fine-tuning these types of inferences
later in this chapter. As facts are collected and validated, an entity builds a view of
the system that will be used to construct a proof of authorization.
DEFINITION 4.3.2 (Fuzzy Validity Interval). The interval [ts, te] is a fuzzy validity
interval for some fact f if f can be shown to be valid at some (possibly unknown) time t
such that ts ≤ t ≤ te.
DEFINITION 4.3.3 (Concrete Validity Interval). The interval [ts, te] is a concrete va-
lidity interval for some fact f if f can be shown to be valid at all times t such that
ts ≤ t ≤ te.
DEFINITION 4.3.4 (Fact State). Let the set T contain all possible time stamps, let ⊥
denote the null value, and let ` be a predefined length parameter. The fact state for a
fact f as observed by some entity is denoted by the five-tuple s = 〈id , e, tα, tω, fuzzy〉 ∈
{0, 1}`×E×T ∪{⊥}×T ∪{⊥}×B. The value id is an `-bit identifier assigned to the fact
f (which may simply be an encoding of that fact), e identifies the entity from which f was
obtained, tα and tω are local timestamps, and fuzzy is a Boolean value indicating whether
[tα, tω] specifies a fuzzy (fuzzy = true) or concrete (fuzzy = false) validity interval. The
set of all possible fact state tuples is denoted by S.
Entities in the system create fact state tuples as the validity of certain facts is re-
vealed during the execution of the distributed proof protocol. In the remainder of
this chapter, we will use dot notation to access the fields of fact state tuples. For
instance, s.id represents the identifier of the fact whose state is stored in s. If a
fact state tuple s for a fact f has either of its s.tα or s.tω fields set to ⊥, then no
conclusions can be drawn about the validity status of f .
DEFINITION 4.3.5 (View). A view is a finite set of fact state tuples containing no more
than one tuple for any 〈id , e〉 pair.
An entity e’s view of the system is a set of local observations that e has made re-
garding the validity of certain facts. Given that any such view contains only local
observations, it is unlikely to capture a precise snapshot of the entire system state.
As such, the consistency level of a view is of central importance. Although a view
may contain data associated with any number of facts, unless noted otherwise, we
assume without loss of generality that an entity e will only wish to enforce consis-
tency constraints on views comprised of facts associated with a single distributed
proof.
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DEFINITION 4.3.6 (View Consistency). A view V is said to be φ-consistent if and only
if V satisfies some predicate φ that places temporal constraints on the observed validity
intervals of the facts whose state data are stored in V .
4.3.3 Levels of Consistency
We now describe three increasingly-stringent levels of view consistency relevant to
distributed proof construction protocols for use in the system model described in
Section 4.3.1. We then discuss a fourth view consistency level designed specifically
for use in pervasive computing environments.
Incremental Consistency
The most basic definition of view consistency that one can imagine is what we will
refer to as incremental consistency. Intuitively, an incrementally consistent view is
a view in which each fact was valid at some point during the construction of the
related proof tree. To formally define the notion of incremental consistency, we first
define the predicates checked : S → B, fuzzy : S → B, and concrete : S → B.
checked(s) ≡ (s.tα 6= ⊥) ∧ (s.tω 6= ⊥) ∧ (s.tα ≤ s.tω) (4.1)
fuzzy(s) ≡ checked(s) ∧ s.fuzzy (4.2)
concrete(s) ≡ checked(s) ∧ ¬s.fuzzy (4.3)
The predicate checked(s) ensures that the fact state tuple s contains a fully-defined
validity interval. The fuzzy(s) predicate is true if and only if s encodes a fully-
defined fuzzy validity interval; concrete(s) is true if and only if s encodes a fully-
defined concrete validity interval. Given these predicates, we can now formally
define the notion of incremental consistency for distributed proof systems via the
predicate φinc : 2S × T × T → B as follows:
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φinc(V, ts, te) ≡ ∀s ∈ V : checked(s) (4.4)
∧(fuzzy(s)→
((ts ≤ s.tα) ∧ (s.tω ≤ te)))
∧(concrete(s)→
((s.tα ≤ ts ≤ s.tω) ∨
(s.tα ≤ te ≤ tω))
The predicate φinc—which is a reformulation of the predicate φinc defined in Chap-
ter 3—is satisfied by a view V during some interval [ts, te] if and only if each fact
state tuple in the view contains a fully-specified validity interval, each fuzzy valid-
ity interval is a subinterval of [ts, te], and each concrete validity interval overlaps
[ts, te] at some point. This gives us the following definition for an incrementally
consistent proof construction, and an associated theorem.
DEFINITION 4.3.7 (Incremental Consistency). A view V generated between the time
that a given query was issued, tiss, and the time that the completed proof tree was received
by the issuer, trcv, is incrementally consistent if and only if φinc(V, tiss, trcv) is true.
THEOREM 4.3.8. The Minami-Kotz distributed proof construction protocol always uses
incrementally consistent views when evaluating authorization policies.
Proof. Assume that the distributed proof construction algorithm succeeds in con-
structing a proof tree using a view that is not incrementally consistent. This implies
that there exists some fact f that was not true at any point during execution of the
proof construction protocol. This means that the validity status for f (which must
be true for the proof to succeed) was contributed to the proof tree before the proof
construction process was started or, equivalently, was a replayed validity status
from an earlier execution of the protocol. However, each validity status returned
by a fact provider is causally-linked to the query executed by a querier-provided
nonce (see [90]), which prevents both the incorporation of old validity information
and replay attacks. This implies that f was valid during the protocol execution,
which is a contradiction.
The fact that existing distributed proof construction protocols use incrementally
consistent views when making authorization decisions is exactly what leads to the
types of safety violations discussed in Section 4.1. This is because incremental con-
sistency provides no guarantees regarding the overlap of the observed validity pe-
riods for facts whose state is stored in V in the event that any fact used during the
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proof construction is not a stable assertion. The other consistency levels defined in
this section will address this problem.
Query Consistency
The next more stringent level of consistency that we define is query consistency.
Informally, this consistency level guarantees that all facts used to construct a dis-
tributed proof were valid simultaneously at the time that the query triggering that
proof construction was issued. We formally define query consistency in terms of
the predicate φquery : 2S × T → B, as follows:
φquery(V, tiss) ≡ ∀s ∈ V : concrete(s) (4.5)
∧(s.tα ≤ tiss ≤ s.tω)
DEFINITION 4.3.9 (Query Consistency). A view V is query consistent with respect
to a query issued at time tiss if and only if φquery(V, tiss) is true.
If an authorization policy is satisfied using a query consistent view, the semantics
of policy satisfaction in the distributed proof construction setting remain the same
as if the proof had been constructed using a centralized proof framework support-
ing transactional evaluation (e.g., a Prolog theorem prover). In the event that any
facts necessary to construct a given proof of authorization are unstable (i.e., their
value can change once set), a view consistency level that is at least as strong as
query consistency should be enforced to ensure that the satisfaction of a given au-
thorization policy carries the same meaning as policy writers and analysts would
expect it to have. In this respect, query consistency bears many similarities to the
internal and endpoint consistency levels introduced in Chapter 3.
Interval Consistency
The most stringent consistency level that we consider in this chapter is called in-
terval consistency. We say that some view V is interval consistent during some
interval [ts, te] if each fact state tuple in V encodes a concrete validity interval that
includes at least [ts, te]. More formally, we define interval consistency using the
predicate φinterval : 2S × T × T → B, as follows:
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φinterval(V, ts, te) ≡ ∀s ∈ V : concrete(s) (4.6)
∧(s.tα ≤ ts ≤ te ≤ s.tω)
DEFINITION 4.3.10 (Interval Consistency). A view V is interval consistent for a time
interval [ts, te] if and only if φinterval(V, ts, te) is true.
The above definition of interval consistency is a reformulation of the definition of
interval consistency developed in Chapter 3, altered to fit within the formalization
of the consistency problem presented in Section 4.3.2. In distributed proving, the
notion of interval consistency is useful for two primary reasons. First and foremost,
interval consistency is important in the event that a resource provider wishes to
monitor the conditions that lead to the permission of a given resource access. For
instance, the hospital smart room discussed in Section 4.1 may wish to first check
that Alice is the only person located in her locked office before allowing her to
project patient records onto the wall and then continue to monitor these conditions.
If her door subsequently became unlocked, for instance, access to the projector
could be revoked.
At the implementation level, interval consistency can also be useful in the event
that a proof tree is constructed that permits access to a given resource, but that
view cannot be shown to be query consistent. The fact that a proof could be formed
at all implies that it is possible that the facts that make up the proof were valid
simultaneously, even though this could not be guaranteed from the view used to
construct the proof. If it is faster to recheck a proof than it would be to generate
the proof tree again, then this recheck could lead to an interval consistent view
during the interval [trcv, trecheck], where trcv is the time that the original proof was
returned to the resource provider and trecheck is the time at which the resource
provider begins revalidation of the proof tree. We will explore this case further in
Section 4.4.3.
Sliding Windows of Consistency
Although powerful, the notion of interval consistency defined above may be too
strong in some circumstances. For example, in pervasive computing environments
with rapid contextual changes, fact validity statuses may fluctuate often around
some acceptable baseline; this could lead to situations in which views were repeat-
edly determined to be inconsistent and cause numerous service interruptions (e.g.,
consider a policy that is in some way predicated on the number of occupants in a
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busy hallway). Rather than falling back on the notion of query consistency, which
provides no continuing validity checks, entities may wish to enforce a level of view
consistency that provides guarantees somewhere between what is afforded by the
query and interval consistency levels.
As one interesting example, a service provider might wish to enforce the constraint
that at each time t, all facts used to justify resource access must have been simulta-
neously valid at some time t′ such that t−∆ ≤ t′ ≤ t, where∆ is the length of a slid-
ing window defined by the service provider. More formally, we define this notion
of sliding windows of consistency using the predicate φsliding : 2S ×T ×T ×N→ B
as follows:
φsliding(V, ts, te,∆) ≡ ∀t ∈ [ts, te] ∃t′ ∈ [t−∆, t] such that (4.7)
∀s ∈ Vt′ : concrete(s) ∧ (s.tα ≤ t′ ≤ s.tω)
DEFINITION 4.3.11 (Sliding Window Consistency). A view V is sliding window
consistent for a time interval [ts, te] and a window size ∆ if and only if the predicate
φsliding(V, ts, te,∆) is true.
The notion of sliding window consistency is only useful in situations where the
validity of the facts being monitored in a particular view change over time. As a
result, sliding window consistency is not a property of a single view, but is rather a
property of a series of views representing the observed fluctuations of a set of facts.
The definition of Equation 4.7 reflects this by introducing the notion of a subscripted
view. The view Vt′ used in this definition refers to the instance of the view V con-
taining information about fact validity statuses at the time t′. In Section 4.4.4, we
will see that the algorithm used to enforce this notion of view consistency requires
periodic evaluation of intermediate conditions, which is a reflection of this notion
of evolving views.
4.4 Algorithm Details
In this section, we discuss modifications to the Minami-Kotz distributed proof con-
struction algorithm that ensure the use of consistent system views during policy
evaluation. As this algorithm trivially ensures that an incrementally consistent
view is used (by Theorem 4.3.8), we will focus our discussion on creating query,
interval, and sliding window consistent views.
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Algorithm 4.1 A query consistency enforcement algorithm
1: // Receive a fact response tuple relevant to a query issued at time tiss
2: // from some entity e. Only invoked on true facts.
3: Function RCVFACT(f ∈ F , d ∈ N, e ∈ E, tiss ∈ T, V ∈ 2S )
4: trcv ← NOW
5: if trcv − tiss ≤ d(1− δ) then
6: V.insert(ENCODE(f), e, tiss, tiss, false)
7: else
8: V.insert(ENCODE(f), e, tiss, NOW , true)
9:
10: // Check the query consistency condition on a view V relative
11: // to a query issued at time tiss.
12: Function CHECKQUERY(V ∈ 2S , tiss ∈ T )
13: for all s ∈ V do
14: if s.fuzzy ∨ (tiss < s.tα) ∨ (s.tω < tiss) then
15: return false
16: return true
4.4.1 Preliminaries
In this section, we will be concerned with both the correctness and security prop-
erties of our proposed proof construction algorithm modifications. In addition to
proving the soundness of our consistency enforcement algorithms, we will also
address their proximity to ideal completeness. As in Chapter 3, a φ-consistency en-
forcement algorithm is said to be ideally complete if and only if it is capable of
constructing φ-consistent views for all protocol executions in which an ideal algo-
rithm run by an omniscient entity could construct a φ-consistent view. Further, we
will ensure that each proposed modification is a policy-safe modification to the proof
construction protocol. That is, we will show that our modifications do not violate
the integrity or confidentiality policies specified by each entity.
4.4.2 Query Consistency
We now show that with relatively minor changes, the Minami-Kotz distributed
proof construction protocol can be modified to use query consistent views when
making authorization decisions. As presented by Minami and Kotz [90], this proof
construction algorithm assumes that each knowledge base KB is defined as a sub-
set of all possible facts, F . Rather, we will define a knowledge base KB as a subset
ofF×T in which each fact is associated with the local time at which it was inserted
into KB . This allows each node to track the duration of a given fact’s validity lo-
cally.
To leverage this new knowledge base format, the format of query responses must
also be altered. Rather than an entity e responding to some query ?f with a Boolean
response b ∈ B indicating whether f is considered valid by e (as in Section 4.2),
they will instead respond with a fact response tuple of the form 〈b, d〉 ∈ B× N. The b
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component of this tuple indicates whether e considers f to be valid, as before, and
the d component of this tuple represents the length of time that e acknowledges that
f has been true, or some duration less than this if the exact duration of validity is
considered sensitive. In the event that f is a base atom, d is (at most) the difference
between the current time and the time associated with f in e’s knowledge base; if f
is the head of a Horn clause f :- f1, . . . , fn, then d is set to be (at most) the minimum
such duration associated with any of f1, . . . , fn. In the case that f is false, d is set to
0. Note that neither f nor any f1, . . . , fn need to be locally-stored facts.
Given the above modifications to the formats of entities’ knowledge bases and
query responses, we now present the details of Algorithm 4.1, which facilitates
the creation of query consistent views. In Algorithm 4.1 and all other algorithms
presented in this chapter, we make the following assumptions:
• The current local time is available via the local variable NOW .
• The absolute value of the maximum clock drift rate between any two entities
in the system is no more than some constant δ. This does not imply that
clocks are in any way synchronized, only that for each n time units that pass
one entity, no less than n(1 − δ) time units and no more than n(1 + δ) time
units pass at any other entity.
• Fact state tuples can be inserted into a view data structure via the function
insert : {0, 1}`×E×T×T×B→ ⊥. Note, for instance, that V.insert(id , e, t, t′, b)
will replace any existing fact state tuples in V that have the identifier id and
were received from entity e (see Definition 4.3.5).
• The function ENCODE : F → {0, 1}` returns an encoding of some fact f ∈ F
suitable for insertion into a view (see Definition 4.3.4).
• Each entity detects the failure of other participants in the algorithm by using
timeouts. If the initiator of an algorithm detects such a failure, the algorithm
can be aborted and restarted. To simplify the presentation of our algorithms,
further details of this process are omitted.
Algorithm 4.1 consists of two functions that are to be used by the querying entity.
Whenever the querier issues a new query, she records the query issue time tiss
and chooses a view V to which the results of her query are considered relevant;
V need not be a new empty view. In the event that the response to her query is
true, Alice invokes the RCVFACT function. If the fact provider attests that the fact
whose status was queried was valid for some duration d that is longer than the
time between when the query was issued and when its response was received, this
function inserts a fact state tuple into V asserting that the corresponding fact was
65
valid at time tiss. Otherwise, a fact state tuple encoding a fuzzy interval is inserted
into V . The function CHECKQUERY checks to see that φquery is true, as defined by
Equation 4.5.
THEOREM 4.4.1. If the function CHECKQUERY(V, tiss) returns true, then V is query
consistent relative to the query issue time tiss, provided that V was constructed using only
the RCVFACT function.
Proof. The CHECKQUERY function clearly enforces the constraint that all fact state
records encode concrete validity intervals that include the time tiss. Thus
CHECKQUERY(V, tiss) ↔ φquery(V, tiss) and V is query consistent with respect to
the time tiss by Definition 4.3.9, provided that all concrete validity intervals estab-
lished by RCVFACT are correct. Lines 5 through 8 of Algorithm 4.1 ensure that
RCVFACT inserts a concrete validity interval into V if and only if the validity dura-
tion, d, reported by the fact provider is longer than the query round trip time, even
when adjusted to assume the largest possible clock drift between entities. Since the
query and its associated response can be causally linked by nonces used in the un-
derlying proof construction protocol (see Minami and Kotz [90]), we can infer that
the fact provider sent its response to the query at some time t ≥ tiss. This implies
that the fact associated with the state tuple being inserted into V was valid at tiss
because t − d(1 − δ) ≤ tiss ≤ t for all possible values of t such that tiss ≤ t ≤ trcv
since trcv − tiss ≤ d(1− δ).
THEOREM 4.4.2. Algorithm 4.1 is a policy-safe modification to the Minami-Kotz dis-
tributed proof construction protocol.
Proof. Minami and Kotz [90] prove that their distributed proof construction algo-
rithm constructs a proof of authorization only if the integrity policies of every par-
ticipating entity are satisfied. Since Algorithm 4.1 does not alter the mechanism
through with the proof construction algorithm constructs proof trees, it does not
affect the enforcement of any entity’s integrity policies. We now show that Algo-
rithm 4.1 does not affect the enforcement of any entity’s confidentiality policies.
Minami and Kotz [90] also show that their distributed proof construction algo-
rithm constructs proof trees only if the confidentiality policies of each participating
entity are satisfied. Recall that these confidentiality policies are enforced by option-
ally encrypting query responses of form b ∈ B using a key bound to some entity
e higher up the proof tree than the direct querying entity (see Section 4.2.3). Since
the modified query responses of form 〈b, d〉 ∈ B × N returned by a fact provider
using Algorithm 4.1 can be encrypted in this same manner, each entity’s confiden-
tiality policies are still enforced. Therefore, Algorithm 4.1 makes only policy-safe
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modifications to the underlying distributed proof construction protocol.
Although Algorithm 4.1 is sound (by Theorem 4.4.1), it is not ideally complete. It
could be the case that a certain fact was valid at the time that a query was issued,
even if the validity duration reported by the fact provider is less than the query
round-trip time; this is an inevitable consequence of the use of a causal ordering
rather than synchronized clocks. Although not a violation of ideal completeness,
this algorithm can also fail in the event that the validity of some fact is not moni-
tored until the first query regarding this fact is issued. Both of these cases make it
desirable to have an efficient means of revalidating a given view, as it is likely to be
found consistent if rechecked. This leads directly to the stronger notion of interval
consistency.
4.4.3 Interval Consistency
Recall from Chapter 3 that establishing an interval consistent view typically in-
volves observing that the validity statuses of the facts comprising the view do not
change or fluctuate during the course of several observations of portions of the sys-
tem. In the distributed proving setting, one cannot simply construct a given proof
twice to establish an interval of validity, as there would be no guarantee that the
values of facts did not fluctuate between proofs or even that the same proof tree
was generated for each query.2 The requery method can succeed, however, if we
leverage caches at intermediate nodes to ensure that the same proof tree is con-
structed at each invocation and that fluctuations can be detected (via cache misses
caused by proactive revocations). The intermediate node caches proposed by Mi-
nami and Kotz [91] could be modified to suit this purpose.
Although this modified requery strategy for ensuring interval consistent views is
appealing due to its simplicity, it is in fact a worst-case strategy for a number of
reasons. First, this strategy requires excessive storage of data at intermediate nodes
which is undesirable if nodes wish to remain autonomous. Second, the requery
strategy requires that the entire proof tree be traversed twice, even though only the
values managed by the leaves of the proof tree are of any significance to whether
the proof succeeds; this results in high communication overheads. Lastly, due to
reliance on intermediate node caches, a failure of any node contributing to the proof
tree can cause the revalidation process to fail.
Assuming that the rules of inference dictating the structure of a proof tree are not
2Recall that the portions of the proof tree outside of the querier’s integrity policies are unknown
to the querier; these portions of the proof tree may differ between invocations and go undetected.
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revoked over time, we can design a more optimal strategy for ensuring interval
consistent views. Specifically, we can alter the proof construction protocol in such
a way as that the querying entity would learn not only whether a proof succeeded,
but also a set of association tuples, each of which binds the identity of some leaf
entity e in the proof tree to a fact identifier that can be used to recheck the sta-
tus of the fact provided by e. This strategy eliminates the need for intermediate
node caches, incurs the lowest possible overall communication overheads during
a proof recheck, and fails only if a data-providing entity fails. Even though this
leaf exposure strategy is optimal in many respects, it can potentially violate the
confidentiality policies of the leaf entities.
In an attempt to balance the efficiency of the leaf exposure strategy with the pri-
vacy preservation of the requery strategy, we propose the leaf indirection strategy
for constructing interval consistent views. As was the case with the query enforce-
ment strategy presented in Section 4.4.2, we require slight modifications to formats
of the entities’ knowledge bases and query responses.3 Wewill define a knowledge
base KB as a subset of F × {0, 1}` in which facts are associated with some locally-
unique identifier. It is important that each time a fact is inserted into a knowledge
base, it is associated with a previously-unused local identifier in {0, 1}`. Further,
an entity ewill respond to a query of the form ?f with a response tuple of the form
〈b, (〈e′, id〉)Kq〉 ∈ B × {0, 1}n. The b component of this tuple indicates whether e
considers f to be valid, as in the unmodified proof system. The e′ and id compo-
nents of this tuple form an association tuple from the set E × {0, 1}`, as described
above, though this association tuple is encrypted with the public key of the original
querying entity, q. As in the leaf exposure strategy, e may choose to bind herself
to the proof tree, in which case e′ = e and id is set to the identifier currently as-
sociated with f in e’s knowledge base. However, e can instead choose a trusted
indirect entity, ie, at random, obtain a nonce n from ie, and bind ie to the proof tree
by setting e′ = ie and id = n. Each indirect entity maintains a small remote cache
that associates locally-chosen nonces with 〈entity, fact identifier〉 pairs to facilitate
the proof recheck process.
The leaf-indirection strategy for constructing interval consistent views is imple-
mented by Algorithm 4.2. Prior to explaining this algorithm in detail, we first as-
sume that entities have access to the following local data structures and methods,
in addition to those required in Section 4.4.2:
3Although the modifications required for the leaf indirection strategy are presented indepen-
dently of the modifications required for query consistency, this need not be the case. In practice,
both sets of modifications can be used together to allow for the creation of either query or interval
consistent views.
68
• Each entity maintains a set of locally-trusted indirect entities, Indirect .
• The symbol ←r denotes random assignment from some set. For example,
e←r Indirect chooses a randommember from the set of trusted indirect enti-
ties.
• An entity’s node identifier can be accessed via the local variableME .
• The function GETFRESHNONCE: ⊥ → {0, 1}` chooses a previously unused
identifier to be associated with some fact or fact provider.
• The local knowledge base is accessible via the data structure KB . The func-
tion KB .contains : {0, 1}` → B checks whether the fact associated with a
given identifier is currently in the local knowledge base.
• An entity’s remote cache is accessible via the RemoteCache data structure.
This data structure has member functions insert : {0, 1}` × E × {0, 1}` → ⊥,
contains : {0, 1}` → B, lookup : {0, 1}` → E ×{0, 1}`, and delete : {0, 1}` → ⊥.
Algorithm 4.2 works as follows. An entity contributing a base fact to some proof
tree invokes the GENERATEASSOCIATION function to generate the association tuple
that will be propagated back up the proof tree to the initial querier. If the entity q
for whom this association tuple is being prepared is authorized by the local entity’s
confidentiality policies to learn the value of the fact associatedwith id , this function
binds the local entity to the provided fact identifier. If q is not authorized to learn
of the local entity’s involvement in the proof process, a randomly-chosen trusted
indirect entity is bound to the proof tree via a call to the INSERTREMOTE(e, id)
function. This function triggers the execution of the INSERTASSOCIATION function
at the entity e; INSERTASSOCIATION chooses a fresh nonce and binds this to the
pair 〈e′, id〉, where e′ is the entity who called INSERTREMOTE(e, id). The nonce is
then returned to the entity e′. The initial querier thus receives both the proof tree
constructed by the algorithm discussed in Section 4.2 and a list of association tuples
binding either leaf entities or indirect leaf entities to the proof tree. Each of these
association tuples is used to construct fact state tuples in some view V by using the
RCVASSOC function.
Once the view V contains all of the necessary fact state tuples, the initial querier
can then attempt to establish an interval of consistency through one or more calls to
the RECHECKVIEW(V ) function. For each fact state tuple s ∈ V , this function uses
the ASKREMOTE function to query the remote entity s.e to see if the fact associated
with s.id is still valid. If the fact associated with s is still valid, then the validity
interval in s is updated. Fuzzy validity intervals are turned into concrete validity
intervals ranging from the end of the fuzzy interval until the time that the recheck
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Algorithm 4.2 An interval consistency enforcement algorithm
1: // Generate an association tuple for the fact associated with identifier id
2: // to be sent to the initial querying entity q
3: Function GENERATEASSOCIATION(id ∈ {0, 1}`, q ∈ E)
4: if q not authorized to learn fact associated with id then
5: e←r Indirect
6: id ′ ← INSERTREMOTE(e, id)
7: return 〈e, id ′〉
8: else
9: return 〈ME , id〉
10:
11: // Accepts an entry to the RemoteCache table after
12: // entity e calls INSERTREMOTE
13: Function INSERTASSOCIATION(e ∈ E, id ∈ {0, 1}`)
14: id ′ ← GETFRESHNONCE()
15: RemoteCache.insert(id ′, e, id)
16: return id ′
17:
18: // Insert a fact state tuple associated with the association record 〈e, id〉
19: // bound to a query issued at time tiss into the view V .
20: Function RCVASSOC(〈e, id〉 ∈ E × {0, 1}`, tiss ∈ T, V ∈ 2S)
21: V .insert(id , e, tiss,NOW , true)
22:
23: // Recheck the fact tuples making up a view V
24: Function RECHECKVIEW(V ∈ 2S )
25: for all s ∈ V do
26: t← NOW
27: if ASKREMOTE(s.id , s.e) then
28: if s.fuzzy then
29: V.insert(s.id , s.e, s.tω , t, false)
30: else
31: V.insert(s.id , s.e, s.tα, t, false)
32:
33: // Revalidate the fact identified by id
34: Function RECHECKFACT(id ∈ {0, 1}`)
35: if KB .contains(id) then
36: return true
37: if RemoteCache.contains(id) then
38: 〈e, id ′〉 ← RemoteCache.lookup(id)
39: b← ASKREMOTE(e, id ′)
40: if ¬b then
41: RemoteCache.delete(id)
42: return b
43: else
44: return false
45:
46: // Check the interval consistency condition on a view V relative
47: // to the time interval [ts, te]
48: Function CHECKINTERVAL(V ∈ 2S , ts ∈ T, te ∈ T )
49: for all s ∈ V do
50: if s.fuzzy ∨ (ts < s.tα) ∨ (s.tω < te) then
51: return false
52: return true
was invoked; concrete validity intervals are just extended. The ASKREMOTE(id , e)
function works by invoking the RECHECKFACT(id) function at the entity e. This
function returns true if the fact associated with id is still in e’s local knowledge base
or in the knowledge base of the entity associated with the nonce id in e’s remote
cache, and returns false otherwise. The function CHECKINTERVAL(V ) checks to see
that φinterval(V ) holds, as defined by Equation 4.6.
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THEOREM 4.4.3. If the function CHECKINTERVAL(V, ts, te) returns true, then V is in-
terval consistent on the interval [ts, te] provided that V was constructed using only calls to
the RCVASSOC and RECHECKVIEW functions.
Proof. The CHECKINTERVAL(V, ts, te) function enforces the constraint that all fact
state tuples in V encode concrete validity intervals that include at least the interval
[ts, te]. Therefore, CHECKINTERVAL(V, ts, te) ↔ φinterval(V, ts, te), which implies
that V is interval consistent on the interval [ts, te] by Definition 4.3.10, provided
that all concrete validity intervals established by RCVASSOC and RECHECKVIEW
are correct. RCVASSOC(〈e, id〉, tiss) inserts a fuzzy validity interval bounded by the
query issue time, tiss, and the association tuple receipt time for the fact f described
by identifier id . This is a legitimate action, as nonces used by the underlying proof
construction protocol (see [90]) allow us to causally link the query and its response
and therefore establish that the fact provider asserted f ’s validity at some time
t ≥ tiss. We must now show that RECHECKVIEW updates these fuzzy intervals
correctly.
Assuming that the ASKREMOTE function correctly determines whether a given fact
is still true at the providing entity, RECHECKVIEW extends the validity interval
for each fact state tuple whose corresponding fact is still valid. Assume that the
recheck process for a fact state tuple s corresponding to some fact f starts when
NOW = tr and succeeds. If s encodes the fuzzy validity interval [s.tα, s.tω], s is
updated to encode the concrete validity interval [s.tω, tr], since f was true at some
time t ≤ s.tω and was not yet revoked at some later time t′ ≥ tr. If s encodes
a concrete validity interval [s.tα, s.tω], it is extended to encode the concrete valid-
ity interval [s.tα, tr]. We now show that RECHECKFACT(id)—which is invoked at
entity e by the call ASKREMOTE(id , e)—correctly assesses the validity of the fact
associated with the identifier id .
We must consider both the case in which the fact f associated with the identifier
id was originally stored in e’s local knowledge base and the case in which id was
an entry in e’s remote cache. In the case where f was stored in e’s local knowledge
base, line 35 of Algorithm 4.2 returns true if e’s knowledge base still contains the
fact f associatedwith id ; we know that f has not yet been revoked because the GET-
FRESHNONCE function ensures that fact identifiers are not reused. If f has since
been removed from e’s knowledge base, then the call to KB .contains(id) will fail.
The check on line 37 will then fail because the state tuple associated with id was
originally stored locally and thus would not be associated by GETFRESHNONCE
with an entry in e’s remote cache. This failure would then cause RECHECKFACT
to return false, which implies that RECHECKFACT performs correctly in the case
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in which the fact f associated with identifier id was originally stored in e’s local
knowledge base.
We now consider the case in which id was originally associated with an entry in e’s
remote cache. Line 38 first determines the tuple 〈e′, id ′〉 associated with the iden-
tifier id in e’s remote cache. If this lookup fails, we know that the fact that was
indirectly associated with the identifier id has been revoked, as entries in e’s re-
mote cache are only removed after failed lookups (by line 41). By reasoning similar
to that used above, the call to ASKREMOTE on line 39 will cause RECHECKFACT
to return true in the event that the fact f ′ associated with id ′ in e′’s knowledge
base has not yet been revoked. Again, we know that this is not a false positive,
as GETFRESHNONCE ensures that fact identifiers are used at most once. If f ′ has
been removed from e′’s knowledge base, but not from e’s remote cache, this call
to ASKREMOTE will return false. This will cause the entry associated with id to be
removed from e’s remote cache; RECHECKFACT will then return false, as expected.
The fact that RECHECKFACT behaves as expected implies that ASKREMOTE cor-
rectly assesses the continuing validity of remotely store facts. This, in turn, implies
that RECHECKVIEW correctly updates the validity intervals encoded in the fact
state tuples of a given view initially constructed by one or more calls to the RCVAS-
SOC function. Since views can be correctly constructed by calls to the RCVASSOC
and RECHECKVIEW functions andwe have shown that CHECKINTERVAL(V, ts, te)↔
φinterval(V, ts, te), we can conclude that CHECKINTERVAL(V, ts, te) returns true if
and only if V is interval consistent on the interval [ts, te].
Although Algorithm 4.2 is shown to be sound by Theorem 4.4.3, it is not ideally
complete. That is, an omniscient entity may have been able to observe an inter-
val consistent view even if Algorithm 4.2 fails. This can occur because the set of
rechecks initiated after the time te takes a non-zero amount of time to complete.
As with the completeness limitations discussed in Section 4.4.2, this is an artifact
of relying on causal orderings to establish validity intervals, rather than perfectly
synchronized clocks. We now show that Algorithm 4.2 is a policy-safe modification
to the underlying distributed proof construction protocol.
THEOREM 4.4.4. Algorithm 4.2 is a policy-safe modification to the Minami-Kotz dis-
tributed proof construction protocol.
Proof. As was the case with Algorithm 4.1, Algorithm 4.2 does not affect the con-
struction of distributed proof trees. Therefore, the proof given by Minami and
Kotz [90] stating that proof trees are constructed only if the integrity policies spec-
ified by each participating entity are respected still holds. We must now show that
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the confidentiality policies specified by each entity are still respected. To this end,
we must show that no unauthorized entity along the path from the querier q to
some fact provider e can learn both the fact f provided by e and f ’s validity as
reported by e. To address the most general case, we will assume that learning e’s
identity is sufficient for an unauthorized entity to infer f . We then show that (i)
each entity participating in the construction of the proof tree that is not entitled to
know f cannot learn e’s identity, and (ii) entities that do know f but should not
learn f ’s validity cannot infer it.
We first treat case (i) and show that each unauthorized entity u in the proof tree
that should not learn f does not learn e’s identity. There are two sub-cases: u = q
and u 6= q. Consider the case where u is an intermediate entity in the proof tree; that
is, u 6= q. In this case, u cannot learn e’s identity, as the association tuple that might
possibly bind e to the proof tree is encrypted with q’s public key, Kq. In the case
that u = q, we must show that u cannot learn e’s identity. In this case, q receives
an association tuple binding an indirect entity ie to the fact provided by e. Since
ie is trusted by e not to reveal e’s identity, q cannot learn the identity of e and thus
cannot infer the hidden fact f provided by e.
Case (ii) is handled by the encryption of sensitive query responses as described
in Section 4.2.3. Since the incorporation of association tuples into query responses
does not affect this encryption process, the proof construction algorithm will cor-
rectly enforce the confidentiality of responses as proven by Minami and Kotz [90].
As we have shown that each entity that should not learn the fact f provided by
e cannot learn f and that entities that should not learn f ’s validity cannot learn
it, we can conclude that e’s confidentiality policies are correctly enforced. Since
both e’s confidentiality policies and integrity policies are correctly enforced, we can
conclude that Algorithm 4.2 is a policy-safe modification to the underlying proof
system.
AlthoughAlgorithm 4.2 is a policy-safemodification to theMinami-Kotz distributed
proof construction framework, it does nonetheless reveal additional information to
the initial querying entity q. Specifically, in addition to knowing the portion of the
initial proof tree specified by its integrity policies, q learns a list of association tu-
ples declaring certain entities to be (possibly indirect) contributors of atomic facts
to the proof tree. We now prove that this list of association tuples gives q only min-
imal information regarding the structure of the generated proof tree beyond what
is implied by its integrity policies.
THEOREM 4.4.5. Given the set of association tuples A = {〈e1, n1〉, . . . , 〈ei, ni〉} associ-
ated with a given proof tree, the initial querier q learns only the number of entities con-
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Figure 4.5: A diagram illustrating several possible proof tree structures. Infer-
ence nodes are represented by squares and fact leaves are represented by circles.
The dashed lines indicate the expected leaves of the proof tree as perceived by the
querier.
tributing facts to the proof tree and, in some cases, whether the proof tree extends beyond
the proof tree implied by their integrity policies.
Proof. Assume without loss of generality that each entity involved in the construc-
tion of a distributed proof makes at most one inference step. Let the set E contain
the leaf entities implied by q’s integrity policies, henceforth called the set of expected
leaves of the proof tree. To prove this claim, we must explore two cases: |E| = |A|,
and |E| < |A|. If |E| = |A|, we know that each expected leaf node e ∈ E is either
a fact provider or the initiator of a chain of inference forming a linear subproof
whose leaf provides a fact to the proof generated by q’s query. If e is mentioned
explicitly in an association tuple a ∈ A, then q cannot conclude whether e con-
tributed directly to the proof tree or was chosen as an indirect entity for the actual
leaf, e′, of the linear subproof initiated by e. These two indistinguishable sub-cases
are shown in Figure 4.5 parts (1) and (2). Note that in Figure 4.5, each inference
node Ik is associated with a unique entity ek by our prior assumption. If e is not
explicitly mentioned in any association tuple in A, then q cannot differentiate be-
tween the case in which e contributed a fact to the proof tree via an indirect entity
and the case in which e initiated a chain of inference resulting in a linear subproof.
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If |E| < |A|, then q knows that the proof tree certainly extends beyond the proof
tree implied by her integrity policies and that at least one e ∈ E initiated a sub-
proof contributing multiple facts to the proof. In the event that |E| > 1, q cannot
infer which entity or entities in E initiated subproofs contributing multiple facts to
the proof, as the set of association tuples A encodes no structural information. If
|E| = 1, then q clearly knows which entity was responsible for initiating a subproof
that contributedmultiple facts to the proof tree. However, q cannot differentiate be-
tween linear and branching chains of inference, again, as no structural information
is encoded in the set A. This case is illustrated in Figure 4.5 parts (3) and (4). This
shows that q learns no information beyond the number of facts used in the proof
tree and whether, in some cases, the proof tree extends beyond the expected leaves
of the proof tree.
4.4.4 Sliding Windows of Consistency
Recall from Section 4.3.3 that the definition of sliding window consistency requires
the use of a sequence of views recording observational information regarding the
validity of the facts used during the construction of a given distributed proof. As
a result, the algorithm used to enforce this consistency condition cannot follow
the “construct and validate” strategies used to enforce the notions of interval and
query consistency. Rather, algorithms for enforcing sliding window consistency
constraints must repeatedly sample the state of the proof tree, evaluating interme-
diate consistency conditions all the while.
A naive approach to enforcing this consistency condition involves repeated use
of Algorithm 4.1. If a query evaluator uses this algorithm to establish a query
consistent view every τ time units for some τ ≤ ∆, it is easy to show that the
φsliding predicate (Equation 4.7) is satisfied. However, as we will see in Section 4.5,
the overhead of constructing an initial proof tree (e.g., as in Algorithm 4.1) is far
greater than the cost of rechecking an existing proof tree. This implies that this
naive approach to enforcing the sliding window consistency condition is computa-
tionally more expensive than is strictly necessary. A more cost-effective alternative
is to create an algorithm that leverages both the simplicity of Algorithm 4.1 and the
efficient rechecking process used by Algorithm 4.2.
To accomplish this, we require that knowledge bases are of the form KB ⊆ F ×
T × {0, 1}`. This allows each fact in an entity’s knowledge base to be associated
with a period of validity (as in Section 4.4.2) and a locally-unique identifier (as in
Section 4.4.3). Unlike in Section 4.4.3, however, the unique identifier for a given
fact does not need to change over time. An entity e will respond to a query of the
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form ?f with a response tuple of the form (b, d, (〈e′, id〉)Kq) ∈ B × N × {0, 1}n. As
before, the b component of this tuple indicates whether e considers f to be valid,
and the d component represents the duration of validity recorded for f at the time
that the response tuple was generated. As in Section 4.4.3, the e′ and id portions
of this response form an association tuple that provides a means for the querier to
recheck the validity of a given fact without revealing which fact is being rechecked
or which entity maintains the status information for that fact. After carrying out its
initial query, the querier will then be able to use the set of association tuples that
it has gathered to recheck the simultaneous validity of the facts in the view much
more efficiently than is possible through repeated use of Algorithm 4.1.
The above means of enforcing the sliding window consistency condition is imple-
mented by Algorithm 4.3. Prior to explaining this algorithm in detail, we make the
following assumptions, in addition to those made in Section 4.4.2:
• The local knowledge base is accessible via the the data structure KB . The
function KB .isLocalId : {0, 1}` → B checks whether the fact associated with
a given identifier has ever been monitored by this knowledge base. The func-
tion KB .lookup : {0, 1}` → B × T returns the validity status and duration of
validity for the fact associated with a given identifier.
• An entity’s remote cache is accessible via the RemoteCache data structure.
This data structure has member functions contains : {0, 1}` → B and lookup :
{0, 1}` → E × {0, 1}`.
Algorithm 4.3 works as follows. As described earlier, when an entity contributes a
fact to a proof tree, they return the fact’s validity status, a duration of validity, and
an association tuple describing how the validity status of this fact can be efficiently
rechecked. For brevity, the details of managing the remote cache that manages
these associate tuples have been omitted from Algorithm 4.3, but the procedure
for choosing indirect nodes and creating association tuples used in Algorithm 4.2
could be used in this algorithm without modification. After the querying node
receives a response tuple, they use RCVRESPONSE method to insert this response
tuple into their local view. This process represents the initialization phase of the
sliding window consistency enforcement algorithm. We now describe the ongoing
verification phase of this algorithm.
To verify the consistency of a view V constructed using calls to the RCVRESPONSE
method, the querier calls the CHECKSLIDING function, providing as arguments
the view V , a window length ∆, and the time at which V was last verified to be
sliding window consistent. This function first saves the current time and then calls
the RECHECKVIEW method. RECHECKVIEW checks the current validity status of
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Algorithm 4.3 A sliding window consistency enforcement algorithm
1: // Receive a fact response tuple relevant to a query issued at time tiss
2: // from some entity e. Only invoked on true facts.
3: Function RCVRESPONSE(〈e, id〉 ∈ E × {0, 1}`, d ∈ N, tiss ∈ T, V ∈ 2S )
4: trcv ← NOW
5: if trcv − tiss ≤ d(1− δ) then
6: V.insert(id , e, tiss, tiss, false)
7: else
8: V.insert(id , e, tiss, NOW , true)
9:
10: // Recheck the fact tuples making up a view V
11: Function RECHECKVIEW(V ∈ 2S , t ∈ T )
12: for all s ∈ V do
13: (b, d)← ASKREMOTE(s.id , s.e)
14: ts ← NOW
15: if b then
16: if ¬s.fuzzy ∧ (ts − s.tω ≤ d(1− δ)) then
17: V.insert(s.id , s.e, s.tα, t, false)
18: else if ts − t ≤ d(1− δ) then
19: V.insert(s.id , s.e, t, t, false)
20:
21: // Revalidate the fact identified by id
22: Function RECHECKFACT(id ∈ {0, 1}`)
23: if KB .isLocalId(id) then
24: return KB .lookup(id)
25: else if RemoteCache.contains(id) then
26: 〈e, id ′〉 ← RemoteCache.lookup(id)
27: return ASKREMOTE(e, id ′)
28: else
29: ERROR
30:
31: // Check the sliding window consistency condition on a view V relative to the window size∆.
32: // The parameter tlast represents the last time that this consistency condition was true. The
33: // second component in the tuple returned by this function indicates the last time at which the
34: // sliding window consistency condition was verified to hold. This can, in turn, be used as
35: // the tlast argument to future invocations of this function.
36: Function CHECKSLIDING(V ∈ 2S ,∆ ∈ N, tlast ∈ T )
37: t← NOW
38: if (tlast > 0) ∧ (tlast < t−∆) then
39: return (false, tlast )
40: RECHECKVIEW(V, t)
41: status ← true
42: for all s ∈ V do
43: if s.fuzzy ∨ (t < s.tα) ∨ (s.tω < t) then
44: status ← false
45: if status then
46: return (true, t)
47: else if t−∆ ≤ tlast then
48: return (true, tlast )
49: else
50: return (false, 0)
each fact identified in V by calling ASKREMOTE. ASKREMOTE(e, id), in turn, calls
the RECHECKFACT(id) method at entity e, which looks up the validity of the fact
associated with the identifier id in e’s knowledge base or in the knowledge base of
the entity identified by e’s RemoteCache object, and then returns this status to the
querier. Note that unlike its counterpart in Algorithm 4.2, RECHECKFACT does not
remove entries from an entity’s RemoteCache object if the remote lookup returns a
false value, as validity fluctuations are permissible under the definition of sliding
window consistency; evictions from this cache will instead take place by means of
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some other strategy (e.g., LRU).
After the call to RECHECKVIEW returns, CHECKSLIDING iterates over the state tu-
ples stored in V and checks to see if each tuple was valid at the previously-saved
timestamp. If this check succeeds, CHECKSLIDING indicates that V is still sliding
window consistent and that all facts were verified to be simultaneously true at the
aforementioned time stamp. Should this check fail but all facts were previously
observed to be simultaneously valid within ∆ time units of the previously-saved
timestamp, this previous time of simultaneous validity is returned in support of
V ’s continuing sliding window consistency. If neither of these conditions are true,
then V is no longer sliding window consistent and CHECKSLIDING returns false.
Note that the second component of the tuple returned by CHECKSLIDING indi-
cates the last time at which the sliding window consistency condition was verified
to hold; this timestamp can then be used as the tlast argument in future invocations
of CHECKSLIDING.
We make the following claim regarding the soundness of Algorithm 4.3:
THEOREM 4.4.6. If the series of n function calls CHECKSLIDING(V,∆, 0), . . . ,
CHECKSLIDING(V,∆, tnlast) made at times t1, . . . , tn return the values (true, t
′
1), . . .,
(true, t′n) then the view V is sliding window consistent on the interval [t1, tn] using the
window size ∆, provided that V was initially constructed using only RCVRESPONSE,
was modified only through the above calls to CHECKSLIDING, and that tilast = t
′
i−1 for all
i ≥ 2.
Proof. By an argument similar to that used in the proofs of Theorems 4.4.1 and 4.4.3,
the RCVRESPONSE function correctly constructs the initial view V . We must now
show that the function RECHECKVIEW correctly updates the fact state tuples stored
in V . This function utilizes the ASKREMOTE function to query the entity associated
with each fact state tuple s ∈ V regarding the associated fact’s status. This triggers
the RECHECKFACT function at the remote entity, which either returns a response
from its local knowledge base or, if this node is an indirect node, queries the actual
fact provider and returns that response to the initial querier. If the fact status re-
turned is true and the associated validity duration overlaps an already-established
validity interval for this fact even after it is adjusted to account for clock skew, then
this existing validity interval is lengthened. Otherwise, if the fact is true, and the
validity duration encompasses the time t at which RECHECKVIEW was invoked
then the existing validity interval is replaced by the interval [t, t]. If neither of these
cases holds, the existing validity interval is left unchanged. Since the changesmade
to V by RECHECKVIEW are consistent with the querier’s observations and account
for clock skew between nodes in the system, we can conclude that RECHECKVIEW
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correctly updates V .
Given that RCVRESPONSE correctly creates views and RECHECKVIEW correctly up-
dates the validity information stored in a view, we must now show that CHECK-
SLIDING correctly enforces the sliding window consistency condition. We proceed
by induction on the number of calls made to the CHECKSLIDING function. To prove
the base case, we must show that if CHECKSLIDING(V,∆, 0) is invoked at time t
and returns the tuple (true, t′) then the predicate φsliding(V, t, t,∆) holds true. In
this case, the first if statement in CHECKSLIDING will be bypassed, since tlast = 0,
and V will be updated by a call to RECHECKVIEW. Now, CHECKSLIDING will
only return true if the if statement at Line 43 succeeds for each s ∈ V . Since this
test ensures that the validity interval for each s ∈ V includes the time t at which
CHECKINTERVALwas invoked, it implies that the predicate φsliding(V, t, t,∆) holds.
Assume that the predicate φsliding(V, t1, tn,∆) holds if the series of function calls
CHECKSLIDING(V,∆, 0), . . . , CHECKSLIDING(V,∆, tnlast) is made at times t1, . . . , tn
and returns the values (true, t′1), . . ., (true, t′n). To complete this proof, we must
now show that if CHECKSLIDING(V,∆, t′n) returns (true, t′n+1) when invoked at
time tn+1, then the predicate φsliding(V, t1, tn+1,∆) holds. As long as the first if
statement in CHECKSLIDING—which ensures that tn+1 is within ∆ of the last time
at which V was evaluated to be sliding window consistent—evaluates to true, then
CHECKSLIDING will update the validity intervals stored in the view and return
(true, t′n+1). If all of the validity intervals maintained by V could be extended to
include the time tn+1 then t′n+1 = tn+1, otherwise t′n+1 = t′n. In either case, the
theorem holds.
AlthoughAlgorithm 4.3 is shown to be sound by the above theorem, it is not ideally
complete. There could very well be unobserved times between calls to the CHECK-
SLIDING function in which the facts comprising V are simultaneously valid. Enti-
ties can, however, balance a trade-off between proximity to ideal completeness and
computational overhead by increasing the frequency of calls to CHECKSLIDING.
We now prove that Algorithm 4.3 is a policy-safe modification to the Minami-Kotz
distributed proof construction protocol.
THEOREM 4.4.7. Algorithm 4.3 is a policy-safe modification to the Minami-Kotz dis-
tributed proof construction protocol.
Proof. Algorithm 4.3 does not affect the construction of distributed proofs, so all
integrity policies are still respected. To show that the confidentiality policies of
nodes in the system are respected by Algorithm 4.3, we note that the only differ-
ence between the recheck procedure followed by this algorithm and that followed
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by Algorithm 4.2 is that this algorithm also reveals a validity duration in addition
to the fact status. Since disclosing this duration to the querying entity does not
reveal any more confidential information than revealing the status of a given fact,
an argument identical to that used in the proof of Theorem 4.4.4 shows that Algo-
rithm 4.3 also respects each entity’s confidentiality policies.
4.5 Evaluation
In this section, wemeasure the performance impact of our consistency enforcement
algorithms. The environment in which we ran our tests consisted of a 25 node
cluster connected with 100Mbit Ethernet. Each node has a 3.2GHz Intel Pentium
D 940 dual-core processor and 2GB RAM, and runs RedHat Linux AS 4 and Sun
Microsystems’ Java runtime (v1.4.2). Our system has approximately 12,500 lines of
Java code, of which about 600 lines represent extensions to the core implementation
of the proof construction system described by Minami and Kotz [91]. We used the
Java Cryptographic Extension (JCE) framework to implement RSA and Triple-DES
(TDES) cryptographic operations. A 1024-bit public key whose public exponent is
fixed to 65537 was used in all of our experiments and the RSA signing operation
used MD5 [103] to compute the hash value for each message to be signed. On this
hardware, the RSA signature and verification operations take 6.62 ms and 0.62 ms,
respectively. We used Outer-CBC TDES in EDE mode [43] to perform symmetric
key operations. The length of our DES keys was 192 bits, and the padding opera-
tion in TDES operations conforms to RFC 1423 [6].
During our experiments, wemeasured the latency of constructing distributed proof
trees using two different strategies to ensure interval consistency. These experi-
ments utilized 25 servers, each of which was run by a different principal. Each
query issued during our experiments was of the form ?grant(P,R) where P is a
principal and R is a resource. The body of each rule in each knowledge base is of
the form a0(c0), . . . , an−1(cn−1), where each ai is a predicate symbol and each ci is
a constant. Our experiments attempted to create proof trees containing up to 35
nodes. We believe that proof trees of this size are significantly larger than would
be required in most applications, thus, our results should provide guidelines about
the worst-case latency for a wide array of practical applications. Authorization,
confidentiality, and integrity policies were generated for each of these principals
automatically and in such a fashion as to ensure that valid proof trees of the appro-
priate size could be constructed. For each size of proof tree analyzed during these
experiments, measurements were taken during the construction of ten different
proof trees of varying internal structure.
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Figure 4.6: Latency for handling queries.
Figure 4.6 compares the query-handling latencies of three different proof construc-
tion algorithms; each data point is an average of 50 runs (5 runs for each of the
10 different proof trees generated per proof size). The proof construction curve il-
lustrates the cost of generating the proof tree corresponding to some initial query.
Note that unless Algorithm 4.1 is used, no guarantees about the consistency level
of the view used to construct these proof trees can be made. The leaf exposure curve
illustrates the cost of using the leaf exposure strategy to guarantee that proofs are
generated using interval consistent views. In this case, the identities of all leaf
nodes in the system are forwarded to the initial querier, who can then recheck the
validity of each base fact directly. Recall from Section 4.4.3 that, in many ways,
this scenario represents a time-optimal strategy for constructing interval consis-
tent views. The leaf indirection curve represents the cost of ensuring that proofs are
generated using interval consistent views through the use of the leaf indirection
strategy described in Algorithm 4.2.
Figure 4.6 shows that these two strategies for enforcing the use of interval consis-
tent views cost little more than generating the initial distributed proof. Specifically,
the leaf exposure strategy takes only about 10–15% more time than generating the
initial proof tree, while the leaf indirection strategy takes only 25–30% more time
than generating the initial proof tree. These results confirm our earlier conjecture
that the leaf indirection strategy is a close approximation of the time-optimal leaf
exposure strategy. The leaf indirection strategy is also vastly more efficient than the
naive requery strategy which, by definition, would require 100% more time than
generating the initial proof tree. Although these results depend on our specific im-
plementations of the distributed proof construction and consistency enforcement
81
algorithms, it is still interesting to note that it is possible to recheck proofs much
faster than they can be constructed; this may lead to the design of more efficient
distributed proof engines in the future. These efficiency results combinedwith The-
orems 4.4.4 and 4.4.5 firmly establish the leaf indirection strategy (as implemented
by Algorithm 4.2) as a low-cost, privacy-preserving method for ensuring the use
of interval consistent views during the construction and evaluation of distributed
proofs.
We also note that the cost of enforcing the sliding window consistency condition
via Algorithm 4.3 can be calculated using the data from Figure 4.6. An execution of
Algorithm 4.3 involving r rechecks of the proof requires the time indicated on the
proof construction curve plus r times the difference between the proof construction
and leaf indirection curves. As was alluded to in Section 4.4.4, this cost is signifi-
cantly less than using r invocations of Algorithm 4.1, which would have a cost of r
times the proof construction curve.
4.6 Summary
In this chapter, we explored the problem of enforcing consistency constraints on
the system views used during policy evaluation in an authorization system based
on distributed proof construction. In particular, we focused on enabling the use
of consistent system views when evaluating policies within the proof construction
framework presented by Minami and Kotz [90]. This framework complicates the
view consistency problem, as the confidentiality and integrity policies declared by
entities in the systemmay render the full details of a given proof tree unavailable to
the initial querier. Further, simple signed assertions are used as facts in the system,
rather than CA-issued certificates.
Within this framework, we formally defined the view consistency problem and sev-
eral important levels of view consistency. We then presented efficient algorithms
for enforcing three interesting levels of view consistency, proved the soundness
of each algorithm, commented on the proximity of these algorithms to ideal com-
pleteness, and proved that all three algorithms represent policy-safe modifications
to the underlying proof system. That is, none of these algorithms have any effect on
the proper enforcement of confidentiality or integrity policies defined by entities in
the system. We then quantitatively evaluated the impact of these algorithms on an
implementation the proof system presented by Minami and Kotz [90]; this impact
was found to be minimal. The solutions developed in this chapter generalize those
from Chapter 3, which assumed that all assertions used during the proof construc-
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tion process were encoded in CA-issued certificates and that each assertion used
during the protocol was available to the policy evaluator for inspection.
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5 Audit in the Absence of
Traditional User Identities
All the world’s a stage,
And all the men and women merely players;
They have their exits and entrances,
And one man in his time plays many parts
—William Shakespeare
As You Like It (II, vii)
The preceding two chapters showed how to develop mechanisms to ensure that
only safe decisions are made by decentralized ABAC approaches to authorization
when they are used in asynchronous distributed systems. The next logical ques-
tion involves exactly how to deploy these systems. In addition to considering ar-
chitectures and strategies for integrating ABAC approaches into existing legacy
environments (e.g., see [78; 79]), we must also consider how the paradigm shift to
ABAC systems will affect existing best practices. In particular, the lack of available
identity information in attribute-based trust management systems complicates the
design of audit and incident response systems, anomaly detection algorithms, col-
lusion detection and prevention mechanisms, and reputation systems, all of which
are taken for granted in traditional distributed systems.
In this chapter, we show that as two entities in an attribute-based trust manage-
ment system interact, each learns one of a limited number of virtual fingerprints de-
scribing their communication partner. We show that these virtual fingerprints can
be disclosed to other entities in the open system without divulging any attribute or
absolute-identity information, thereby forming an opaque pseudo-identity that can
be used as the basis for the above-mentioned types of services. To this end, we de-
velop the Xiphos reputation system to allow reputation establishment using virtual
fingerprints, rather than entities’ civil identities. We discuss the trade-off between
privacy and trust, examine the impacts of several attacks on the Xiphos system,
and discuss the performance of Xiphos in a simulated grid computing system.1
1A portion of the material presented in this chapter was originally published as [74].
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5.1 Introduction
Decentralized ABAC systems provide an effective and scalable means for mak-
ing access control decisions in open systems, but depending on their deployment
model, may have the side effect of virtually eliminating absolute identity informa-
tion. In systems where a user’s attributes are bound to a single identity certificate,
this is obviously not the case. However, in more flexible systems where users may
have multiple “identity” certificates or attributes represented by credentials that
are not linked to their other credentials (e.g., each attribute is a separate X.509 key
pair), the more traditional notion of user identity becomes blurred. This lack of ab-
solute identity can be a double-edged sword in that it increases system scalability
while also increasing user anonymity; this may not be appropriate in all application
domains.
In traditional distributed computing systems, user identity forms the basis of au-
dit and incident response systems, anomaly detection algorithms, collusion detec-
tion/prevention mechanisms, and reputation systems. As such, this functionality
either does not exist or exists only in limited form in current open system propos-
als. In this chapter, we take a first step towards addressing this problem by de-
scribing a method for the linking and correlation of multiple identities used by the
same entity in attribute-based trust management systems. We then show how these
identities can be turned into virtual fingerprints which can be exchanged between
entities in the system without leaking sensitive attribute or civil-identity informa-
tion. Virtual fingerprints act much like fingerprints in the physical world in that
they allow multiple actions initiated by an entity to be linked without necessarily
knowing the civil-identity of their owner. The virtual fingerprints derived during
a protocol execution can be exchanged between multiple users, thereby forming a
solid foundation upon which the types of functionality previously described can
be constructed.
In simple applications, such as audit logs or distributed black lists, virtual finger-
prints can take the place of user identities in a fairly straightforward fashion. How-
ever, to more fully explore the expressive identity-matching semantics afforded by
this approach, we will study the use of virtual fingerprints in a more data-intensive
application. Specifically, we will show how virtual fingerprints can be used as the
basis for Xiphos, a reputation system for use in conjunction with decentralized
ABAC approaches. Reputation systems will be a necessary part of the open sys-
tems of the future, as current research trends are beginning to embrace distributed
theorem proving approaches to access control [12; 119]. In these types of systems,
proof fragments and access hints are collected from various parties in the network
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and used to construct proofs of authorization. Accepting proof fragments or access
hints from malicious entities could have negative consequences, including poten-
tially unbounded searches for non-existent credentials and the risk of being denied
access to a resource which one is, in fact, authorized to access. We show how virtual
fingerprinting can be used as the foundation of a reputation system that will allow
entities in an open system to gain confidence in information provided by others
(including proof hints) without compromising each entity’s desire to protect his or
her sensitive credentials.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 describes how
virtual fingerprints can be derived from the information collected during interac-
tions in decentralized ABAC systems and discusses some target application do-
mains for virtual fingerprinting. In Section 5.3, we describe the design of Xiphos,
a reputation system in which reputations are aggregated using the virtual finger-
printing mechanism described in Section 5.2. We also discuss several deployment
models for this reputation system, each of which allows for a different balance of
privacy and completeness of available information. In Section 5.4, we discuss the
privacy implications of the Xiphos reputation system and examine the effects of
several attacks against this system. Section 5.5 presents an evaluation of our repu-
tation system in a simulated grid computing network to demonstrate its utility and
quantify its costs of deployment. We then summarize this chapter in Section 5.6.
5.2 Identity in Open Systems
Each entity, A, in an attribute-based trust management system has a finite set of
credentials, CA = {c1, . . . , cn}, which attest to her various attributes. Although
these credentials might never explicitly reference A’s civil identity (for example,
they could be X.509 credentials that assert only that their owner has a given at-
tribute), we claim that in practice, CA completely describesA. In trust management
systems such as PolicyMaker [22], KeyNote [21], QCM [55], Cassandra [17], and
various trust negotiation proposals (e.g., [20; 68; 83; 118]), each credential is issued
to exactly one owner in order to avoid the group key revocation problem. Thus, if
an entity E can prove ownership of some c ∈ CA, then necessarily E = A.
Since entities may consider some of their credentials to be private, CA is in most
cases not globally available as a basis of comparison for identity establishment.
However, as entities in these systems interact, they collect valuable information
about one another even if no civil identity information is explicitly disclosed. Specif-
ically, as entities A and B interact, B learns DBA ⊆ CA. We will call sets such as DBA
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descriptions.
DEFINITION 5.2.1 (Description). A description is a subset of the credentials owned by
one entity which is learned by another entity in the system.
We will use the notation DBA to represent the description of A known by B. It is
important to note that forB to acceptDBA as a description ofA,Amust demonstrate
proof of ownership of each credential c ∈ DBA to B.2 The collection of all such
descriptions will be denoted by D.
Over the course of multiple interactions, B can use previously obtained descrip-
tions to recognize when he is communicating with a familiar entity. For this to be
useful, however, the number of disjoint descriptions that an entity assume must be
small. We assert that this is indeed the case; even though an entity can have an in-
finite number of self-issued or other low-value credentials, only credentials issued
by trusted third parties will be useful in gaining access to the resources shared in
an open system. It should not be possible to obtain an unlimited number of such
credentials (e.g., a user should not be able to obtain two driver’s licenses), which
implies that the set of useful descriptions that can be assumed by any entity will
necessarily be finite.
Although descriptions are useful for allowing one entity to recognize another en-
tity with whom she has interacted previously, privacy concerns restrict descrip-
tions from being shared between entities. This follows from the fact that entities
may consider some of their attributes to be sensitive: even though B learns some
credential c which belongs to A, this does not mean that any arbitrary entity in the
system has the right to learn c. To allow certain information contained within a
description to be shared between entities, we introduce the notion of virtual finger-
prints.
DEFINITION 5.2.2. The virtual fingerprint associated with a description DBA =
{c1, . . . , ck} is defined as FBA = {h(c1), . . . , h(ck)}, where h(·) is a cryptographic hash
function and each h(ci) is called a feature. The collection of all such virtual fingerprints
will be referred to as F.
The collision-resistance property of hash functions allows virtual fingerprints to be
used as pseudo-identifiers in the same way as descriptions. For instance, if SHA-1
is used to derive virtual fingerprints, we expect that each person on Earth would
need to hold approximately 247 credentials before a collisionwould be found, given
2The only exception to this rule occurs when c is a delegated credential. In this case, DBA should
contain both c and the long-term credential from which cwas derived. For obvious reasons, proof of
ownership of the long-term credential is not required.
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that the current population is about 6.2 billion < 233 people. Therefore, if two vir-
tual fingerprints overlap, their corresponding descriptions overlap, and thus the
two virtual fingerprints both describe the same entity. Since virtual fingerprints
mask out the details of a user’s credentials, they are more likely candidates for
allowing inferred pseudo-identity information to be shared between entities. It
must be noted, however, that an entity may have multiple disjoint virtual finger-
prints and thus even if two entities have interacted with this entity, theymay not be
able to agree on this fact based on virtual fingerprints alone. However, the limited
number of virtual fingerprints used by an entity, A, in the system (which follows
directly from the limited number of descriptions of A) implies that over time, fac-
tions of entities who know A by each of her virtual fingerprints will form. Clearly,
virtual fingerprints can be used to link and correlate the actions of users in an open
system without revealing their private attribute data to entities who do not know
it already.
It should be noted that virtual fingerprinting cannot be used in conjunction with
all types of trust management systems. For example, virtual fingerprints cannot be
derived in systems that use anonymous credentials (e.g., [29; 33; 34]) or hidden cre-
dentials [60], since the credentials belonging to one entity are never fully disclosed
to other entities in the system. In addition, the systems discussed in [29; 33; 34]
were designed to prevent actions taken at disparate points in an open system from
being linked, and thus prevent any form of distributed auditing. However, there
are many types of systems that could benefit from the scalability of attribute-based
trust management systems, but require the ability to audit transactions in the sys-
tem so that users can be held accountable for their actions. Examples of these types
of systems include grid computing systems, the semantic web, critical infrastruc-
ture management networks, joint military task forces, and disaster management
coordination centers. Virtual fingerprinting can pave the way for the adoption of
attribute-based trust management systems in these types of high-assurance envi-
ronments by increasing user accountability and auditability. In the remainder of
this chapter, we substantiate this claim by describing how virtual fingerprints can
form the basis of a reputation system for use in conjunction with attribute-based
access control systems such as those described in [17; 20; 21; 22; 24; 68; 83; 113; 118].
5.3 The Xiphos Reputation System
Recent research indicates that reputation systems will play an important role in the
peer-to-peer and ad-hoc networks of the future (e.g., [51; 65; 85; 107]). In the context
of open systems, reputation systems are of increasing importance as distributed
88
theorem proving approaches to access control begin to gain traction [12; 119], since
accepting proof fragments or access hints from malicious entities could have un-
desirable consequences. However, the lack of concrete identity information in
attribute-based access control systems makes designing reputation systems a diffi-
cult task.
In this section, we present Xiphos, a reputation system based on the virtual finger-
prints described in Section 5.2. The reputation update equations used by Xiphos
are similar to those used in other proposals and could easily be changed as better
reputation update mechanisms are proposed; in fact, many of the equations pre-
sented in this section are adaptations of those presented by Liu and Issarny in [85],
altered to work within our virtual fingerprint collection and analysis framework.
Thus, our primary contribution is not the reputation update equations themselves,
but rather the framework though which entities can record, index, and exchange
virtual fingerprints obtained during their interactions in a privacy-preservingman-
ner to formulate reputations for entities whose identities are never fully disclosed.
5.3.1 Local Information Collection
As entities in an attribute-based trust management system interact, they learn valu-
able information regarding one another’s virtual fingerprints. Formally, as entities
interact, they can store tuples of the form T = 〈F ∈ F, r ∈ R, τ ∈ T〉, where F is a
virtual fingerprint, r is a rating, and τ is the timestamp of the entity’s most recent
interaction with the entity described by virtual fingerprint F . We assume that the
set of all possible timestamps is T and that reputation ratings come from some set
R of possible values. To simplify our discussion, in this chapter we useR = [−1, 1].
However, in practice it will often be the case that ratings are vector quantities (i.e.,
[−1, 1]n) that allow an entity to rate several aspects of her interaction with another
entity (e.g., both the service quality and recommendation quality). All operations
carried out on reputation ratings in this chapter can be carried out on vectors, so
we use n = 1 in our formulas without loss of generality.
Over time, it is possible that some entity B will learn several non-overlapping vir-
tual fingerprints describing another entity A. Thus, after a tuple 〈FBA , r, τ〉 is in-
serted into B’s database, B must condense the set of all overlapping tuples. That
is, B will remove the set of all tuples T = {T | T.F ∩ FBA 6= ∅} from his database
and insert a single tuple T ′ which is defined as follows:
T ′ =
〈 ⋃
T∈T
T.F ,
∑
T∈T T.r × ϕ(T.τ)∑
T∈T ϕ(T.τ)
, τnow
〉
(5.1)
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In the above equation, τnow is the current timestamp and ϕ(·) is a function which
computes a factor in the interval [0, 1] that is used to scale the impact of older rat-
ings. One possible definition of ϕ(·) fades ratings linearly over some duration d,
though other definitions are certainly possible:
ϕ(t) =
{
1− τnow−td when τnow − t < d,
0 otherwise.
(5.2)
Equations 5.1 and 5.2 form the basis of a local reputation system inwhich any entity
can track her interaction history with any other entity in the absence of concrete
identity information; this history can then be used as a predictor of future success.
In the following subsections, we describe three ways inwhich entities can exchange
portions of their local histories to form a system-wide reputation system.
5.3.2 A Centrally Managed Reputation System
Information Collection
The simplest types of reputation systems to reason about are systems in which a
central server is responsible for storing and aggregating reputation values, such
as the eBay feedback system. In a centralized deployment of Xiphos, the server
will store tuples of the form T = 〈FA ∈ F, lc ∈ [0, 1],FB ∈ F, r ∈ R, τ ∈ T〉
where FA is a virtual fingerprint of the entity reporting the rating, lc is the server’s
linkability coefficient for the entity whose virtual fingerprint isFA,FB is the virtual
fingerprint of the entity being rated (as observed by the rater), r is the rating, and τ
is the timestamp at which this ratingwas logged. Prior to discussing the calculation
of reputation values based on these tuples, we must first explain how the server
learns FA, and the mechanism through which lc is calculated.
For several reasons discussed later in this chapter, it is important that the server
records one of the rater’s virtual fingerprints along with each reputation rating
registered in the system. One way for this to occur is for the rater to simply reveal
several credentials to the server while reporting his reputation rating. Alterna-
tively, the rater could carry out an eager trust negotiation [117] with the reputation
server prior to submitting his reputation ratings. An eager trust negotiation be-
gins by one party disclosing his public credentials to the other party. Subsequent
rounds of the negotiation involve one party disclosing any credentials whose re-
lease policies were satisfied by the credentials that they received during previous
rounds of negotiation. This process continues until neither entity can disclose more
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credentials to the other.
In Xiphos, linkability coefficients are used to weight the reputation rating submit-
ted by a particular entity based on how much the rater is willing to reveal about
herself. To this end, the function γ : D → [0, 1] is used to establish the linkability
coefficient associated with a description (as defined in Section 5.2) learned about an
entity. The exact definition of γ(·) will necessarily be domain-specific, but several
important properties of γ(·) can be easily identified. First, low-value (e.g., self-
signed) credentials should not influence the linkability coefficient associated with
a description. This prevents an entity from establishing a large number of descrip-
tions that can be used with high confidence. Second, γ(·) should be monotonic;
that is, an entity should not be penalized for showing more credentials, as doing
so increases the ease with which her previous interaction history can be traced.
Third, to help prevent slander and self-promotion attacks, the sum of the linkabil-
ity coefficients derived from any partitioning of a description should not be greater
than the linkability coefficient derived from the entire description. More formally,
given a description D ∈ D, ∀P = {p1 ⊆ D, . . . , pk ⊆ D} such that
⋂
p∈P p = ∅,
γ(D) ≥∑p∈P γ(p). We discuss and evaluate a particular γ(·) function which meets
these criteria in Section 5.5.2.
The linkability coefficient is a good metric by which to establish a “first impres-
sion” of an entity, as a high linkability coefficient implies that an entity’s previous
interactions can be more easily tracked. This becomes especially meaningful if the
reputation system itself stores vector quantities and can look up a “rating confi-
dence” value for a particular user (such as the RRep value stored in [85]). Entities
with higher linkability coefficients are more likely to have many meaningful rating
confidence scores reported by other entities which could be used to weight their
contributions to the system. In this chapter, we simply use the linkability coeffi-
cient as an estimate of an entity’s rating confidence.
Given that the server stores tuples in the above-mentioned format, we now discuss
how reputation ratings are updated. Assume that after interacting with some en-
tity, the server determines that the tuple T = 〈F , lc,F ′, r, τ〉 should be inserted into
the database. Prior to inserting this tuple, the database first purges all prior repu-
tation ratings reported by the entity described by F regarding the entity described
by F ′. That is, the set of tuples Told = {T | (T.FA ∩ F 6= ∅) ∧ (T.FB ∩ F ′ 6= ∅)}
are deleted from the database.3 At this point, T can be inserted. Note that user up-
dates replace older reputation ratings rather than scaling them since users locally
time-scale their own ratings according to Equation 5.1.
3Alternatively, these tuples could be saved for historical purposes, but marked as expired.
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Query Processing
Having discussed how information is stored at the reputation server, we now de-
scribe how queries are processed. If an entity is interested in obtaining the repu-
tation of some other entity whose virtual fingerprint is F , he submits a query of
the form FQ ⊆ F to the reputation server. To compute the reputation for the entity
with the virtual fingerprint FQ, the server must first select the set of relevant tuples
TQ = {T | T.FB ∩ FQ 6= ∅}. If any subset T AQ of the tuples in TQ have overlap-
ping FA components, these tuples will be removed from TQ and replaced with a
summary tuple of the form:
〈 ⋃
T∈T AQ
T.FA,max ({T.lc | T ∈ T AQ }),
⋃
T∈T AQ
T.FB,
∑
T∈T AQ T.r × ϕ(T.τ)∑
T∈T AQ ϕ(T.τ)
, τnow
〉
(5.3)
This duplicate elimination prevents the server from overcounting the rating of a
single entityAwho knows the subject of the query bymore than one disjoint virtual
fingerprint, each of which overlapsFQ. Let T ′Q denote the results of performing this
duplicate elimination process on TQ. Given T ′Q, the reputation associated with the
query FQ is defined by the following equation:
rQ =
∑
T∈T ′Q(T.lc × ϕ(T.τ)× T.r)∑
T∈T ′Q(T.lc × ϕ(T.τ))
(5.4)
In short, the reputation returned by the server is the weighted average reputation
rating of entities matching the virtual fingerprint FQ, where each reputation rat-
ing is weighted based on both the linkability coefficient of the rater (which acts as
an estimator of her rating confidence value) and the age of the reputation rating.
An interesting area for future work involves exploring the applicability of various
weighting schemes adapted from the information retrieval field. For example, in
some situations, it may be advantageous to weight each tuple based on its degree
of similarity to the query. In this case, similarity could be measured either in terms
of the number or value of overlapping features that a tuple’s FB component shares
with FQ.
The curious reader might wonder why the set intersection operator is used to de-
fine TQ = {Ti | Ti.FB ∩FQ 6= ∅} as the set of matching tuples for a query FQ rather
than the transitive closure of this operator. While in a network with only honest
participants, the transitive closure would give more accurate reputation ratings, it
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would cause incorrect results to be calculated if cheaters are present in the system.
As an illustration, consider a system in which some entity E (with virtual finger-
print FE) is known to have an excellent reputation. Amalicious entityM (with vir-
tual fingerprint FM ) could then inflate his reputation by having some third party
N (with virtual fingerprint FN ) report a rating for the “entity” whose virtual fin-
gerprint is FE ∪ FM , thereby causing the tuple T = 〈FN , lcN ,FE ∪ FM , r, τ〉 to be
inserted into the central database. If the transitive closure of the set intersection
operation was then used to define TQ, any searches forM ’s reputation would then
also include all ratings for E, thereby inflatingM ’s reputation. For this reason, we
use only set intersection for query matching, as entities can submit queries derived
from virtual fingerprints which they have verified to belong to another entity. This
further justifies the use of the linkability coefficient as a first impression of another
entity, since as the linkability coefficient increases towards 1.0, the information in-
cluded in TQ approaches completeness.
5.3.3 A Fully Distributed Reputation System
We now describe a fully distributed deployment of Xiphos. In this model, entities
calculate reputation ratings for other entities by querying some subset of the other
entities in the system and aggregating the results from their local databases. As in
the centralized model, queries are of the form FQ ∈ F. Each node queried selects
from their local database all tuples which overlap FQ (i.e., T = {T | T.F ∩ FQ 6=
∅}) and then creates a summary tuple of the form T = 〈rQ, τ〉 to return to the
querier. If only a single tuple T ′ matches the query, then its r and τ components are
used to form T ; otherwise, Equation 5.1 is used to generate a tuple whose r and τ
components are used.
Upon receiving each of these summary tuples, the querier then augments them by
adding the linkability coefficient that she has associated with the entity which sent
the result. This linkability coefficient can either be cached from a previous interac-
tion, the result of an eager trust negotiation initiated by the querier, or calculated
from a set of credentials sent by the other entity along with the summary tuple.
Given this collection of augmented summary tuples, TQ, the querier then computes
the reputation rating of the entity whose virtual fingerprint is characterized by FQ
as follows:
rQ = ωlocal × rlocalQ + (1− ωlocal )×
∑
T∈TQ(T.lc × ϕ(T.τ)× T.r)∑
T∈TQ(T.lc × ϕ(T.τ))
(5.5)
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Figure 5.1: A simple super-peer network (super nodes shown in black).
The term ωlocal ∈ [0, 1] represents a weighting factor which allows the querier to
determine how much of the reputation rating that she calculates should be based
on her previous interactions with the subject of a query (denoted by rlocalQ ) versus
the reputation ratings reported by other entities in the system. For instance, using
ωlocal = 0 would mean that the reputation ratings provided by other entities will
be used exclusively and any local reputation score will be ignored. In addition
to choosing the weight given to the reputations returned by others, users must
manually balance the time they spend querying other nodes with the accuracy of
the reputation rating that they hope to derive.
5.3.4 A Reputation System for Super-Peer Network Topologies
The final deployment model that we consider is a reputation system built on top of
a super-peer network. Super-peer networks [120] are peer-to-peer networks which
leverage the heterogeneity of nodes in the network by using nodes with higher
bandwidths and faster processors to act as intelligent routers which form the back-
bone of the network. In these networks, a small number of so-called “super nodes”
act as gateways for a large number of standard peers. Figure 5.1 shows a simple
super-peer network topology.
In this model, each super node is assumed to have complete information regarding
the virtual fingerprint to reputation bindings stored by each of its client peers; that
is, each super node acts as a centralized server as described in Section 5.3.2. Given
a query FQ, a super node then uses Equations 5.3 and 5.4 to compute a local rep-
utation rating, rSQ, based on the ratings provided by its client peers. However, in
addition to calculating this local reputation rating, the super node can also include
the reputations reported by other super nodes. After reissuing the query to each
other super node and obtaining TQ, the set of resulting summary tuples calculated
using Equations 5.3 and 5.4, the super node computes the aggregate reputation in
response to the query FQ as follows:
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rQ = ωS × rSQ + (1− ωS)×
∑
T∈TQ(T.lc × ϕ(T.τ)× T.r)∑
T∈TQ(T.lc × ϕ(T.τ))
(5.6)
As in the fully distributed model, ωS is a weighting factor which determines how
much the reputation rating calculated from the super node’s local peer group is
weighted in comparison to the reputation ratings returned by all of the other super
nodes.
5.4 Discussion
In this section, we discuss the privacy concerns associated with each deployment
model of the Xiphos system. We see that Xiphos is in fact a double-edged sword,
and that system architects must make explicit choices regarding balancing privacy
preservation and completeness of available information. We then discuss several
well-known attacks on reputation systems and describe their effects on Xiphos.
5.4.1 Privacy Considerations
Though reputation systems will form a necessary part of the open systems of the
future, it is important to note that the information that they provide comes at a cost.
In particular, there is a very clear trade-off between preservation of user privacy
and the completeness of information obtained through the reputation system. We
now identify the threats to user privacy which manifest themselves in each of the
deployment models presented in Section 5.3.
Possible Privacy Violations
We have identified three types of potential privacy violations that may occur as a
result of the Xiphos system: leakage of interaction history, discovery of groups of
entities with similar attributes, and inference of particular attribute information.
Interaction history leaks occur in the centralized and super-peer deployments of
the Xiphos system any time that one entity registers a reputation rating for another.
This action allows the super peer or central server to infer that the rater and the
ratee have interacted in the past. In the fully distributed deployment model, any
time that A answers a query issued byB, B can infer that A has interacted with the
subject of his query. However, leakage of interaction history occurs in every other
reputation system that we are aware of, thus we do not discuss it further here.
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The second type of privacy violation occurs as a central server or super peer col-
lects large numbers of reputation tuples. Recall that these tuples are of the form
T = 〈FA, lc,FB, r, τ〉. After building a substantial database, a malicious server can
select all tuples whose FB component overlaps a given FQ exactly. We now claim
that the FA components of these matching tuples determine a set of entities in the
server’s view of the open system who have similar attributes. The justification of
this claim comes from the fact that each entity described by some Ti.FA was able
to determine the same virtual fingerprint for the entity matching FQ. Thus, each
of these entities was able to unlock each of the credentials used to derive FQ, a feat
which requires that each of these entities be able to satisfy the same set of creden-
tial release policies. Because these release policies may include disjunctions, we
cannot determine that each matching Ti.FA has the same set of defining attributes,
though we can claim that these entities are similar in some respects. The similarity
of these entities is directly correlated with the restrictiveness of the release policies
protecting the credentials used to derive FQ; more restrictive policies lead to more
closely related entities.
The third type of privacy violation allows certain entities in the system to infer
attributes possessed by another entity in the system. In the centralized and super-
peer models, this attack is an extension of the previously discussed attack. Con-
sider the case where a server S knows the description DSA of a node A. Let us
also assume that some c ∈ DSA is protected by a release policy, p, which is also
known to S (e.g., as a result of some previous interaction). S can then form a query
FQ = {h(c)} and process it using the technique described above, thereby learning
the virtual fingerprints of a group of entities who can satisfy p. Since S knows p, he
then knows not only that each entity that matched his query is related somehow, but
also that they satisfy p; that is, S can infer the attributes which cause the similarities
between the nodes which match his query.
A Balancing Act
To an extent, choosing an appropriate deploymentmodel for the Xiphos system can
mitigate these attacks. The centralized model makes these attacks easier to carry
out, as the server has complete information regarding the reputation tuples regis-
tered with the system. By using a super-peer deployment, the information flow is
restricted greatly. Both the group discovery and attribute inference attacks are lim-
ited to occurring within a single peer group, since super nodes do not have access
to each others’ databases. Thus, if client nodes restrict their information sharing to
super nodes whom they can trust (e.g., super nodes with Better Business Bureau
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memberships or TRUSTe-issued privacy policies), then they can have some assur-
ance that the super node will not abuse their partial information to carry out these
attacks. Limiting the size of peer groups managed by each super node further re-
stricts these attacks. It should also be noted that using the super-peer deployment
model does not sacrifice the completeness of information available, as ratings reg-
istered by every peer are still included as the contribution of each super node is
folded into the reputation rating calculated using Equation 5.6. However, unless
each super node has a roughly equivalent number of members, ratings may be
biased towards the opinions of entities at super nodes with fewer members. Addi-
tionally, unless super nodes coordinate to ensure that there is no overlap between
their respective peer groups, the accuracy of the reputation ratings calculated using
this method may suffer, as malicious peers could register ratings at multiple super
nodes.
These attacks can be further limited by using the fully distributed deployment
model, as no entity in the system has any sort of complete information. Each en-
tity is restricted to querying a limited number of other entities in the system, as
querying each node in turn becomes inefficient as the size of the network grows.
Additionally, when issuing the queryFQ, an entityA cannot be sure if the respond-
ing entities have matched all of FQ or simply some F ′ ⊂ FQ. This implies that A
must carry out the group discovery or attribute inference attacks by issuing queries
FQ where |FQ| = 1 to ensure that all matches returned are total matches. Note also,
that Awill most likely need to know cwhere FQ = {h(c)}, as otherwise she is sim-
ply guessing that FQ is an “interesting” virtual fingerprint, which may often be a
difficult task. This implies that A is very likely to know p, the release policy for
c, as she satisfied p to learn c in the first place. In this respect, the group discov-
ery attack is eliminated, as A is forced to carry out the stronger attribute inference
attack. The attribute inference attack is itself no more feasible than trying to de-
termine whether the attribute a attested to by c is possessed by each node in the
network directly (e.g., by means of an eager negotiation or another resource access
request protocol), thus this attack is no more feasible with Xiphos in place than it
would have been without it. This implies that attacks which cause the aforemen-
tioned privacy violations can be virtually eliminated by using the fully distributed
deployment model, though at the cost of losing the completeness of reputation in-
formation.
In addition to leveraging the privacy versus completeness trade-off which exists in
the Xiphos system, another possible avenue for the prevention of privacy-related
attacks involves the use of obligations. Obligations are requirements that can be
attached to personal information in certain types of trust management systems.
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For instance, the owner of a digital medical record might attach an obligation to
that record requiring that her health care provider send her an email any time this
record is shared (e.g., while filing a referral to another physician). In these types of
systems, it would be possible for entities to attach obligations to their credentials
which limit the ways that other entities can disclose virtual fingerprints including
hashes of these credentials. For example, an entity could indicate that any vir-
tual fingerprint including a hash of her Department of Energy security clearance
credential may only be released to a reputation server operated by the U.S. gov-
ernment. These types of obligations allow users to reap the benefits of the Xiphos
reputation system while still maintaining some control over their private informa-
tion. We expect that most entities will allow at least some “interesting” subset
of their credential hashes to be included in virtual fingerprints because they will
likely interact with other entities who require the ability to obtain their reputation
rating prior to interaction. Note that in most systems obligations are not guaran-
teed to be enforced; that is, obligations more closely resemble preferences rather
than demands and thus a malicious entity could still leak “unauthorized” virtual
fingerprints to reputation services. However, a malicious entity could also post the
actual credentials associated with these virtual fingerprints in an open forum, so the
threat of leaked virtual fingerprints is minimal.
5.4.2 Attacks and Defenses
There are several types of well-known attacks that can be launched against repu-
tation systems in hopes of biasing the reputations reported by the system. Specif-
ically, Hoffman et al. identify five classes of attacks against reputation systems:
self-promoting, whitewashing, slandering, orchestrated, and denial of service at-
tacks [59]. In this section, we address thewhitewashing, slandering, self-promoting,
and orchestrated classes of attack and discuss their effects on the Xiphos system.
We also discuss two potential attacks on the Xiphos system itself. We do not discuss
denial of service attacks, as they do not typically target the calculation mechanism
of the reputation system, which was the primary focus of this chapter.
Whitewashing. One common attack against reputation systems is whitewashing,
which occurs when a user sheds a bad reputation by establishing a new identity in
the system. In some systems, this is as simple as reconnecting to the network to
obtain a new node identifier, while in others it may involve establishing a new
pseudonym (e.g., email address) by which one is known to the system. In Xiphos,
reputation ratings are associated with virtual fingerprints. As discussed in Sec-
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tion 5.2, each user has only a limited number of virtual fingerprints, which are
uniquely determined by the set of credentials that she possesses. Obtaining new
identities thus reduces to establishing new virtual fingerprints, which requires that
a user obtain all new credentials, as any overlap will link this entity to old ratings
in the system. If users are routinely required to utilize multiple credentials, this
process is likely to be time consuming and involve multiple certificate authorities,
thereby making whitewashing a very impractical attack for habitual cheaters.
Slander and Self-Promotion. In reputation systems that either do not track the
identity used to register a rating or allow for easily obtaining multiple identities,
it is possible for an entity to register multiple ratings for a single entity and thus
have their opinion overcounted. In Xiphos, the virtual fingerprinting system can
be used to limit the number of claims that an entity can register with the system.
Entities have only a finite number of disjoint virtual fingerprints which can be used
to register claims and thus can only register a finite number of reputation ratings
for other entities in the system. In addition to capping the number of ratings that an
entity can register, the virtual fingerprint system also limits the benefits of register-
ingmultiple ratings. A properly designed γ(·) functionwill assign lower linkability
coefficients to ratings associated with a small rater virtual fingerprint than it will
to ratings associated with large rater virtual fingerprints. This means that given a
properly designed γ(·) function, an entity’s influence on the overall rating of an-
other entity will be less if she registers multiple ratings using a large number of
small virtual fingerprints than it would have been if she had registered only a sin-
gle rating using the union of each smaller virtual fingerprint. Such a γ(·) function
is discussed in Section 5.5.2.
Orchestrated. In an orchestrated attack, a colluding group of attackers leverages
multiple attack strategies in an attempt to subvert the system. For example, one
group of nodes might misbehave while another group of nodes attempts to artifi-
cially inflate the ratings of the misbehaving nodes. While Xiphos cannot prevent
participants in the system from colluding, the ability of virtual fingerprints to limit
the influence of individual misbehaving nodes (as discussed above) does limit the
effectiveness of this class of attacks.
Exploiting ϕ(·). One attack against Xiphos itself involves exploiting the use of
the ϕ(·) function. Recall that ϕ(·) is used to weight the contribution of a single
tuple to the overall reputation calculated for a query. In the centralized and super-
peer deployment models, entities in the system may try to increase their influence
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by repeatedly updating their ratings for other entities in the system to keep them
current. In the absence of certified transactions and synchronized clocks, there is
little that can be done to prevent this problem. However, this attack will likely
have little influence on the ratings calculated by the central server if the majority
of the users in the system remain honest. Nonetheless, investigating mechanisms
for providing general-purpose certified transaction support is an important area of
future work.
Opinion Erasure. One last attack onwhich we comment occurs when amalicious
party M is able to steal some set of credentials C′A ⊆ CA from another entity A.
If M then submits a reputation rating for some entity B described by the virtual
fingerprint FB while posing as A (by using the stolen credentials C′A), this rating
will overwrite the rating previously stored by A. For this attack to be successful, A
must have previously rated B. Though this attack is serious, it is possible in any
system in which one entity is able to effectively steal the identity of another (e.g., by
guessing another entity’s password). Due to the fact that users in attribute-based
trust management systems have many identities (which we have referred to as
descriptions in this chapter), the design of usable and secure identity management
systems is an important research challenge.
5.5 Evaluation
In this section, we present a simulation study conducted to evaluate the perfor-
mance and utility of the Xiphos reputation system.
5.5.1 Experimental Setup
Simulating an attribute-based trust management system presents several interest-
ing challenges, including modeling the distribution of credentials throughout the
system and determining the assignment of release policies to the credentials held
by entities in the system. To overcome these difficulties, we chose to simulate a
constrained grid computing system rather than a general-purpose open system.
Figure 5.2 illustrates the credential ontology used in our simulated network.
In this network, we assume that there are two types of entities: users and resources.
Users represent humans interested in using the computing grid to carry out some
task, while resources represent things such as computing clusters, mass storage
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Figure 5.2: The credential ontology used in the evaluation scenario.
devices, wave tanks, and visualization facilities. Our experiments analyzed the in-
teractions that took place in networks of various sizes generated as follows. For a
network consisting ofN hosts, we assume that 0.8N of these hosts are users, while
the remaining 0.2N of the hosts are resources. Users and resources are randomly
generated and assigned credentials and credential release policies in accordance
with Table 5.1. The number of credentials of each type that are assigned to a given
user or resource is chosen uniformly at random from the quantities listed in the
“Users” and “Resources” columns of this table, respectively; in situations where
multiple release policies are indicated for a single credential type, one is chosen
uniformly at random for each credential generated. Computing grid resources are
assigned access policies according to Table 5.2. The collections of hosts and re-
sources are considered to be disjoint and are assumed to be ordered in decreasing
order of popularity. We assume that there are no ties with respect to the popularity
of nodes in the system. We assume that users randomly interact with both other
users and with resources. Resources passively accept incoming interactions (e.g.,
job submissions) and do not initiate any interactions of their own.
We then simulated the interactions that would occur in this network over the course
of multiple days. Each day, every user interacts with between 10 and 30 randomly-
chosen entities in the network. 80% of these interactions are with other users in
the network, while the remaining 20% are with resources. These interactions are
chosen such that the number of incoming connections is distributed over the collec-
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Credential Type (Abbrev.) Users Resources Release Policy
Professional Organization (po) 0–2 none
Organization (o) 0–1 1 none, pp
Department (d) 1–2 1 none, pp, po
ProjectName (pn) 1–4 0–4 none, fa = F , bbb, pp
FundingAgency (fa) 1–2 0–2 none, bbb, pp
BankAcct (ba) 0–1 0 pp ∨ bbb, pp ∧ bbb
CreditCard (cc) 0–3 0 pp ∨ bbb, pp ∧ bbb
DriversLicense (dl) 0–1 0 none, pp
MailingAddress (ma) 0–2 0 none, pp
StudentID (s), FacultyID (f), or
StaffID (st)
1 0 none
PrivacyPolicy (pp) 0 0–1 none
BBB (bbb) 0 0–1 none
Table 5.1: Credential distribution used in the evaluation scenario. The variable F
represents a particular funding agency.
Type Description Policy
1 Project specific ((d = ‘CS’) ∨ (d = ‘ECE’)) ∧ p ∈ {P1, . . . , Pn}
2 Funding agency ((d = ‘CS’) ∨ (d = ‘ECE’)) ∧ fa = F
3 Academic ((d = ‘CS’) ∨ (d = ‘ECE’)) ∧ (s ∨ f)
4 Paid academic (s ∨ f) ∧ (ba ∨ cc)
Table 5.2: Four types of resource access policies. The variables P1–Pn represent
specific projects and F represents a specific funding agency.
tions of users and resources according to Zipf distributions [124]. As nodes inter-
act, they obtain virtual fingerprint information about one another and the initiating
node registers both local and centralized ratings for their satisfaction with the in-
teraction as described in Section 5.3.
As mentioned in Section 5.3, the equations used to determine reputation in Xiphos
are very similar to those used in more traditional reputation systems. As such, our
experiments do not simulate the convergence of these equations as this process has
been simulated elsewhere in the literature. Specifically, our system uses reputation
update equations similar to those whose convergence behavior was studied in [85].
In the remainder of this section, we focus on measurements of utility that are spe-
cific to the Xiphos system. Namely, we explore a particular γ(·) function designed
for our grid computing scenario, examine the storage requirements for nodes par-
ticipating in the Xiphos system, and examine query execution time as a function of
database size.
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5.5.2 The Effects of γ(·)
It has long been observed that the concept of trustworthiness used in both physical
and virtual interactions is heavily context-bound [86]. For instance, most people
would be more likely to accept tax advice from an accountant rather than a hair
stylist. We can leverage this notion of context sensitivity to simplify the task of
defining the γ(·) function for a given environment. In some sense, the ontology
presented in Figure 5.2 quantifies the exact context relevant to assessing the trust-
worthiness of entities in our grid computing scenario; this is very similar to the
use of controlled vocabularies in information retrieval. While entities in the system
are very likely to have numerous other credentials and attributes, the relevance of
these credentials to establishing the user’s trustworthiness in the context of grid
computing is likely to be minimal. This limited contextual scope leads to a simple
definition of γ(·) that meets the requirements identified in Section 5.3.2.
According to Table 5.1, users can have at most 19 credentials described by the on-
tology shown in Figure 5.2; resources can have at most 10 credentials described by
this ontology. Note also that only resources will have BBB or PrivacyPolicy creden-
tials. From this information, we can derive one possible instantiation of the γ(·)
function:
γ(D) =
{ |D|
10 if D contains a PrivacyPolicy or BBB credential,
|D|
19 otherwise.
(5.7)
This function assigns a linkability coefficient to a description consisting of creden-
tials from the ontology shown in Figure 5.2 by comparing the number of exposed
credentials to the maximum number of possible credentials that could have been
included. Note that any credentials outside of this ontology are explicitly ignored
because they are considered to be out of context. This definition of γ(·) clearly satis-
fies the criteria described in Section 5.3.2 and has the added advantage of encourag-
ing resources to disclose their BBB and PrivacyPolicy credentials, as this identifies
them as resources and assigns more weight to the credentials that they do show.
Note that in many cases, this definition of γ(·)will assign relatively low linkability
coefficients to entities, as few entities are likely to have the maximum number of
possible credentials. However, Xiphos uses γ(·) only as a relative weighting func-
tion so this definition is satisfactory.
Figure 5.3 shows the average linkability coefficient assigned to entities in networks
of 10,000–100,000 users; each data point represents the average over 10 randomly
generated networks. We see that the average linkability coefficient varies slightly
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Figure 5.3: Average linkability coefficients for entities with credentials allocated
according to Table 5.1.
around the expected value of 0.5658. This implies that an all-powerful attacker (i.e.,
an attacker with the maximum number of credentials which will be weighted by
γ(·)), has no more than 1.77 times the influence of an average user on the system.
This assumes that the attacker cannot convince certificate authorities to issue him
duplicate credentials (e.g., two driver’s licenses). Therefore, if the attacker wanted
to have both a “good” virtual fingerprint and a “malicious” virtual fingerprint
(which must obviously be disjoint), at least one of these will have a below-average
linkability coefficient, and thus less influence on the reputation scores calculated
by Xiphos; average attackers are affected to an even greater degree. This shows
that the linkability coefficient is useful not only for developing a “first impression”
of entities in the system, but also for preventing certain types of attacks.
As reputation systems begin to be used in systems with wider contexts (e.g., the
semantic web), it is important that the reputations calculated account for this con-
text as well [85]. If Xiphos deployments wish to consider the context of the sys-
tem (the possibility of which was alluded to in Section 5.3.1), the γ(·) function used
should be implemented as a family of functions with one relevant member for each
context considered. Other interesting future work in this area involves exploring
non-uniform weighting schemes for the credentials considered by γ(·). This will
allow credentials of various relevance to impact the linkability value of a particular
description differently.
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Figure 5.4: Growth of local reputation databases over time for networks ranging in
size from 10,000–70,000 entities.
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Figure 5.5: Daily change in size of local databases over time for networks ranging
in size from 10,000–70,000 entities.
 0
 50
 100
 150
 200
 250
 300
 350
 400
 0  10  20  30  40  50  60  70  80  90  100
Lo
ca
l D
at
ab
as
e 
Si
ze
 (tu
ple
s)
Days
Network Size
 10,000 users
 20,000 users
 30,000 users
 40,000 users
 50,000 users
 60,000 users
 70,000 users
Figure 5.6: Growth of local reputation databases over time for networks ranging in
size from 10,000–70,000 entities, when tuples over one month old are evicted daily.
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5.5.3 Database Growth
Local Database Growth
As users in our simulations interact with resources and other users in the system,
they update their local databases as defined in Section 5.3.1. This implies that over
time, a host’s local database will continue to grow in size and could include up
to NF entries, where N is the size of the network and F is the average number
of virtual fingerprints by which the host knows each entity in the network. In our
simulations, we assumed that the participants in the network were honest and thus
F ≈ 1. This is not an unrealistic assumption, as if a host is known by many virtual
fingerprints, the linkability coefficients associated with each virtual fingerprint and
thus her overall reputation rating will be low and thus unlikely to remain in a given
host’s local database for very long.
For each network size simulated, we created 10 random networks and calculated
the average growth of local databases in these networks over the course of 5000
days. Figure 5.4 shows this average growth assuming that nodes had unlimited
storage and did not evict infrequently used tuples. This is an upper bound on
tuple storage, as it effectively sets d ≥ 5, 000 days in Equation 5.2. For a network
of size 10,000 (a large grid computing network by today’s standards), we see that
the average database size is less than 7,000 tuples after 5000 days of execution.
Figure 5.5 shows the average daily growth of a local database over the same period
of time. These databases grow rapidly at first but then taper off over time. Due to
the long tail of the Zipf distribution, it is unlikely that this daily growth will reach
zero within the lifetime of any deployed system.
Instead of requiring that each host maintain their complete interaction history, we
can allow them to discard tuples that are more than one month old (effectively
simulating the effect of using d = 30 days in Equation 5.2); this reduces storage
requirements drastically. Figure 5.6 shows that storage for networks of all sizes
tends to quickly stabilize at between 325 and 400 tuples, far less than the 6,000 to
19,000 tuples shown in Figure 5.4. The average daily change in local database size
stabilizes around zero, as shown in Figure 5.7.
This decrease in local database size comes at the cost of forgetting about previous
interactions that had unfavorable outcomes. Figure 5.8 shows the average growth
of local databases when old tuples with favorable results were evicted from the
database after they were 30 days old but unfavorable results were kept indefinitely.
We assumed that an evenly distributed 20% of the nodes in the network were bad.
This policy allows nodes to learn from history by keeping their badmemories while
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Figure 5.7: Daily change in size of local databases over time for networks ranging
in size from 10,000–70,000 entities, when tuples over one month old are evicted
daily.
 0
 500
 1000
 1500
 2000
 2500
 3000
 3500
 4000
 4500
 0  500  1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500 4000 4500 5000
Lo
ca
l D
at
ab
as
e 
Si
ze
 (tu
ple
s)
Days
Network Size
 10,000 users
 20,000 users
 30,000 users
 40,000 users
 50,000 users
 60,000 users
 70,000 users
Figure 5.8: Growth of local reputation databases over time for networks ranging in
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Figure 5.9: Daily change in size of local databases over time for networks ranging in
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reclaiming space by purging obsolete favorable memories. Note the slower growth
rate when compared to Figure 5.4. Figure 5.9 shows the average daily change in lo-
cal database size in this scenario. For this type of strategy to be effective, however,
the definition of ϕ(·) presented in Equation 5.2 would need to be modified. Given
these favorable results for very simple eviction policies, exploring more compli-
cated eviction policies could prove to be a fruitful area of future work.
Central Database Growth
The database stored by a central server or super node is necessarily larger and
more complex than those stored by other nodes in the system. In fact, a naive
implementation of a central server would need to store NA tuples, where N is the
number of entities in the system who report ratings to this central server and A is
the average size of each entity’s local database. Upon examining Figures 5.4, 5.6,
and 5.8, we see that this database would quickly become enormous! In order to
keep query execution times reasonable, it is clear that optimizations must be made
at these central points.
The database size itself is not likely to be a problem for centralized Xiphos servers;
rather, the time needed to process queries on exceedingly large databases will be
the bottleneck. To address this, centralized Xiphos servers could allow interested
users to become members of their service. Members first register with Xiphos by
exposing some number of public credentials. At this point, the server creates a
member entry in its database for this entity; member entries are of the form 〈F ∈
F, n ∈ R, d ∈ R〉, where F is the virtual fingerprint derived from the credentials
exposed by the entity. The server then precomputes a partial reputation rating for
F by using Equations 5.3 and 5.4 on the entire database (containingO(NA) tuples).
To do this, the numerator of Equation 5.4 is stored in the n field of the member
entry and the denominator of Equation 5.4 in the d field of the same tuple. These
precomputed reputation ratings will be refreshed on a time-available basis by the
Xiphos server and thus will not reflect the exact reputation rating for a given user,
but rather will act as an estimator for that value.
Processing a query FQ then involves selecting all member entry tuples which over-
lap FQ and combining their corresponding partial reputations. More formally, if
TQ is the set of all member entries whose F component overlaps FQ, then the final
reputation estimate is calculated as follows:
r̂Q =
∑
T∈TQ T.n∑
T∈TQ T.d
(5.8)
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There are at most NF member tuples, where N is the number of entities recording
reputation ratings at this server and F is the average number of distinct virtual
fingerprints used by each entity. As we will see in Section 5.5.2, in our grid com-
puting scenario F  A, meaning that the use of member entries will greatly reduce
the number of tuples that must be accessed to answer queries. However, this re-
duction comes at the cost of introducing overcounting in the event that the same
entity reports reputation ratings for multiple member entries, all of which match a
given query. Further investigation will be required to fully evaluate the utility of
this type of tuple-reduction method.
5.5.4 Query Execution Time
Now that we see how the size of each local database grows over time, we examine
the average time required to process queries as a function of database size. To
this end, we have implemented a prototype of the client portion of the Xiphos
system in the Java programming language. Our implementation searches local
databases in a linear fashion (i.e., the stored records are not indexed), making it
a lower bound on the performance that one would expect in practice. The query
execution times reported are averages over 1000 queries submitted to 10 randomly
populated local databases. These queries were run on an IBM T40p laptop with
a 1.6GHz Pentium M processor and 1 GB of memory running Windows XP. We
consider this machine as a lower bound of what a scientist would use to submit
and track jobs on a computational grid. Clearly, resources in the system would be
much more powerful than this.
Figure 5.10 shows the execution time (in milliseconds) for queries submitted to
databases ranging in size from 0 to 50,000 tuples. The linear trend is not surprising,
as we implemented the O(N) algorithm that follows directly from the description
in Section 5.3.3. Figure 5.11 shows the number of queries per second that can be
processed for local databases in the 10,000–50,000 tuple size range. For the database
sizes shown in Figure 5.8, we feel that the query throughput afforded by even our
prototype implementation of Xiphos is acceptable, as illustrated in Figure 5.12. An
interesting avenue of future work involves optimizing the data structures used in
local databases and their associated query processing algorithms. For example, if
each virtual fingerprint is treated as a document and each feature is considered a
keyword, then inverted indexes [50] can be used to increase query throughput.
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Figure 5.10: Query execution time for databases ranging in size from 0–50,000 tu-
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Figure 5.11: Query throughput for reputation databases ranging in size from
10,000–50,000 tuples.
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5.5.5 Concluding Remarks
In this section, we analyzed the performance and utility of Xiphos by simulating a
number of grid-computing systems of various sizes. We found that when using an
extremely conservative tuple eviction policy, the average size of a local reputation
database in a network with 10,000 users was approximately 1,500 tuples after a
simulated 5,000 days. In a network of 70,000 users, the average local database con-
tained 4,000 tuples after 5,000 simulated days. When executing a prototype Xiphos
implementation on a 1.6GHz laptop, Xiphos could process queries on databases of
these sizes at throughputs of 600 and 200 queries per second, respectively, with-
out indexing. The use of a more aggressive, though still reasonable, tuple evic-
tion policy resulted in query throughputs of over 2,200 queries per second on both
simulated networks, again without indexing; it is unlikely that the network char-
acteristics of actual grid computing systems would even allow queries to arrive at
such a high rate. We also verified that a suitable γ(·) function can limit the damage
caused by attackers in the system. These observations indicate that Xiphos can be
used as a reasonable means of reputation establishment in the open systems of the
future, despite the complications arising from the fact that users can legitimately
have multiple virtual fingerprints.
In this chapter, we described the use of virtual fingerprinting as the basis for one
particular reputation system. However, the reputation scores bound to virtual fin-
gerprints can be aggregated according to any reputation calculation method, pro-
vided that the complications arising from the legitimate assumption of multiple
identities (in the form of disjoint virtual fingerprints) are addressed. In particular,
systems need to mitigate the effects of malicious users assumingmultiple identities
to over-influence the system. Additionally, the fact that queries may overlap multi-
ple tuples could lead to problems at naive centralized servers wishing to maintain
precomputed reputation scores. The ontology-based definition of the γ(·) func-
tion discussed in Section 5.5.2 prevents malicious entities from over-influencing
our simulated grid computing system; similar definitions are likely to be possible
in other domains as well. We also presented a method for maintaining precom-
puted reputation estimates which could be used to enhance the performance of a
centralized deployment of Xiphos. Similar modifications could be made to current
and future reputation systems, thereby enabling them to use virtual fingerprints as
a means of identity and extending their applicability to attribute-based trust man-
agement systems.
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5.6 Summary
In this chapter, we examined one of the major systems challenges associated with
adopting decentralized ABAC approaches to authorization. In particular, we pre-
sented a method for the linking and correlation of multiple identities in attribute-
based trust management systems. We discussed how the descriptions that one en-
tity learns about another can be transformed into opaque virtual fingerprints, which
can be used in place of more traditional user identities as a privacy-preserving basis
for audit and incident response systems, anomaly detection algorithms, collusion
detection/prevention mechanisms, and reputation systems. To evaluate the utility
of virtual fingerprints, we developed the Xiphos reputation system, which we then
studied in detail. We presented several deployment models of the Xiphos system,
discussed the privacy versus utility trade-off for each of these deployments, and
examined the impacts of several attacks against the Xiphos system.
The performance of this system and its costs of deployment were then analyzed in
the context of a grid computing scenario. Our evaluation of the Xiphos system in-
dicates that it is an acceptable means of reputation establishment for open systems.
In addition, we argued that the more general notion of virtual fingerprints can be
used in conjunction with any reputation calculation mechanism, thereby allowing
reputation systems which rely on more traditional notions of identity to be used
in attribute-based trust management systems. Virtual fingerprinting can also be
used as the foundation for other useful security services, such as secure audit and
incident response systems. These types of systems could be used to ensure that
users are held accountable for their actions and to aid in discovering certain types
of collusion occurring at points distributed across an open system.
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6 TrustBuilder2: An Architectural
Framework for Trust Negotiation
Rome ne fut pas faite toute en un jour.
—French proverb
To date, research in trust negotiation has focused mainly on the theoretical issues
involved in the trust negotiation process. Most implementations have been de-
signed largely as proofs of concept and, therefore, were never intended to be used
heavily in practice. These theoretical works and proofs of concept have been quite
successful, and thus researchers must now begin to address the systems constraints
that act as barriers to the deployment of these systems. The effort required to de-
velop and optimize the myriad trust negotiation formulations present in the litera-
ture can be greatly reduced by first creating a suitable architectural framework that
can be parameterized to support various types of trust negotiation systems and
components. In this chapter, we present TrustBuilder2, a fully-configurable frame-
work for prototyping and evaluating trust negotiation systems. We then use this
framework to examine several interesting systems properties of the trust negotia-
tion process.
TrustBuilder2 leverages a plug-in based architecture, extensible data type hierar-
chy, and flexible communication protocol to provide a frameworkwithinwhich nu-
merous trust negotiation protocols and system configurations can be quantitatively
analyzed. We discuss the design and implementation of TrustBuilder2, present sev-
eral case studies highlighting the framework’s extensibility, and examine the costs
associated with designing flexible authorization systems. We also study the per-
formance of TrustBuilder2, explore the bottlenecks of the trust negotiation process,
and leverage this knowledge to identify important topics for future research as well
as to identify a novel method for attacking trust negotiation systems.
6.1 Introduction
Previous research in trust negotiation has been primarily of a theoretical nature,
focusing on a number of important issues including languages for expressing re-
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source access policies (e.g., [17; 19; 57; 83]), protocols and strategies for conducting
trust negotiations (e.g., [20; 68; 69; 122]), and logics for reasoning about the out-
comes of these negotiations (e.g., [24; 119]). These results provide a strong theo-
retical foundation upon which provably-secure authorization systems can be de-
signed, built, and verified. Some of the techniques discussed in the trust negotia-
tion literature have also been shown to be viable solutions for real-world systems
through a series of implementations (such as those presented in [20; 58; 67; 118])
that demonstrate the feasibility of using these theoretical advances. However, after
several years of research, trust negotiation protocols have yet to make their way
into the mainstream.
Prior to deploying access control systems based on trust negotiation, the systems
and architectural properties of trust negotiation must be more fully understood.
Existing trust negotiation implementations have been developed largely as proofs
of concept designed to illustrate the feasibility of the underlying theory and have
performed admirably in this capacity. Unfortunately, these proof-of-concept im-
plementations can be difficult to configure and use and are generally not easily
extended or modified. As a result, exploring certain types of systems research
problems surrounding trust negotiation becomes difficult. For example:
• Is it possible to unify the myriad formulations of trust negotiation described
in the research literature under a common framework? Adopting such a frame-
work would make it possible to further deploy and experiment with novel
trust negotiation systems and components in a grassroots fashion.
• What are the performance bottlenecks of the trust negotiation process, as op-
posed to those of a specific implementation? How can we quantify these costs?
• How can we identify and measure the severity of attacks that are made pos-
sible by various approaches to trust negotiation?
• When all other factors are held constant, what are the costs and benefits of
using one trust negotiation system component (e.g., negotiation strategy, pol-
icy compliance checker, etc.) over another? To what extent do various ap-
proaches limit or mitigate attacks?
In an effort to address these types of systems research challenges, we have devel-
oped TrustBuilder2, a flexible and reconfigurable Java-based framework for sup-
porting trust negotiation research. TrustBuilder2 supports a plug-in based archi-
tecture to allow any system component to be modified or replaced by users of the
system without requiring modification or recompilation of the underlying frame-
work. TrustBuilder2 is also agnostic with respect to the formats of credentials and
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policies used during the negotiation. Support for new policy languages, creden-
tial formats, or trust negotiation evidence types (e.g., trust tickets [20], uncertified
claims [20; 24], or proof fragments [119]) can be incorporated by implementing ex-
tensions to the TrustBuilder2 data type hierarchy. In this chapter, we discuss the
design and implementation of TrustBuilder2, as well as the results of research car-
ried out using this framework. Specifically, we make the following contributions:
• TrustBuilder2 represents the first fully-configurable framework for trust ne-
gotiation. TrustBuilder2 leverages a plug-in based architecture, extensible
data type hierarchy, and flexible communication protocol to provide a frame-
work within which numerous trust negotiation protocols and system config-
urations can be quantitatively analyzed.
• We carry out performance studies using TrustBuilder2 to help identify the
primary performance bottlenecks of the trust negotiation process. This leads
to the identification of a novel class of denial of service attacks against trust
negotiation systems that exploits the time required to check compliance with
trust negotiation policies. This differs significantly from the attacks previ-
ously discussed in the research literature, which focus predominantly on the
cryptographic aspects of the trust negotiation process.
• TrustBuilder2 demonstrates that adding a high degree of flexibility to ad-
vanced authorization frameworks does not necessarily lead to high runtime
overheads. In Section 6.7, we show that the time spent handling the indirec-
tion needed to support user plug-ins and other extensions amounts to less
than 0.2% of the total execution time.
• The insights gained while studying the performance of TrustBuilder2 also in-
spired novel research leading to the development of CLOUSEAU, a highly-
optimized trust negotiation policy compliance checker, which will be dis-
cussed in greater detail in Chapter 7.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 6.2, we examine
previously-developed trust negotiation implementations and discuss the features
provided by these systems. Section 6.3 presents a use case analysis examining the
characteristics of several target deployment domains for trust negotiation systems.
In Section 6.4, we use the results of our use case analysis to identify a number of
useful features that should be provided by frameworks designed to facilitate re-
search on the systems aspects of trust negotiation and the eventual deployment of
authorization systems based on trust negotiation; we then identify the subsets of
these desiderata that are addressed by existing trust negotiation implementations.
Section 6.5 presents the architecture of the TrustBuilder2 framework for trust nego-
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tiation. In Section 6.6, we explore the ways in which TrustBuilder2 can be extended.
Section 6.7 discusses a performance evaluation of the TrustBuilder2 framework and
lessons learned through this process. In Section 6.8, we examine how TrustBuilder2
addresses the desiderata presented in Section 6.4. We also discuss attacks on trust
negotiation systems, potential research topics uncovered by our performance eval-
uation, and describe how to obtain the TrustBuilder2 framework. We then present
our conclusions in Section 6.9.
6.2 Existing Implementations
Over the last several years, several implementations of trust negotiation systems
have been described in the literature. The earliest such implementation was the
TrustBuilder architecture for trust negotiation [118]. TrustBuilder is a Java imple-
mentation that supports the use of X.509 certificates to encode attributes and XML
to represent policies written using the IBM Trust Policy Language (TPL) [57]. The
IBM Trust Establishment (TE) compliance checker is used to determine whether
a certain set of credentials satisfies a given policy. TrustBuilder has been embed-
ded into an implementation of TLS [58] and several other protocols to demonstrate
the applicability of trust negotiation in existing systems. TrustBuilder supports the
use of only one credential format, one policy language, and one trust negotiation
strategy.
Trust-X [20] is an XML-based framework for supporting trust negotiations in peer-
to-peer systems. In Trust-X , each user creates an X -profile that stores X -TNL cer-
tificates describing their attributes along with uncertified declarations containing
other information about the user (e.g., preferences, phone numbers, or other such
information). To the best of our knowledge, Trust-X does not support credential
formats other than X -TNL certificates nor policies specified in any language other
than X -TNL. To allow users to optimize various aspects of the trust negotiation
process, Trust-X supports a variety of interchangeable trust negotiation strategies.
Another particularly innovative feature of the Trust-X framework is its support for
trust tickets. Trust tickets are receipts that attest to the fact that a user recently com-
pleted a negotiation with another party. These trust tickets can then be presented
within some limited lifetime (typically 24-48 hours) to bypass redundant portions
of future negotiations with the same party.
In [67], Koshutanski andMassacci describe a trust negotiation framework designed
for web services. This framework facilitates the composition of access policies
across the constituent pieces of a workflow, the discovery of credentials needed
116
to satisfy these policies, the management of the distributed access control process,
and the logic to determine what missing credentials must be located and provided
to satisfy a given policy. The use of X.509 and SAML credentials is supported by
the framework, as is the use of the negotiation strategies described in [67] and [69].
Policies are represented using a Datalog-based language. To the best of our knowl-
edge, the use of other credential formats, negotiation strategies, or policy languages
is not supported.
In [38], De Coi and Olmedilla describe a flexible and expressive trust negotiation
implementation. The authors examined the PEERTRUST [98] and PROTUNE [25]
systems in an effort to derive a set of common requirements that should be sup-
ported by any trust negotiation implementation, and then implemented a frame-
work embodying these requirements. Their system supports PEERTRUST and PRO-
TUNE inference engines, and allows users to add support for other inference en-
gines. Furthermore, users can specify trust negotiation strategies as action selec-
tion algorithms within their framework. Credentials are expressed as signed logical
statements and are loaded from a credential repository that is accessed by their im-
plementation. To the best of our knowledge, the use of other credential formats is
not supported.
While not specifically an implementation of a trust negotiation framework, Cas-
sandra [17] is a policy language for distributed access control that supports the
specification of policies with a tunable level of expressiveness. The features of Cas-
sandra are such that it can encode a certain, fixed, trust negotiation strategy. A pro-
totype system that uses the Cassandra language has been implemented in OCaml
to facilitate research on the features of this policy language. This implementation
uses a single computer to simulate the interactions of up to thousands of users in
a distributed system and has been used to explore the use of Cassandra within the
medical records domain [18]. Support for new constraint domains for the Cassan-
dra language or improved policy evaluators can be added by implementing plug-
ins for the system. Since this implementation is actually a simulator, credentials
are represented as text strings, rather than concrete certificates protected by digital
signatures.
6.3 Use Case Analysis
To derive the functional requirements for the TrustBuilder2 system, we examined
three interesting potential usage scenarios for decentralized ABAC systems. In
particular, we explored scenarios involving client-server information sharing on
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the World Wide Web, scientific grid computing, and information sharing in high-
assurance environments. It should be noted that most research to date has focused
on two-party trust negotiations. In this section, however, we relax this assump-
tion and consider cases in which multi-party interactions could be useful, in hopes
of deriving requirements that will lead to trust negotiation architectures with in-
creased levels of flexibility.
6.3.1 The World Wide Web
TheWorldWideWeb is an almost endless source of examples of client-server inter-
actions ranging from e-commerce to research applications. Rather than examining
a particular client-server interaction in detail, we will discuss this problem more
generally. Consider the case in which some service provider wishes to offer their
service, S, to any clients who satisfy some access control policy, P , which is spec-
ified in any one of a number of trust negotiation languages (e.g., Cassandra [17],
X -TNL [19], TPL [57], or RT [83]). Upon requesting access to S, the client and
the server begin a trust negotiation to determine whether the client satisfies P and
should be granted access to the service.
In such interactions, the client and server are likely to have different requirements
governing the execution of the trust negotiation. From the client’s perspective, the
following assumptions may hold true:
• To prevent identity theft, the client is likely to have few credentials which are
freely disclosable. That is, most of the client’s credentials will be protected by
release policies.
• Clients will not often be concerned with the threat of denial of service (DoS)
attacks being launched on their trust negotiation agents by the services that
they contact. However, information gathering attacks will be expected.
• To ensure access to S, the client will often be willing to do extra work. For
instance, if a client does not possess a credential required by P , they may be
willing to try to locate the missing credential (within certain limits).
• Technically savvy clients may wish to be involved directly in the trust nego-
tiation process. This could take the form of a client either writing his or her
own credential release policies or making strategic decisions at the time of
negotiation. Naive clients may wish to have “reasonable” policies provided
to them and allow their user agent to perform the entirety of the negotiation
process using these policies.
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In contrast to these points, the following assumptions are likely to hold true at the
server:
• Many servers are public interfaces to resources and will likely have very few
credentials protected by release policies.
• Due to the heavyweight nature of trust negotiation, servers will be concerned
with the threat of DoS attacks. However, information gathering attacks will
not be a concern, as most credentials held by the server will be publicly avail-
able.
• Due to the threat of DoS, servers are unlikely to engage in expensive external
efforts to ensure the success of a negotiation (such as searching for requested
credentials).
• The negotiation protocol executed by the server must be entirely automated,
as there is no human operator present to make decisions at runtime.
• To increase revenue or information dissemination, servers will likely wish to
have a robust trust negotiation configuration which will maximize the num-
ber of clients who can access the system while minimizing the cost of a nego-
tiation to the server.
In examining these points, we notice twomain discrepancies that exist between the
client and server. First, servers wish to maximize the number of trust negotiations
that can be conducted per unit time, while the client is often willing to allow this
process to take longer in hopes of ensuring success. Second, the fact that servers are
public entities is in direct contrast with the private nature of individuals. Several
interesting features will be derived from these differences later in this chapter.
6.3.2 Scientific Grid Computing
In scientific grid computing, researchers utilize geographically and administra-
tively distributed resources to solve complicated research and simulation prob-
lems. For example, a scientist in Utah might wish to user her allocations of proces-
sor time on computing clusters in Illinois and California, access a wave tank owned
by a university in Florida, and use a data set collected by colleagues in Maine to
analyze various characteristics of a tsunami. In order to successfully submit such a
job for execution on a grid, the scientist must establish the right to access resources
owned by multiple resource providers.
The nature of the interactions that must occur to successfully negotiate for access
to a computational grid lead us to make the following assumptions regarding trust
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negotiation:
• The integrity of jobs submitted to these systems is of the utmost importance to
users, as resource constraints and deadlines often discourage running a job
multiple times. Users will likely have stringent requirements that must be
satisfied by resource providers and may even require interaction with third-
party reputation services to ensure that the results that they obtain will be
accurate.
• The time required to run many grid computing jobs is measured in hours or
days. This implies that users will be willing to spend extra time and effort
to ensure the success of their trust negotiation sessions, as this cost can be
amortized over the duration of the job.
• Even though users may be willing to interact with third parties to help ensure
the success of their negotiations, this must be done with care, as third parties
may give incorrect answers either accidentally or maliciously (particularly if
there is a high demand for resources, as there tends to be near deadlines).
• Users will have many sensitive credentials detailing their research and orga-
nizational memberships, especially if they are employed in government or
industry research labs where need-to-know is used to limit information dis-
semination.
Though at first glance the resource providers in computational grids seem equiv-
alent to the servers discussed in the World Wide Web use case, they are in fact
quite different. Resource providers in computational grids are likely to make the
following assumptions regarding trust negotiation:
• Maximizing system utilization is key. Many resources attached to computa-
tional grids are expensive to own and operate, thus it is in the best interest of
resource providers to ensure that the maximum number of authorized users
gain access, to help pay the cost of operating the resources. This implies that
resource providers will be configured to maximize the number of clients able
to access the system successfully and will be concerned less with the speed
with which trust negotiation sessions occur.
• The length of time required to run a grid job implies that resource providers
will be carrying out fewer trust negotiation sessions than, for example, e-
commerce web sites. As a result, resource providers will be more open to
the idea of doing extra work to ensure the success of a negotiation. For in-
stance, resource providers may attempt to locate credentials requested by a
particular client.
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• Resource providers will likely have some number of public credentials, as
was the case with servers on the World Wide Web, though they will likely
have other more sensitive credentials that will be protected by release policies
(particularly in government computing environments).
While the grid computing application domain has some similarities with the Web
environment, the inherently collaborative nature of this environment gives rise
to several unique assumptions. These contrasting assumptions will elicit require-
ments for features not needed in the client-server domain.
6.3.3 High Assurance Environments
High-assurance environments such as disaster management networks or critical in-
frastructures, such as the electric power grid, tend to have stringent requirements
on information sharing. In particular, it is of the utmost importance that qualified
individuals gain access to all necessary information in a timely manner, even if
those qualified individuals happen to be outsiders. For instance, during a time of
crisis, it is important that police, fire, and rescue workers can access status infor-
mation about the incident to which they are responding, even if they happen to be
volunteers from another district. In the case of the electric power grid, there are
times when market-sensitive information should be released to competing entities
to enable proper response to changing conditions in the grid and avoid cascading
blackouts or other failure situations.
As with the previous two use cases, we examine characteristics of this environment
from the perspective of both clients (information consumers) and servers (informa-
tion producers). From a client viewpoint, the following assumptions are likely to
hold true:
• Emergencies and other situations in which information sharing is likely to
occur in high-assurance environments are usually highly context-dependent.
The variability that this introduces can make it difficult for users to under-
stand why their access requests are permitted or denied. The reasons for the
success and failure of any access control decisions should be explained care-
fully by the underlying trust negotiation architecture.
• Often critical decisions must be made quickly. Users will not tolerate long
delays when requesting information in this environment.
• The criticality of these systems implies that users want their interactions to
succeed if at all possible. Interactions with external parties that would in-
crease the likelihood of a successful negotiation will be tolerated, though they
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will be subject to stringent timing constraints.
• Users will likely act in uncharacteristic ways during times of crisis or when
adverse conditions arise in the system. Since these environments have strin-
gent security requirements, atypical user activities carried out during a crisis
may be investigated after the crisis is past. To protect themselves, users will
require that verifiable audit trials be stored. These records should include
information about both the external environment (i.e., system context) and
specific records detailing the negotiations carried out by the user.
With respect to information producers in high-assurance environments, the follow-
ing assumptions regarding information sharing are likely to hold true:
• The high-security nature of these environments implies that in many ways
they are more constrained than the World Wide Web or grid computing en-
vironments discussed previously. Support for a wide array of configuration
options regarding supported credential types and strategies is likely to be
unnecessary; a preordained set of these options should suffice.
• Since flow of information is key to the operation of these environments, in-
formation providers will want their trust negotiation systems be fast and re-
sistant to denial of service attacks.
• In general, high-assurance environments have very stringent requirements
on the flow of information. However, under certain circumstances (e.g., emer-
gency conditions) information providers may take a more permissive ap-
proach to information dissemination in hopes of solving problems of criti-
cal importance. To help detect patterns of abuse, information providers will
need strong audit trails detailing exactly what information was released and
to whom it was released.
6.4 System Requirements
We now examine the assumptions made in the previously presented use cases and
derive functional requirements for a general-purpose trust negotiation framework.
These requirements fall naturally into three categories: requirements placed on
core trust negotiation components, requirements relating to external interactions,
and performance and extensibility requirements. In all cases, we examine both the
derivation and implications of each requirement. We first discuss the requirements
relating to the general functionality afforded by the core components of the trust
negotiation system.
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Arbitrary policy languages In many cases, resource providers will wish to be ac-
cessible to as many potential clients as possible. To facilitate this, these enti-
ties should be able to parse access policies written in a variety of formats (e.g.,
Cassandra [17], X -TNL [19], TPL [57], RT [83], and XACML [93]). It should
be easy to add support for new policy languages to deployed systems.
Arbitrary credential formats To further enable interactions with a maximal set of
users, trust negotiation systems should support the use of multiple credential
formats such as X.509 certificates [61] and SAML assertions [30]. It should
also be easy to add support for new credential formats to deployed systems.
Interchangeable negotiation strategies Trust negotiation is by nature a strategy-
driven process. Entities should be able to choose negotiation strategies that
direct the execution of a trust negotiation session to meet their particular
goals (e.g., maximizing privacy or minimizing latency). One can imagine
many situations in which the goals of the participants in a negotiation might
be conflicting. The use of families of interoperable strategies that allow ne-
gotiation participants to choose different, yet compatible, strategies (e.g., as
in [122]) should be supported. It should be possible to add support for new
negotiation strategies to deployed systems.
Flexible policy and credential stores Clients are likely to utilize several comput-
ing devices—such as desktop computers, laptops, PDAs, and smart phones—
during the course of their daily activities. It is therefore important that a trust
negotiation architecture support interactions with a variety of flexible policy
and credential stores (e.g., [7; 111]) that will enable users to effectively man-
age their digital identities across multiple devices.
While these basic flexibility requirements are important, they do not address all as-
pects of the negotiation process. In particular, we must also consider the ability to
add more advanced features that might increase the efficiency, understandability,
or functionality of the trust negotiation process. For instance, the World Wide Web
use case highlighted the need for users to be able to request help in locatingmissing
credentials from external entities (e.g., as in [119]). Similarly, the grid computing
use case introduced the need to support a wider array of helpful third parties, such
as reputation systems. In yet other cases, the active participation of the human on
whose behalf a negotiation is initiated may be desired. Unfortunately, the naive
inclusion of these features can lead to a variety of problems. The following require-
ments help to safely enable beneficial external interactions:
Strategy-driven external interactions Negotiation participants should have the
ability to interact with a wide range of external entities that can help solve
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difficult problems which may arise during the negotiation. Examples of such
interactions include the calculation of reputations or credential chain discov-
ery.
Advanced logging capabilities The architecture should include a logging service
that can record information regarding any aspect of the negotiation process.
Since a high degree of logging is not always needed, the logging subsystem
should support the recording of logs at various granularities.
Tunable human involvement In some instances, humansmaywish to be involved
directly in the negotiation process. For example, users maywant to specify an
“ask me” release policy for a sensitive credential, see a visual representation
of the negotiation process for policy evaluation purposes, or be involved in
the decision-making process when the negotiation comes to a point where
there are multiple execution paths that could be followed rather than relying
on a predefined strategy. The framework should support extensions that can
add a human “in the loop” if such features are requested.
Selective feature activation To enable more efficient or more secure trust negotia-
tion sessions, the features enabled by the framework should be fully config-
urable. For instance, disabling support for visualization features and external
interactions might increase the performance of the system, while disabling
third-party plug-ins might increase overall system security and trustworthi-
ness.
Feature ordering To enhance the performance of the system and its robustness
against attack, entities should have the ability to choose the order in which
certain functionalities are invoked. For instance, it should be possible for a
negotiation strategy to choose the time at which credentials are validated.
That is, there may be benefits to validating credentials as they become rele-
vant, rather than validating them as they are received.
The diversity of use cases that we considered leads us to believe that it represents
a useful set of features to support when designing a general-purpose trust negotia-
tion framework. However, the requirements presented above cannot be considered
complete, as it is impossible to consider every possible trust negotiation use case.
To acknowledge and partially address this gap, we introduce one further require-
ment that helps ensure additional features can be easily added to the framework.
Extensibility The framework must support the addition of new functionality af-
ter deployment without requiring modifications to the existing code base.
Example features may include (but are not limited to) the inclusion of new
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TrustBuilder Trust-X Koshutanski De Coi Cassandra
Arbitrary policy languages N N N P P
Arbitrary credential formats N N P N N
Interchangeable negotiation strategies N P P Y N
Flexible policy and credential stores N N N N N
External interactions N N N Y Y
Tunable human involvement N N N N N
Advanced logging N N N P N
Selective feature activation N N N N N
Feature ordering N N N N N
Extensibility N N N P P
Table 6.1: Features supported by existing trust negotiation implementations (Y =
yes, N = no, P = partially supported).
local data processing rules, the enforcement of obligations, and the incorpo-
ration of new data types (e.g., trust tickets, partial proofs, or other forms of
evidence) into the negotiation process.
Table 6.1 identifies the subsets of these requirements addressed by each of the trust
negotiation frameworks discussed in Section 6.2. As shown, no existing trust nego-
tiation framework provides even partial support formore than half of the identified
features; this is not surprising, given that these implementations were not meant to
be general-purpose frameworks. We will revisit these requirements in Section 6.8
to discuss the ways in which TrustBuilder2 addresses these desiderata.
6.5 The TrustBuilder2 Framework
In this section, we describe the design of TrustBuilder2, a Java-based framework for
trust negotiation. The primary goal in designing TrustBuilder2 was not to imple-
ment one particular trust negotiation protocol, but rather to provide a framework
within which any number of trust negotiation techniques can be implemented and
evaluated. This led to unique challenges in designing the communication protocol
used by negotiation participants, the data type hierarchy used by TrustBuilder2,
and the software architecture of the system. In this section, we describe the above
facets of the TrustBuilder2 framework.
6.5.1 Communication Protocol and Data Types
One of the first challenges we faced when designing TrustBuilder2 was defining
a communication protocol that could be interpreted by the framework, without
constraining the trust negotiation protocols that could be supported. For example,
we did not want to mandate that only credentials and policies are exchanged dur-
ing a trust negotiation session, as that would prevent the implementation of pro-
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AbstractPolicyBrick
TrustBrick
ResourceBrick
AbstractCredentialBrick ClaimBrick
X509CredentialBrick UncertifiedCredentialBrick JessPolicyBrick
NegotiationTarget StatusBrickInitBrick
RTCredentialBrick
Figure 6.1: Class hierarchy for several important TrustBrick subclasses.
tocols such as Trust-X [20] and PeerAccess [119] within the TrustBuilder2 frame-
work, since these protocols also exchange digitally-signed trust tickets and proof-
fragments, respectively. To this end, TrustBuilder2 uses a very simple commu-
nication protocol combined with an extensible data type hierarchy to enable the
implementation of a wide range of trust negotiation protocols.
Data type hierarchy
At a high level, a trust negotiation session is an exchange of messages containing
credentials, policies, uncertified claims, and other information between two par-
ties. In order to support thewidest possible range of trust negotiation protocols, the
core components of the TrustBuilder2 framework (which will be described in Sec-
tion 6.5.2) rely heavily on the use of an extensible data type hierarchy. All types of
information that might be exchanged between negotiating parties are represented
as subclasses of the TrustBrick class, which forms the basic building block of the
trust negotiation process. In this way, users can extend the data types supported
by TrustBuilder2 without modifying each component in the system; components
can simply ignore TrustBricks that they do not know how to process, leaving them
for other system components to handle. Entities then exchange TrustMessage ob-
jects containing one or more of these TrustBricks.
Figure 6.1 shows the relationships between several important subclasses of Trust-
Brick. The InitBrick, NegotiationTarget, and StatusBrick classes are used to provide
high-level information regarding a negotiation: InitBricks are used to establish the
parameters of a trust negotiation, a NegotiationTarget is used to indicate the par-
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ticular resource that the initiator of a trust negotiation wishes to access, and a Sta-
tusBrick is included in the last message of the negotiation to indicate whether the
negotiation succeeded in establishing trust between the participants. Any item ex-
changed during a trust negotiation that could possibly be protected by a release
policy is a subclass of ResourceBrick. This ensures that TrustBuilder2 can properly
enforce disclosure requirements on data items without necessarily understanding
the data item itself.
The AbstractCredentialBrick and AbstractPolicyBrick classes are used to represent
attribute certificates and policies at an abstract level, which enables components of
TrustBuilder2 to handle credentials and policies of various formats without need-
ing to understand the intricacies of each format explicitly. The X509CredentialBrick
class is used to hold information about X.509 certificates, while the RTCredential-
Brick class holds information about RT credentials [83]. The UncertifiedCreden-
tialBrick class provides TrustBuilder2 with the ability to create “fake” credentials
on-the-fly to facilitate the rigorous testing of system components as they are de-
veloped. Lastly, the JessPolicyBrick class is used to hold policies that can be inter-
preted by the CLOUSEAU compliance checker, which we have developed to explore
efficiency issues in the design of trust negotiation compliance checkers. CLOUSEAU
will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 7.
In Section 6.6, we illustrate the ways in which this extensible type hierarchy fa-
cilitates the extension of the TrustBuilder2 framework to incorporate new features,
such as support for new policy languages or credential types. Readers interested in
more detail regarding TrustBrick or its subclasses should consult the TrustBuilder2
programmer documentation included with the TrustBuilder2 distribution.
The communication protocol
As previously mentioned, the TrustBuilder2 communication protocol is nothing
more than an exchange of TrustMessage objects containing one or more TrustBricks
between the participants of the negotiation. The first message sent by the initia-
tor of the trust negotiation session contains a single InitBrick object describing the
TrustBuilder2 system configurations (i.e., strategy families, credential formats, and
policy languages) that she supports, along with other system parameters. If the re-
sponder supports a system configuration that is compatible with one of the system
configurations proposed by the initiator, he returns a TrustMessage containing an-
other InitBrick describing this system configuration. At this point, both parties can
configure their TrustBuilder2 framework to use this mutually-acceptable system
configuration during their negotiation session. The initiator then responds with a
127
TrustMessage containing a NegotiationTarget that indicates the resource that she
wishes to access. Beyond this, no constraints are imposed on the contents of these
messages; future TrustMessage objects exchanged by the participants are handled
by the strategy modules (described in the next section) supported by each of the
participants, rather than the core TrustBuilder2 framework. This allows Trust-
Builder2 to support a wide range of trust negotiation protocols without requiring
protocol-specific modifications be made to the framework itself.
6.5.2 Software Architecture
Figure 6.2 presents a high-level architecture diagram of the TrustBuilder2 runtime
system. The design choices made when implementing this system are a result of
the requirements discussed in Section 6.4 and the need to support the flexible com-
munication protocol discussed in Section 6.5.1. Components enclosed in dashed
boxes are not included in the current version of TrustBuilder2; they are only meant
to serve as examples of components that could be developed by users as plug-ins
and added to the TrustBuilder2 data path. We now describe each of the major
components identified in this diagram and comment on the flow of data between
components.
The external interface to the TrustBuilder2 runtime system is provided by the Trust-
Builder2 class. Trust negotiation sessions are conducted by making a series of calls
to methods exposed by this class. When a new trust negotiation session is started,
the TrustBuilder2 class creates and manages a Session object that keeps track of all
necessary state between rounds of the negotiation. For example, after the exchange
of InitBricks described in Section 6.5.1, the Session object will contain a description
of the TrustBuilder2 configuration to be used for this session, including the strat-
egy module to use, a list of supported policy languages, and a list of supported
credential formats. Any component in the system can add its own internal state
to a given Session object. This allows components to avoid maintaining this state
locally and eases the development of reentrant system components.
During the trust negotiation process, all incoming TrustMessages are processed by
the TrustBuilder2 object, which generates a response TrustMessage to return to the
remote participant. Prior to processing a remote TrustMessage itself or dispatching
it to the StrategyModuleMediator, the TrustBuilder2 object first passes all incoming
messages to the IOManipulationModule. The IOManipulationModule is the first class
to process each incoming TrustMessage and the last class to process each outgoing
TrustMessage. This component is capable of loading user-defined plug-ins that
can examine and modify all TrustMessage objects entering and leaving the Trust-
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Figure 6.2: TrustBuilder2 architecture overview diagram.
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Builder2 runtime system. The VisualizationModule is an example plug-in to the
IOManipulationModule that provides an interface for writing and using custom log-
ging and visualization components. The TrustBuilder2 distribution includes two
such components: the GuiVisualizer class is a plug-in that uses the Swing API to
graphically visualize every TrustMessage processed by TrustBuilder2, while the
BasicConsoleVisualizer is a plug-in that provides a console logging facility.
The core of the TrustBuilder2 runtime system—that is, the interfaces to the strategy
modules, compliance checkers, credential and policy stores, and credential manip-
ulation routines—is provided by a set of four mediator classes. Each mediator class
acts as a dispatcher providing access to any number of user-specified trust negoti-
ation system core components as described in more detail below.
StrategyModuleMediator This class acts as the coordinator for a given trust ne-
gotiation session, as it dispatches incoming TrustMessages to the appropri-
ate strategy module according to the strategy that was chosen for use during
that session; any number of strategymodules can be loaded into the Strategy-
ModuleMediator at a given time. Given an incoming TrustMessage and any
state that it had previously stored, a strategy module decides what should be
disclosed in a response to the remote party. Strategy modules can make any
number of calls to the ComplianceCheckerMediator, CredentialChainMedia-
tor, or QueryEngineMediator components during their execution.
ComplianceCheckerMediator TheComplianceCheckerMediator acts as a dispatch
routine that enables access to the various compliance checkers loaded into the
TrustBuilder2 runtime system. A compliance checker takes as input a policy,
a set of credential chains, and a set of claims, and then determines whether
the supplied credentials and claims satisfy the given policy. The Compli-
anceCheckerMediator chooses the compliance checker to use for a given set
of inputs based on the language of the policy that its caller is trying to sat-
isfy. TrustBuilder2 supports the use of compliance checkers that find at most
one satisfying set of credentials for a given policy and also compliance check-
ers that find all satisfying sets of credentials for a given policy. More details
regarding compliance checker modes of operation will be discussed in Chap-
ter 7.
CredentialChainMediator This component is responsible for creating and veri-
fying chains of credentials used during a trust negotiation. The Creden-
tialChainMediator supports the use of any number of credential chain con-
struction and verification algorithms that can be implemented as user plug-
ins. TrustBuilder2 includes support for one credential chain construction al-
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gorithm and two credential chain verification algorithms by default.
QueryEngineMediator This component accepts queries from other system com-
ponents, processes these queries, and returns a result. All queries are sub-
classes of the AbstractQuery data type and are dispatched to an appropriate
query engine based upon their query type. For example, queries to load a
user’s credentials from disk are dispatched to the ProfileManager. Any num-
ber of query engines can be loaded by the QueryEngineMediator and sup-
port for new query engines can be added by developing plug-ins for the
QueryEngineMediator. Currently, TrustBuilder2 includes support for two
query engines: the PolicyManager and the ProfileManager, which are them-
selves extensible interfaces to a user’s policy stores, and credential and claim
repositories, respectively.
For the sake of brevity, not every component of TrustBuilder2 was discussed in
this section. Readers desiring a more complete treatment of the components of the
TrustBuilder2 system should consult the programmer documentation available in
the TrustBuilder2 distribution.
6.5.3 Default Configuration
By default, TrustBuilder2 includes support for a version of the TrustBuilder1-
Relevant strategy for trust negotiation described in [122] that has been modified
to further minimize information disclosure in the event that multiple satisfying
sets of credentials are found for a given policy during a negotiation. As described
above, TrustBuilder2 supports the use of X.509 v3 credentials during interactions
with remote parties but can also use uncertified “test” credentials to exercise the
functionality of new plug-ins or components as they are being designed and de-
veloped. Plug-ins are provided for the CredentialChainMediator that allow Trust-
Builder2 to form a set of credential chains from a collection of credentials of any
format and to verify the authenticity of the credential chains that were formed.
TrustBuilder2 currently supports the CLOUSEAU compliance checker and can load
a user’s policies, credentials, and uncertified claims from repositories on the local
file system.
6.6 Case Studies in Extensibility
In this section we discuss the extensibility of TrustBuilder2 at a high level, as well
as provide a more detailed treatment of two significant extensions added to the
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framework after its initial development.
6.6.1 General Extensibility
As was our goal from the outset, almost every component of the TrustBuilder2
framework can either be extended or replaced by a user-defined plug-in. Because
the TrustBuilder2 framework was developed using Java, dynamic class loading can
be used to incorporate these user plug-ins at runtime without requiring any mod-
ification to the TrustBuilder2 framework itself. Extensions to the primary compo-
nents of TrustBuilder2—that is, the IOManipulationModule, StrategyModuleMedia-
tor, ComplianceCheckerMediator, CredentialChainMediator, and the QueryEngine-
Mediator—as well as plug-ins that interpose between these components, can be
added to the system quite easily. Users simply write and compile plug-ins con-
forming to the appropriate interfaces and instruct the TrustBuilder2 runtime sys-
tem to incorporate these modules the next time that a TrustBuilder2 object is cre-
ated. For instance, adding a new strategy to TrustBuilder2 involves writing a class
implementing StrategyModuleInterface and adding this class to the list of strategy
modules to be loaded by the StrategyModuleMediator.
We now discuss how the abstract type hierarchy used by TrustBuilder2 allows sup-
port for new credential and policy formats—as well as new forms of negotiation
evidence—to be added to the the system without requiring modifications to the
underlying framework. As will be shown, this process is very straightforward and
allows support for novel trust negotiation features to be easily incorporated into
the TrustBuilder2 framework.
6.6.2 X.509 Credentials and Uncertified Claims
Our initial version of the TrustBuilder2 framework only included support for un-
certified “test” credentials, as encoded by theUncertifiedCredentialBrick class. These
credentials can be easily created andmodified and thus allow for rapid and efficient
testing of system components. However, to better study the properties of trust ne-
gotiation systems that might be deployed in practice, support for more realistic
credential types was required. As a result, we added support for uncertified claims
encoding user data such as phone numbers or preferences (as in [20; 24]), as well
as X.509 v3 certificates to the TrustBuilder2 framework.
Support for uncertified claims required two extensions to TrustBuilder2. First, the
ClaimBrick data type was added as a subtype of the ResourceBrick data type in the
TrustBuilder2 type hierarchy (see Figure 6.1). SubtypingResourceBrick in this way
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ensures that uncertified claims can be treated as sensitive and optionally protected
by release policies. Second, a loader plug-in was written for the ProfileManager so
that uncertified claims could be loaded from the file system. In total, less than 300
lines of commented code had to be written to support the addition of uncertified
claims to TrustBuilder2.
Adding support for X.509 v3 certificates to TrustBuilder2 was accomplished in a
similar manner. Specifically, the X509CredentialBrick data type was added as a
subtype of the AbstractCredentialBrick type and another loader plug-in was writ-
ten for the ProfileManager so that X.509 certificates could be loaded from the file
system. The X509CredentialBrick data type wraps the functionality of the X.509
data type supported by Java natively and provides additional methods that extract
attribute information from a credential’s extension OID fields, populate the data
structures used by AbstractCredentialBrick objects, create and verify proof of own-
ership challenges, and verify issuer signatures. Since TrustBuilder2’s default policy
compliance checker, credential chain construction algorithms, and credential chain
verification algorithms operate on AbstractCredentialBrick objects, no further mod-
ifications were needed for TrustBuilder2 to support X.509 v3 certificates. Fewer
than 1000 lines of commented code were needed to implement the plug-ins for this
support.
6.6.3 RT Credentials and Policies
To further extend the functionality of TrustBuilder2, we have also implemented
support for RT0 and RT1 credentials and policies [83]. Adding support for the nec-
essary credential types involved a process similar to that followed for supporting
X.509 credentials. That is, TrustBuilder2’s type hierarchy was extended to include
RT credentials, and a loader plug-in was written to read these credentials from
disk. However, since Java does not support RT credentials natively, considerably
more code had to be written than was the case for adding support for X.509. In
total, approximately 3500 lines of commented code were required to add support
for loading, parsing, and using these types of credentials within the TrustBuilder2
framework.
In general, adding support for a new policy language to TrustBuilder2 would re-
quire developing a new policy compliance checker that is capable of analyzing the
satisfaction of this new type of policy. Such a compliance checker would take the
form of a plug-in to the ComplianceCheckerMediator. However, this was not nec-
essary forRT0 andRT1 policies. As we will see in Chapter 7, these types of policies
can be compiled into a format that can be efficiently analyzed by the CLOUSEAU
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compliance checker, which is already supported by TrustBuilder2. Currently, poli-
cies must be compiled in an offline manner prior to being used by TrustBuilder2,
which limits the credential chain discovery functionality supported by RT . To
overcome this barrier, we plan to implement a plug-in that interposes between the
StrategyModuleMediator and the ComplianceCheckerMediator and compiles RT
policies at runtime.
6.7 Performance Evaluation and System Profiling
We now discuss the results of a preliminary performance evaluation of the Trust-
Builder2 framework. Our primary goals in this investigation were to evaluate the
overheads associated with the flexible nature of TrustBuilder2 and to better under-
stand the bottlenecks involved in the trust negotiation process. As TrustBuilder2
relies heavily on dynamic class loading and the use of indirection through medi-
ator classes to trigger the execution of various plug-ins installed in the system, it
seemed likely that the flexibility afforded by TrustBuilder2 might come at the cost
of high overheads. Also, by understanding where time is spent during the trust
negotiation process, we can better allocate our limited development time to focus
on problem areas in the implementation.
6.7.1 The Scenario
Our scenario was designed to be a realistic trust negotiation scenario that might
take place in one branch (Acme Springfield) of a national-scale corporation (Acme
Fabrication). In this scenario, an employee wants to access a file server containing
sensitive files related to “Project X.” The policy protecting the Project X file reposi-
tory states that an authorized entity must be either (i) a full-time employee of Acme
Springfield who has an Acme Fabrication issued sensitive document training certi-
fication and works in a department whose number is in the range 2460–2469, or (ii)
a full-time employee of Acme Springfield who has an Acme Fabrication issued sen-
sitive document training certification, works in a department whose number is in
the range 2400–2499 and was granted an “access exception” for Project X by either
Alice or Bob. This policy was thought to be a reasonable example of a negotiation
that one might see in a large corporation, as it is much simpler than managing a
long access control list, but also includes provisions for the explicit white-listing of
people who are not authorized by the blanket policy. Entities on the white-list can
easily be traced back to the employee authorizing them by examining their access
134
InitBrick
InitBrick
NegotiationTarget: “Project X Repository”
Project X policy
Credential: Acme Springfield employee
Policy: Acme Springfield service?
Credential: Acme Springfield service
Credentials: Sensitive document
training certification, Access exception
Access granted!
Psvc
PX
Figure 6.3: A simplified view of the trust negotiation used during our experiments.
exception credential; this is in stark contrast to current ACL-based systems that do
not maintain a history of who added whom to the list.
The client in our scenario has a valid employee ID stating that he is a full-time
employee in department 2442 of Acme Springfield, a sensitive documents training
credential, and an access exception issued by Bob. Figure 6.3 illustrates this ex-
ample negotiation scenario graphically. The first two messages exchanged during
the negotiation contain configuration information used by TrustBuilder2 to estab-
lish the parameters for the negotiation session. The second message sent by the
client indicates his interest in accessing the file server associated with Project X.
The second message sent by the file server releases the policy protecting this file
server to the client. The client can satisfy this policy, but is not willing to disclose
his security clearance or access exception unless the server can prove that it is op-
erated by Acme Springfield. As such, the third message sent by the client discloses
the release policy protecting these credentials and the credential chain ending with
his employee ID. Supporting credentials—such as the certificates of Acme Fabri-
cation and Acme Springfield—are not shown in Figure 6.3. At this point, the file
server validates the proof-of-ownership associated with the client’s employee ID
and accepts this credential. It also then discloses the credential chain that certify-
ing that the file service is operated by Acme Springfield. The client verifies this
credential chain and the proof-of-ownership associated with the leaf credential in
the chain and then discloses his sensitive documents training credential and his
access exception to the file server. The file server verifies the proofs-of-ownership
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associated with these credentials and then grants the client access to the service.
6.7.2 The Experiments
We used the above trust negotiation scenario to conduct two experiments. The
first experiment was designed to enable us to study the average execution time of
a trust negotiation session. In this experiment, a client application made a TCP
connection to a server application and carried out the trust negotiation described
by Figure 6.3 using an ObjectOutputStream to write TrustMessages to the remote
server and anObjectInputStream to read response TrustMessages. When the nego-
tiation succeeded, the client disconnected from the server. This entire process was
repeated 100 times. The client and server applications were both executed from the
system command prompt using JDK 1.5.0 06.
In the second experiment, we sought to profile the execution of the TrustBuilder2
runtime system to gain a better understanding of the costs of the various compo-
nents of a trust negotiation. In this experiment, the server process described above
was started from the system command line using JDK 1.5.0 06. The client applica-
tion was loaded into the Eclipse development environment [46] and profiled using
the Eclipse Test and Performance Tools Platform (TPTP) tracing and profiling tools
plug-in version 4.2.1 [47].
In our experiments, the TrustBuilder2 objects used by the client and server pro-
cesses supported only the use of X.509 credentials encoded as X509CredentialBrick
objects. All X.509 credentials used during this scenario encoded RSA key pairs.
Further, each credential was represented as a unique X.509 certificate with its own
key pair. Both the client and server processes used the CLOUSEAU compliance
checker. The strategy used by both parties was the variant of the TrustBuilder1-
relevant strategy discussed in Section 6.5.3 that is implemented by the Maximum-
RelevantStrategy class included in the TrustBuilder2 distribution. Credential chains
were built using theSimpleChainBuilder class and verified using theRootToLeafVer-
ifier class. The IOManipulationModule was disabled at both the client and server.
The experiments described above were run using a single machine, rather than
two machines, as we were more interested in the computational costs of the trust
negotiation than the communication latencies imposed by routing packets through
an Ethernet network. The machine that we used had a 3.2 GHz Intel Pentium 4
processor, 1 GB of RAM, and was running Gentoo Linux (kernel 2.6.12).
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6.7.3 Results
After conducting the first experiment, we found that the average time to conduct
the aforementioned trust negotiation session using TrustBuilder2 was 434.73 ms
with a standard deviation of 97.56 ms. This is at least an order of magnitude faster
than a trust negotiation session carried out using the original TrustBuilder frame-
work, as a similar negotiation takes seconds on averagewithin that framework [79].
We did find that the first trust negotiation session took roughly three times as long
as an average negotiation (1350 ms) due to the cost of Java initially loading the
classes used by the TrustBuilder2 framework. We do not see this as a problem,
however, as it is likely that TrustBuilder2 objects will be used for multiple nego-
tiations and therefore this initial cost will quickly be amortized, as it was in our
experiments.
In our second experiment, we found that the majority of the time was spent in one
of three tasks: using the compliance checker (≈ 49%), reading from and writing
to I/O streams (≈ 15.5%), and signing proof-of-ownership challenges (≈ 14.4%).
What is interesting to note is that the overheads of the remaining portions of the
TrustBuilder2 framework amount to less than 0.2% of the overall cost of the trust
negotiation process. This implies that the flexibility afforded by the TrustBuilder2
framework does not, in and of itself, carry the steep overheads that we had orig-
inally anticipated. Of course, loading inefficient or otherwise expensive plug-ins
could easily increase the cost of a trust negotiation.
6.8 Discussion
In this section, we revisit the requirements presented in Section 6.4 and discuss
the ways in which they are met by TrustBuilder2. We then discuss potential im-
plications of the performance results obtained in Section 6.7. Lastly, we provide
information on obtaining TrustBuilder2.
6.8.1 Requirements Redux
In Section 6.4, we introduced ten requirements that should be provided by frame-
works for exploring the systems aspects of trust negotiation. Section 6.6 illustrated
the ways in which plug-in extensions to TrustBuilder2 can be used to meet the ar-
bitrary policy languages, arbitrary credential formats, interchangeable negotiation strate-
gies, flexible policy and credential stores, and extensibility requirements. The plug-in
interface for defining strategy modules does not place any constraints on how the
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strategy behaves, which enables user-defined strategy modules to meet the tun-
able human involvement and feature ordering requirements. The VisualizationModule
plug-in to the IOManipulationModule enables advanced logging and visualization
features, thus meeting the advanced logging capabilities requirement. Finer-grained
logging can be accomplished by placing calls to the logger at the mediator hook
points described in Section 6.5.2. The QueryModuleMediator can be used to allow
the TrustBuilder2 framework to interact with processes external to the negotiation
at hand simply by developing new query module plug-ins, thereby meeting the
strategy-driven external interactions requirement. Finally, each of the plug-ins to the
TrustBuilder2 system can be individually enabled or disabled, thereby meeting the
selective feature activation requirement.
6.8.2 Attacks and Future Research
One striking result from the performance evaluation presented in Section 6.7 is that
nearly half of a trust negotiation session is spent interacting with the compliance
checker. During our experiments, the client process spent, on average, 226ms inter-
acting with the compliance checker during a single trust negotiation. This suggests
that a novel and highly-effective denial of service attack against trust negotiation-
enabled services is to force the use of the remote party’s compliance checker. An
attacker can easily accomplish this by either placing release policies on every cre-
dential that might possibly be released to the remote party, or by sending spurious
policies that the remote party thinks are protecting resources that could advance the
state of the negotiation. Such an attack involves little overhead for the attacker, yet
can consume arbitrary amounts of processor time on the host being attacked.
This attack is quite different than the types of denial of service attacks on trust
negotiation discussed in the research literature. To date, attacks against trust ne-
gotiation systems have focused on examining ways to exploit the credential chain
construction and verification processes [81; 104]. These attacks leverage the dispar-
ity in cost between transmitting a credential chain and verifying that the chain is
correctly formed to consume resources on the target system. The higher per-unit
cost of policy compliance checking when compared to credential verification im-
plies that attacking the compliance checker used by a trust negotiation system can
be at least as damaging as attacking its credential chain verification process. Fur-
thermore, malicious entities combining these two attacks can slow the processes of
analyzing both local and remote policies at the host being attacked.
Analyzing the cost breakdown of example trust negotiation scenarios not only led
to the identification of this attack strategy, but also helped identify future research
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directions aiming to better optimize trust negotiation systems. For example, an
earlier version of our performance analysis led us to explore alternate formula-
tions of the policy compliance checking problem that would allow for more effi-
cient policy analysis than existing theorem proving approaches. The result was
the CLOUSEAU compliance checker, which leverages an efficient pattern matching
approach to greatly outperform existing compliance checkers both asymptotically
and in practice. However, the attacks described above occur even when using this
optimized compliance checker. An interesting direction for future research is the
development of trust negotiation strategies that can detect the above types of com-
pliance checker abuses and either triage “unproductive” negotiations or seek to
limit the use of the compliance checker without compromising the completeness
property of the trust negotiation protocol.
6.8.3 Obtaining TrustBuilder2
Since it’s initial release in mid-2007, the TrustBuilder2 distribution has been avail-
able for download under a BSD-style license at our web site for the project,
http://dais.cs.uiuc.edu/tn. The distribution includes the source code and
binary distribution of the framework, example client and server applications that
make use of TrustBuilder2, programmer documentation (in Javadoc format), and
a user manual explaining the installation, configuration, and use of TrustBuilder2.
As of July 2008, the TrustBuilder2 framework has been downloaded over 200 times.
Compiling the source code for TrustBuilder2 requires the Java Development Kit
version 1.5.0 or higher.
6.9 Summary
In this chapter, we presented TrustBuilder2, a flexible framework for investigating
the systems aspects of trust negotiation. TrustBuilder2 supports the dynamic load-
ing of new trust negotiation system components—such as strategy modules, com-
pliance checkers, policy and credential storage devices, and logging and visual-
ization modules—without modification to the underlying framework and features
an extensible type hierarchy that allows end-users to easily add support for new
credential formats and policy languages. We explored several case studies in exten-
sibility, as well as profiled the performance of TrustBuilder2. These studies showed
that TrustBuilder2 has a number of desirable properties that make it ideal for re-
searching the systems obstacles to deploying trust negotiation systems in practice.
Furthermore, our performance evaluation enabled us to uncover a novel class of
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attacks against trust negotiation systems and led us to identify promising areas of
future trust negotiation systems research. In the next chapter, we will discuss a
novel approach to efficiently solving the policy compliance checking problem that
we have developed within this framework.
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7 A Pattern Matching Approach to
Policy Compliance Checking
Whenever there is a hard job to be done, I assign it to a lazy man; he is sure to
find an easy way of doing it.
—Walter Chrysler
In Chapter 6, we showed that checking compliance with trust management poli-
cies is one of the most expensive portions of the trust negotiation process. Fur-
thermore, to ensure that a trust negotiation session succeeds whenever possible,
authorization policy compliance checkers must be able to find all minimal sets of
their owners’ credentials that can be used to satisfy a given policy. This obviously
compounds the inefficiency problem. If, however, all of these satisfying sets can be
found efficiently prior to choosing which set should be disclosed next, many strate-
gic benefits can also be realized. Unfortunately, solutions to this problem that use
existing compliance checkers are too inefficient to be useful in practice. Specifi-
cally, the overheads of finding all satisfying sets using existing approaches have
been shown to grow exponentially in the size of the union of all satisfying sets of
credentials for the policy, even after optimizations have been made to prune the
search space for potential satisfying sets [108].
In this chapter, we describe the CLOUSEAU compliance checker. CLOUSEAU lever-
ages an efficient pattern-matching algorithm to find all satisfying sets of credentials
for a given policy in time that grows as O(NA), where N is the number of satisfy-
ing sets for the policy and A is the average size of each satisfying set. We describe
the design and implementation of the CLOUSEAU compliance checker, evaluate its
performance as the number and size of satisfying sets for a given policy varies, and
show that it vastly outperforms existing approaches to finding all satisfying sets of
credentials. To establish the general utility of our approach to compliance checking,
we then present a method for automatically compiling policies written in the RT
andWS-SecurityPolicy languages into a format suitable for analysis by CLOUSEAU.
We further prove the correctness and completeness of these compilation proce-
dures, which ensures that the semantics of the underlying policy languages remain
unchanged, despite the use of a radically different analysis approach.1
1The material presented in this chapter was originally published as [75] and [76].
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7.1 Introduction
The design of robust and highly-available trust negotiation systems hinges on the
availability of efficient policy compliance checkers. Given a policy p and a set C
of credentials, the compliance checker is responsible for determining one or more
minimal subsets of C that satisfy p. We call these minimal subsets satisfying sets
of credentials. To ensure that trust negotiation protocols establish trust whenever
possible, the compliance checkers used by these systemsmust be capable of finding
all satisfying sets of credentials for a given policy. This enables the negotiator to
attempt alternate means of establishing trust in the event that the initially-chosen
negotiation tactic leads to a deadlock or other dead end.
Trust negotiation is intrinsically a strategy-driven process in which the participants
each attempt to advance the state of the protocol while maximizing their own par-
ticular goals [122]. For instance, the so-called eager and parsimonious negotiation
strategies allow negotiation participants to balance a trade-off between negotiation
speed and privacy by choosing to disclose either all credentials that a remote party
is authorized to view or only those that have been deemed relevant to satisfying
the policy at hand, respectively [117]. If a negotiation participant is able to deter-
mine all satisfying sets of credentials for a given policy a priori, much finer-grained
strategies can be employed. For example:
• If entities assign point values to individual credentials that indicate each cre-
dential’s level of sensitivity (e.g., as in [121]), the negotiation process can re-
spond to a given policy by disclosing the satisfying set with the lowest overall
sensitivity.
• In the event that an entity has digital credentials representing memberships
in organizations that may lead to various types of discounts or preferential
treatment (e.g., AAA, AARP, or frequent flyer credentials), the entity could
employ a negotiation strategy that discloses satisfying sets containing these
types of credentials first.
• In some cases, entities might wish to minimize the cumulative number of cre-
dentials disclosed over multiple rounds of a given trust negotiation session;
a simple greedy algorithm could be used to determine the satisfying set that
minimizes the overall number of credentials disclosed.
• A party might wish to steer the negotiation in the direction most likely to
minimize its duration. For example, a servermaywish to lead the negotiation
in the direction that the analysis of logs of past negotiations has shown to be
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the way that most users gain access.
Existing compliance checkers designed for trust negotiation policy languages find
at most one satisfying set of credentials at a time, but can be operated in an it-
erative manner to discover alternate satisfying sets in the event that the first set
found leads to a negotiation path that fails to establish trust. While this iterative
approach to discovering satisfying sets is sufficient to ensure the completeness of
trust negotiation protocols, it is a very slow way to discover all satisfying sets at
once. As a result, it is unrealistic to use this approach as the basis for the types
of strategies discussed above. Specifically, the overheads of finding all satisfying
sets using such an approach have been shown to grow exponentially in the size of
the union of all satisfying sets of credentials for the policy, even after optimizations
have been made to prune the search space for potential satisfying sets [108].
In this chapter, we describe the design and implementation of CLOUSEAU, a highly-
efficient and policy language-agnostic compliance checker for trust negotiation sys-
tems. Rather than discovering satisfying sets of credentials using a top-down proof
construction system, CLOUSEAU solves the policy compliance checking problem by
compiling policies into a format that can be efficiently analyzed using solutions to
the many pattern/many object pattern match problem. Given a set of patterns and
a set of objects, algorithms for solving this problem find all patterns matched by
subsets of the provided objects. Internally, CLOUSEAU represents access control
policies as patterns specifying constraints on the credentials, credential chains, and
uncertified claims (e.g., phone numbers, addresses, etc.) that must be presented to
gain access to a particular resource. The Rete algorithm [52] is then used to find all
satisfying sets by efficiently matching objects representing a user’s credentials and
claims against these patterns. Overall, CLOUSEAU makes several important contri-
butions related to the compliance checker problem for trust negotiation systems:
• CLOUSEAU requires only tens of milliseconds, on average, to determine every
satisfying set of credentials associated with a reasonably-sized policy; this
is comparable to the time required by previous trust negotiation compliance
checkers to find one satisfying set.
• To the best of our knowledge, CLOUSEAU represents the first trust negotiation
compliance checker capable of finding all satisfying sets of credentials for a
given policy with time overheads that scale asO(NA), whereN is the number
of satisfying sets for a policy and A is the average size of each satisfying set.
Previous solutions to this problem have running time overheads that grow
exponentially in the size of the union of all satisfying sets. As a concrete point
of comparison, the iterative solution presented in [108] takes over 10 seconds
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to find two overlapping satisfying sets containing a total of 20 credentials,
while CLOUSEAU finds the same satisfying sets in approximately 40 ms.
• In the worst case, the number of satisfying sets for a given policy can be expo-
nential in the size of the policy. However, CLOUSEAU’s performance remains
reasonable even when policies become inordinately complex. For example,
CLOUSEAU can find 512 satisfying sets each of size 9 in approximately one
second; we have not found policies of this complexity being used in prac-
tice or mentioned elsewhere in the research literature. In Section 7.5, we
show that policies as complex as even the most complicated policies used
in Becker’s formalization of the security requirements for the UK’s electronic
health records service [16] can be analyzed by CLOUSEAU in under 100 ms.
• Since it can efficiently find all satisfying sets of credentials for a given policy,
CLOUSEAU makes the use of “smarter” trust negotiation strategies practical.
In Section 7.5, we show that CLOUSEAU is very fast at finding the minimum-
weight (e.g., least-sensitive) satisfying set of credentials for a given policy.
• The design of a single highly-optimized compliance checker capable of an-
alyzing policies written in any policy language would allow resource own-
ers to write policies without worrying about the costs of analyzing them.
CLOUSEAU compiles policies written in high-level policy languages into an
intermediate representation that specifies constraints on the actual creden-
tials used to satisfy a given access control policy, which it can then efficiently
analyze. We present processes for automatically compiling RT [83] and WS-
SecurityPolicy [96] policies into a format that can be analyzed by CLOUSEAU.
We then prove the correctness and completeness of these compilation proce-
dures. Since policies written in all existing trust negotiation policy languages
are satisfied by the same types of evidence, we expect that equivalent compi-
lation mechanisms could be specified for the other languages as well.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. We begin with a discussion of
compliance checker modes of operation in Section 7.2. We then formally define the
specific instance of the more general policy compliance checking problem solved
by CLOUSEAU in Section 7.3. Section 7.4 describes the Rete algorithm, presents
the design and implementation of the CLOUSEAU compliance checker, and dis-
cusses the internal representation of policies and evidence used by CLOUSEAU.
In Section 7.5 we conduct a series of experiments to evaluate the performance of
CLOUSEAU and compare its benefits and limitations to those of other compliance
checking approaches. We present procedures for automatically compiling RT and
WS-SecurityPolicy policies into a format suitable for analysis by CLOUSEAU in Sec-
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tions 7.6 and 7.7. Lastly, we summarize the results from this chapter in Section 7.8.
7.2 Types of Compliance Checkers
In [105], the authors broadly classify policy compliance checkers for trust manage-
ment and trust negotiation systems into three categories. They first define type-
1 compliance checkers as functions that return only a Boolean result indicating
whether the policy in question was satisfied. This type of compliance checker is
useful in non-iterative systems in which the discovery of why a particular access
is permitted is superfluous. In this type of system, simply knowing that the com-
pliance checker was able to construct a formal proof of authorization is sufficient.
Type-2 compliance checkers return one satisfying set of credentials in addition to a
Boolean value in the case that a policy is found to be satisfied. The ability to asso-
ciate at least one satisfying set of credentials with a compliance checker decision is
required by the trust negotiation process. Without such a satisfying set, individuals
could not determine which credentials should be sent to their negotiation partner
after they determine that a remote policy can be satisfied. Lastly, type-3 compliance
checkers are defined as functions that return every minimal set of credentials that
can be used to satisfy a particular policy.
To date, all existing trust negotiation compliance checkers have been developed as
type-2 compliance checkers, even though significant strategic benefits could be re-
alized through the use of a type-3 compliance checker. In [108], Smith et al. discuss
several important uses of this type of compliance checker and describe the Satisfy-
ing Set Generation (SSgen) algorithm for discovering all satisfying sets for a given
policy using a type-2 policy compliance checker. They show that when policies are
expressed in disjunctive normal form (DNF), then a number of clever optimiza-
tions can be made to prune the state space that must be searched for satisfying sets
of credentials. They then evaluate the performance of an implementation of the
SSgen algorithm that used the IBM TE compliance checker [57] as the base type-2
compliance checker.
Figure 7.1 is a reproduction of the results presented in [108] depicting the running
times of the SSGen algorithm. The three most interesting cases in which the SSgen
algorithm was evaluated include the cases in which (i) a policy has one satisfying
set of size U , (ii) a policy has U satisfying sets of size one, and (iii) a policy has two
satisfying sets, each of size 3U4 . In all cases, U represents the size of the union of all
satisfying sets and was varied between 1 and 24. In case (i), the SSgen algorithm
scaled linearly with U in the sub-second time range. In cases (ii) and (iii), the SS-
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Figure 7.1: Running time of the SSGen algorithm as a function of the size of the
union of all satisfying sets.
gen algorithm’s running time increased exponentially with U and rapidly became
impractical.
As we will see, CLOUSEAU improves upon this previous work by compiling trust
negotiation policies into an intermediate representation that can be analyzed us-
ing efficient pattern matching algorithms. This non-traditional approach to the-
orem proving greatly optimizes the process of finding all possible satisfying sets
of credentials for a given policy. Further, because existing trust negotiation policy
languages can be compiled into a format that can be analyzed using CLOUSEAU,
developers can optimize trust negotiation runtime systems while allowing policy
writers to continue to use existing high-level policy languages.
7.3 Problem Definition
At its most basic level, a trust negotiation session is a bilateral and iterative ex-
change of access policies and evidence conducted to establishmutual trust between
two parties. For example, a student who wishes to access a resource connected to
a computing grid might be returned a policy stating that only full-time students
at accredited universities can access that resource. Prior to proving her enrollment
status to the resource operator, the student might first require that the resource op-
erator prove that it is operated by either an NSF-sponsored organization or an or-
ganization that is a member of the Better Business Bureau. Digital credentials, such
as X.509 certificates, are the most common form of evidence used by these proto-
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cols, although uncertified claims (as in [20; 24]), proof fragments (as in [12; 119]), or
trust tickets (as in [20]) could also be exchanged. In the remainder of this chapter,
we will define E as the set of all such evidence and P as the set of all policies.
Formally, a compliance checker is defined as a function cc : 2E × P → R that takes
some set of evidence and a policy and determines whether (and possibly how) this
policy is satisfied by the specified set of evidence. The exact definition of satisfac-
tion is specific to the policy language being used. For example, in any language
with a model theory, we say that a set E of evidence satisfies a policy p if in every
model where E is true, p is also true. In CLOUSEAU, a policy is specified as one or
more patterns placing constraints on the credentials and other evidence that must
be presented to gain access to a particular resource. We say that such a policy is sat-
isfied if at least one of these patterns can be matched by the set of objects describing
the credentials and other evidence possessed by a given entity. As we will see in
Section 7.6, proving the correctness of our RT to CLOUSEAU policy compilation
process involves proving an equivalence between these two concepts of satisfac-
tion. That is, we must show that an CLOUSEAU pattern-match occurs if and only
if the RT rules of inference draw the same conclusion. A similar parallel will be
drawn with respect to policies specified using the WS-SecurityPolicy language in
Section 7.7.
When a compliance checker is invoked to check the satisfaction of some policy pro-
tecting a local resource r, it will be given a set of evidence provided by the remote
entity wishing to access r. In this case, the compliance checker need only return
a Boolean value indicating whether the policy was satisfied (i.e., R ≡ B). How-
ever, if local credentials are used in an attempt to satisfy a remote policy p, then
R ≡ 22E . That is, the compliance checker must return zero or more sets of local ev-
idence that minimally satisfy p so that the local entity knows which local evidence
can be sent to the remote entity to gain access to the resource protected by p. We
say that some set E of evidence minimally satisfies a policy p if no proper subset of
E also satisfies p. A compliance checker capable of recognizing all possible sub-
sets of the local evidence that minimally satisfy a given policy is required to ensure
that a trust negotiation protocol will establish trust whenever possible and can also
afford its user a number of strategic advantages. Therefore, our focus in this chap-
ter is to efficiently solve the following specific instance of the more general policy
compliance checking problem:
THE TYPE-3 COMPLIANCE CHECKER PROBLEM. Given a set E ∈ E of evidence and a
policy p ∈ P , find all distinct subsets sets e1, . . . , en of E that minimally satisfy p.
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7.4 Design of Clouseau
In this section we discuss the design of the CLOUSEAU compliance checker, which
we have designed to efficiently solve the type-3 compliance checker problem. We
begin by showing that this problem naturally translates into an instance of the
many pattern/many object pattern match problem. This is followed by a discus-
sion of the technical details of our implementation of the CLOUSEAU compliance
checker, including an overview of the Rete algorithm, which is used by CLOUSEAU.
Lastly, we conclude this section with an overview of CLOUSEAU’s internal repre-
sentation of trust negotiation evidence and policies.
7.4.1 Design Approach
To date, most policy languages for trust negotiation are modeled using logic pro-
gramming approaches, as the formal semantics of logic programs are well under-
stood. For example, policies in Cassandra [17], PSPL [24], the language used by
Koshutanski and Massacci [68], RT [83], and PeerAccess [119] are all specified in
this manner. Even some XML-based languages, such as TPL [57] and XACML [66],
can be formally modeled using logic programming approaches. Not surprisingly,
the policy compliance checking approaches used for these types of languages have
leveraged traditional theorem-proving techniques. When the compliance checker
is invoked on a policy p with a set E of evidence, the underlying theorem prover
stores the set of evidence e ⊆ E used during the construction of a single proof that
p was satisfied. Rather than simply returning the Boolean value true, the set e is
also returned by the compliance checker to provide support for its decision.
Although this type of theorem-proving approach to the general compliance checker
problem is natural given the logical foundations of trust management, it is not
the only way in which this problem can be formulated. In fact, using this type
of approach to solve the type-3 compliance checker problem is unappealing, as
theorem provers in general are designed to find a single proof that a fact is valid
(i.e., that a policy is satisfied) and search for alternate proofs only when a given
proof attempt fails. As an alternate approach, we have recognized that the the type-
3 compliance checker problem is actually an instance of the more general many
pattern/many object pattern matching problem [52]:
THE MANY PATTERN/MANY OBJECT PATTERN MATCHING PROBLEM. Given a set
of patterns and a set of objects, determine all of the ways in which the set of objects can be
used to match any of the specified patterns.
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Clearly, if credentials and other evidence are treated as objects and policy clauses
are treated as patterns, an efficient solution to this problem could likely lead to an
efficient solution to the type-3 compliance checker problem. This problem has been
studied previously by the artificial intelligence community, as it is central to the
design of efficient production system interpreters. As a result, efficient algorithms,
such as Rete [52] and TREAT [92], have been developed to solve this problem. The
Rete algorithm is optimized for instances of the many pattern/many object pat-
tern matching problem in which (i) patterns are compilable, (ii) all objects remain
constant once inserted into the Rete engine’s working memory, and (iii) the set of
objects changes relatively slowly [52]. Trust negotiation policies are all compilable,
as they are designed to enable automated reasoning, rather than human interpre-
tation. Further, credentials and other evidence remain constant once obtained. For
example, modifying or tampering with a digital certificate invalidates its attached
issuer signature. Lastly, the set of local evidence changes very infrequently and the
set of remote evidence grows monotonically as the protocol proceeds. We therefore
use the Rete algorithm as the basis for the CLOUSEAU compliance checker.
7.4.2 The Rete Algorithm
We now provide an overview of the Rete algorithm and highlight its benefits in
solving the type-3 compliance checker problem. Readers interested in a more in-
depth treatment of the Rete algorithm should consult [52] for further information.
At a high level, the Rete algorithm works by forming a network of nodes that rep-
resent one or more matching tests found in the specified patterns. Pattern nodes,
which are also known as one-input nodes, are used to match single objects stored in
the working memory of the Rete engine. In the case of CLOUSEAU, these objects rep-
resent constraints on individual pieces of trust negotiation evidence such as digital
certificates and uncertified claims. The outputs of these pattern nodes can then be
fed into one or more join nodes, which are used to build more complex patterns
consisting of conjunctions of basic patterns and constraints existing between the
objects matched by these patterns. In our formulation of the type-3 compliance
checker problem, join nodes are used to specify conjunctions of basic credentials as
well as inter-credential constraints (i.e., chains of trust or credential delegations).
A collection of pattern nodes and join nodes forms a directed acyclic graph whose
sink nodes are called terminal nodes. As matches occur in the Rete network, infor-
mation describing the match is propagated along the edges of the graph. When a
terminal node is reached, an event is triggered that signifies that a complete match
has occurred. In CLOUSEAU, this implies that a given policy has been satisfied and
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Figure 7.2: An example Rete network.
enables the compliance checker to extract the set of evidence that led to this partic-
ular policy satisfaction. Since information is propagated along all possible edges in
the Rete network, all satisfying sets are found by the Rete algorithm.
Figure 7.2 is an illustration of a Rete network for the policy p← a∧ b∧ (c∨ (d∧ e)),
which is represented internally as the pair of Horn clauses p ← a, b, c and p ←
a, b, d, e. Square boxes represent pattern nodes, the trapezoids are join nodes, and
the rounded rectangle node is a terminal node that represents the satisfaction of the
policy p. Note that when using the Rete algorithm, distinct patterns are matched at
most once, despite appearing in multiple Horn clauses. Further, join nodes can be
shared between multiple clauses of the policy.
Another benefit of the Rete approach is that the network maintains state between
invocations, which greatly minimizes the number of times that the working mem-
ory is iterated over as multiple policies are matched. That is, each object in the
Rete engine’s working memory is matched against each pattern node at most one
time and the results of this matching operation are saved. For instance, if the policy
p′ ← a∧b∧(c∨f) is added to the working memory of the Rete engine in Figure 7.2,
the Rete engine needs only to check for the existence of credential f , as anymatches
for a ∧ b and a ∧ b ∧ c were found and memoized during the analysis of the policy
p. These types of optimizations further help make the Rete algorithm an efficient
approach to solving the type-3 compliance checker problem.
7.4.3 Implementation
We now describe our implementation of CLOUSEAU, a fully-functional compliance
checker that leverages the Rete algorithm to efficiently solve the type-3 compli-
ance checker problem. Our goal in designing CLOUSEAU was not to propose a new
trust negotiation policy language, but rather to explore the design of efficient solu-
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tions to the type-3 compliance checker problem. Therefore, rather than designing
CLOUSEAU to check the satisfaction of policies specified in one particular policy
language (e.g., Cassandra, RT , TPL, or X -TNL), we instead focus on designing a
more general-purpose compliance checker. Ultimately, the access control policies
used by trust negotiation systems are satisfied by digital certificates or other such
evidence presented by participants in the negotiation process. To this end, the pol-
icy patterns used to construct the Rete network analyzed by CLOUSEAU specify
constraints on the actual evidence (e.g., certificates, certificate chains, and claims)
necessary to gain access to a particular resource. This is in contrast to higher-level
policy languages, such as RT , which have syntactic constructs to represent con-
cepts such as delegation natively. In Sections 7.6 and 7.7, we discuss processes
through which RT and WS-SecurityPolicy policies can be automatically compiled
into the native rule format used by CLOUSEAU for analysis. Since all trust negotia-
tion policies are eventually satisfied by the same types of evidence, we believe that
equivalent compilation procedures could be derived for other higher-level policy
languages as well.
Our implementation of CLOUSEAU was developed using the Java programming
language. At a high level, CLOUSEAU takes a set E of evidence and an access con-
trol policy p and uses an implementation of the Rete algorithm provided by the
Jess expert system [53] to determine all of the ways in which subsets of E can sat-
isfy p. The running time of this Rete implementation scales, on average, linearly
with the size of its working memory [53]. This implies that CLOUSEAU’s running
time scales as O(NA), where N is the number of satisfying sets for a policy and A
is the average size of each satisfying set; we confirm this result experimentally in
Section 7.5. Our implementation consists of a Jess specification defining the inter-
nal representations of evidence and several useful functions for reasoning about
credential chains, and a larger Java code base responsible for examining various
types of evidence, translating evidence into objects that can be instantiated within
CLOUSEAU, and creating and querying the Rete network used by CLOUSEAU. We
now discuss the internal representation of evidence used by CLOUSEAU as well as
the specification of access control policies.
Evidence Representation
Because Jess provides a general-purpose implementation of the Rete algorithm, it
has no way of representing or reasoning about trust negotiation evidence natively.
We therefore had to define several object templates that represent key types of evi-
dence inside of the Rete engine’s working memory. The current implementation of
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;; Used to describe digital certificates and
;; other credentials
(deftemplate credential
(slot id)
(slot issuer)
(slot subject)
(slot fingerprint)
(slot owned (default FALSE))
(slot map (default (new java.util.HashMap))))
;; Contains an ordered list of credentials making
;; up a credential chain
(deftemplate credential-chain
(multislot credentials))
;; Claims are stored as attribute/value pairs
(deftemplate claim
(slot id)
(slot type)
(slot value))
Figure 7.3: Internal evidence representations used by CLOUSEAU.
CLOUSEAU supports the use of digital certificates, certificate chains, and uncerti-
fied claims as forms of evidence; adding support for other types of evidence, such
as Trust-X trust tickets, would be a relatively straightforward process.
CLOUSEAU makes use of TrustBuilder2’s extensible credential type hierarchy to
allow trust negotiation implementations to add support for new credential types
to CLOUSEAU without modifying its underlying code base. Trust negotiation im-
plementations are responsible for validating any proof-of-ownership challenges
associated with a given credential and for forming and verifying the credential
chains passed into CLOUSEAU. Once a collection of credential chains has been
passed into CLOUSEAU, they are translated into instances of the credential and
credential-chain object types described in Figure 7.3. Uncertified claims pro-
vided as evidence to CLOUSEAU are represented internally as instances of the claim
object type.
Objects of type credential are generated by extracting information from a given
cryptographic credential using methods in the AbstractCredentialBrick class at the
top of TrustBuilder2’s credential type hierarchy. Each credential structure is
assigned a unique identifier and contains fields describing the credential’s subject
and issuer, a cryptographic fingerprint of the credential, a Boolean value indicating
whether proof-of-ownership of the credential was verified, and a map containing
key/value pairs describing attributes (e.g., job function, hire date, etc.) or other
information (e.g., expiry date) embedded in the credential. Internally, credential
chains are represented as ordered lists of unique identifiers satisfying two invari-
ants: (i) the credential referenced by the identifier at index 0 in the list is the root
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;; This policy is satisfied by graduate students at ABET-
;; accredited universities who provide an email address
;; that can be used for future correspondence.
(defrule rule-grad-student
;; Find a certificate chain leading from a university
;; to a graduate student
(credential (id ?iuniv) (subject ?suniv))
(credential (id ?istud) (owned true) (map ?mstud))
(test (eq "Graduate Student" (?mstud get "Type")))
(credential-chain (credentials $?cstud))
(test (is-root ?iuniv ?cstud))
(test (is-leaf ?istud ?cstud))
;; Find a certificate chain leading from ABET to
;; the university found above.
(credential (id ?iabet) (fingerprint
"38:1A:42:E9:00:7D:19:41:AC:66:F2:EF:12:E6:B4:A1"))
(credential (id ?icert) (map ?mcert)
(subject ?scert &: (eq ?scert ?suniv)))
(test (eq "Accredited University" (?mcert get "Type")))
(credential-chain (credentials $?ccert)
(test (is-root ?iabet ?ccert))
(test (is-nth ?icert 2 ?ccert))
;; See if the student provided an email address
(claim (id ?iemail) (type "Email") (value ?v))
=>
(assert (satisfaction (resource-name server)
(credentials ?cstud ?ccert)
(claims ?iemail))))
Figure 7.4: An example CLOUSEAU policy.
of the credential chain and (ii) the credential referenced by the identifier at index
i > 0 was issued by the owner of the credential at index i − 1. Uncertified claims
are represented as attribute/value pairs associated with a unique identifier field.
Policy Specification
In CLOUSEAU, access control policies are specified as collections of Jess rules that
place constraints on the credentials, credential chains, and uncertified claims that
must be presented to gain access to a particular resource. In the remainder of this
section, we provide a overview of the CLOUSEAU policy syntax by discussing an
example access control policy. We note that only a very small subset of the Jess
language is needed to specify CLOUSEAU policies. In particular, we use only the
language constructs discussed in this section.
Figure 7.4 is an example access control policy designed to allow graduate students
at universities accredited by the Accreditation Board for Engineering and Technol-
ogy (ABET) to access some resource, provided that they disclose an email address
that can be used for future correspondence. Because of the relatively simple na-
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ture of this policy, it can be specified using a single Jess rule. Rules consist of two
parts: a left hand side (LHS) specifying patterns that must be matched by objects in
the working memory of the Rete engine and a right hand side (RHS) that specifies
some action to be taken if the pattern in the LHS of the rule is completely matched.
These two parts of a rule are separated by the => token.
The LHS of the rule in Figure 7.4 consists of three groups of patterns that must be
matched by objects in the working memory of the Rete engine representing trust
negotiation evidence. The first group determines whether there exists a certificate
chain whose leaf node is a certificate of type “Graduate Student.” The first line
of this group is a pattern that matches any credential and saves the values of its
unique identifier and subject string in the variables ?iuniv and ?suniv, respec-
tively. The second line in this grouping is a similar pattern that matches any creden-
tial whose ownership was proven during the trust negotiation protocol. The third
line in this grouping enforces the constraint that the second credential matched has
a “Type” field whose value is “Graduate Student.” The last three lines of the first
grouping require that the two matched credentials must exist in a credential chain
whose authenticity was verified by the trust negotiation implementation. Note that
a given pattern need not constrain all fields of the credential object type.
The second group of patterns is similar to the first, in that it also establishes the
existence of another credential chain. The first two lines of this group form a
pattern that matches only the certificate whose cryptographic fingerprint is repre-
sented by the hexadecimal string 38:1A:42:E9:00:7D:19:41:AC:66:F2:EF:
12:E6:B4:A1, which is the fingerprint of the (fictitious) certificate used by ABET
to issue university accreditations. The third, fourth, and fifth lines of this group
form a pattern that matches any credential that has a subject field that is the same
as that of the root of the first credential chain (i.e., the university), and has a “Type”
fieldwhose value is “AccreditedUniversity.” The last two lines of this pattern place
the constraint that the ABET credential must form the root of a credential chain of
length two that ends with the university’s accreditation certificate. The last group
of constraints consists of a single line specifying that the user needs to also disclose
an uncertified claim of type “Email” containing his or her email address, which
will presumably be stored for future correspondence.
In general, the RHS of a CLOUSEAU policy can either assert an intermediate result
that can be used as input to other rules, or assert a satisfaction object describ-
ing one way in which a particular policy was satisfied. The former action might
be taken if a complicated policy has several paths to satisfaction that each require
a common prefix to be matched; we will see examples of this in Section 7.6.2. The
policy in Figure 7.4 takes the latter action and asserts a satisfaction object con-
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taining the set of credentials and the single claim used to satisfy the policy.
Despite a simple policy specification syntax, CLOUSEAU policies can quickly be-
come large and difficult to understand due to the number of constraints that might
exist between elements of a credential chain or fields of credentials in different
chains. However, we do not view this as a limitation of CLOUSEAU. We do not ex-
pect that users of CLOUSEAUwill choose to specify policies using this subset of Jess.
Rather, we view the native policy representation used by CLOUSEAU as being akin
to assembly language in that it provides a representation of a potentially-complex
expression that can be efficiently analyzed. We expect that users will specify poli-
cies in higher-level trust negotiation policy languages and that these policies will
be automatically compiled into CLOUSEAU’s native language, much as programs
written in high-level programming languages are compiled into assembly code
prior to execution. In Sections 7.6 and 7.7, we will make this metaphor more con-
crete by specifying compilation procedures for policies written using the RT and
WS-SecurityPolicy languages.
7.5 Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the CLOUSEAU compliance checker
and then discuss the implications of our findings. In particular, we examine the
amount of time required to find all satisfying sets of evidence for a given policy
in three sets of experiments; each set of experiments was conducted on a 2.5GHz
Pentium 4 with 512MB RAM running Linux. The running times reported include
all overheads associated with generating a Rete network based on the policy rules
provided to CLOUSEAU, creating credential and credential-chain objects
corresponding to the credentials and credential chains provided to CLOUSEAU, in-
serting these objects into CLOUSEAU’s working memory, and recovering all satis-
fying sets of credentials. We first repeat the experiments conducted in [108], which
explored the overheads associated with using a type-2 compliance checker to solve
the type-3 compliance checker problem.
7.5.1 Experimental Results
The three most interesting cases explored in [108] examined the overheads of using
the SSGen algorithm to find all satisfying sets of credentials for a policy in the event
that (i) the policy had one satisfying set of size U , (ii) the policy had U satisfying
sets of size one, or (iii) the policy had two satisfying sets, each of size 3U4 . In all
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Figure 7.5: Running time as a function of the size of the union of all satisfying sets.
cases, U represents the size of the union of all satisfying sets. Recall from Figure 7.1
in Section 7.2 that the overheads associated with cases (ii) and (iii) grew exponen-
tially in the size of the union of all satisfying sets, and quickly became impractical.
Figure 7.5 shows the results of running these same tests using the CLOUSEAU com-
pliance checker; note that the y-axis of Figure 7.1 is labeled in seconds, while the
y-axis of Figure 7.5 is labeled in milliseconds. In our experiments, we varied the
size of the union of all satisfying sets (U ) between 1 and 50. Each data point in the
figure represents the average running time over 100 randomly-generated policies;
a new Rete network was constructed for each of these 100 trials as to eliminate
any optimizations that might occur as a result of partial network reuse (as was dis-
cussed in Section 7.4.2). We see that, in all cases, the running time overheads of
CLOUSEAU grow linearly with U and never exceed 80 ms to find all satisfying sets.
We note also that, unlike the SSgen algorithm, CLOUSEAU does not require that
policies be specified in DNF form in order to efficiently find all satisfying sets.
To further explore the running time characteristics of CLOUSEAU, we conducted an-
other experiment designed to more fully examine the types of policies that might
be processed by CLOUSEAU in practice. In this experiment, we varied both the
number of satisfying sets contained in a particular policy and the size of each sat-
isfying set. For each 〈number, size〉 pair, 100 policies were generated at random
and examined using CLOUSEAU. The random generation of policies allowed us to
explore cases in which satisfying sets overlap with one another to varying degrees.
This is important because overlapping satisfying sets will result in shared nodes
in the Rete network constructed by CLOUSEAU and, thus, more efficient analysis;
examining a random sampling of policies provides us with a more “average case”
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Figure 7.6: Running time as the number of satisfying sets and the size of each
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view of CLOUSEAU’s performance. The results of this experiment are shown in Fig-
ure 7.6 and confirm that the performance of CLOUSEAU scales as O(NA), where N
is the number of satisfying sets and A is the average size of each satisfying set. We
then considered the case in which each credential was assigned a sensitivity value
by its owner, as in [121], and ran the above experiments again. Given the satisfying
sets detected by CLOUSEAU, it took a trust negotiation strategy, on average, only
0.04 ms to choose the least-sensitive satisfying set to disclose.
We next sought to evaluate the performance of CLOUSEAU in a worst-case scenario.
To accomplish this, we analyzed policies of the form p← (c1⊕c2)∧· · ·∧(c2i−1⊕c2i),
which can be satisfied by 2i different sets of i credentials. Figure 7.7 shows the
results of this experiment, which confirm that the performance of CLOUSEAU con-
tinues to scale as O(NA) (note that the x-axis of Figure 7.7 follows a logarithmic
scale). Policies with exponentially-many satisfying sets are unlikely to be used
legitimately in practice, but could be formed by attackers wishing to consume in-
ordinate amounts of system resources. Detecting these types of malicious policies
in practice is out of the scope of this thesis, and thus we defer that topic to future
work. We do note, however, that CLOUSEAU found 512 satisfying sets of creden-
tials in approximately 1 second. This implies that the naive strategy of capping
the time spent in the compliance checker might be a reasonable means of detecting
these types of attacks in practice, as finding that many satisfying sets of credentials
for a non-attack policy seems exceedingly unlikely.
In all of our experiments, a completely new Rete network was created at each invo-
cation of CLOUSEAU. As stated previously, this was done to eliminate the possible
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Figure 7.7: Time required to find all 2i satisfying sets of size i for i = 1, . . . , 10.
benefits of partial network sharing between distinct policies, as network sharing
improves the performance of CLOUSEAU. However, some of the primary benefits
of the Rete algorithm arise precisely because the state encoded in a particular Rete
network can be saved between invocations of the matching algorithm, which re-
duces the number of times objects (i.e., credentials and other evidence) need to be
matched against the pattern nodes (i.e., policy clauses) in the network. If a partici-
pant in the trust negotiation process is willing to trade memory for execution time,
they could maintain a separate Rete network for each ongoing negotiation con-
structed using all of the policies relevant to that particular negotiation. This would
allow them to leverage the statefulness of the Rete algorithm to reduce the number
of matching operations required at each invocation of CLOUSEAU and obtain better
performance as the negotiation proceeds into later rounds. Further examination of
these types of speed versus memory trade offs is an interesting direction for future
work.
7.5.2 Discussion
The experiments discussed above illustrate that our CLOUSEAU implementation
performs very quickly, requiring only tens of milliseconds to find all satisfying sets
of credentials for policies of a reasonable size. Furthermore, these results experi-
mentally confirm our claim that the running time of CLOUSEAU scales as O(NA),
where N is the number of satisfying sets for the policy being analyzed and A is
the average size of each satisfying set. As always, the number of satisfying sets for
a policy p is in the worst case exponential in the size of p, as was the case in the
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third set of experiments described above. Even in this case, CLOUSEAU performed
admirably, finding 512 satisfying sets of size 9 in just one second.
The largest trust management case study to date is Becker’s formalization of the
security policies required by the electronic health record service that is being pro-
posed by the United Kingdom’s National Health Service [16]. This service, also
known as the “Spine,” aims to make electronic patient records available to med-
ical personnel, patients, and their designated agents and includes provisions for
ensuring the confidentiality of patient records. In [16], Becker completely specifies
a collection of Cassandra [17] policies for the NHS Spine and its related services
that comply with all available NHS documents describing the requirements for
the Spine. The complete Cassandra specification includes definitions of 375 policy
rules, 71 roles, and 12 actions that can be taken in the system. Each of the rules is
a Horn clause (i.e., a strict conjunction), although often several rules will have the
same head. For example, there are several ways in which a clinician can assert that
he or she is the “treating clinician” for a particular patient. We will call a set of rules
with the same head a policy, since each such set completely specifies the ways in
which a user can accomplish a particular goal.
Even the most complex policies specified in [16] contain less than a dozen rules,
and thus can be satisfied in at most this many ways. We see from Figures 7.5, 7.6,
and 7.7 that policies of this size can be efficiently analyzed by CLOUSEAU in un-
der 100 ms in all cases. This shows that even when the myriad of requirements
concerning patient privacy in the medical domain are considered, the number of
unique ways that any given policy can be satisfied remains reasonably low. Thus,
CLOUSEAU can efficiently handle the largest and most complex set of realistic poli-
cies assembled to date.
7.6 Analyzing RT Policies
Although CLOUSEAU is much faster than existing approaches to the policy compli-
ance checking problem, writing trust management policies in the native constraint
language analyzed by CLOUSEAU would be a tedious and error-prone process. In
the next two sections, we show that policies written in existing policy languages
can be compiled into this native representation and analyzed by CLOUSEAU with-
out altering the semantics of the original policy language. The ability to correctly
analyze policies written in existing policy languages is a necessary step towards
establishing CLOUSEAU as a general-purpose solution to the type-3 compliance
checker problem. Furthermore, it allows policy writers to write policies using fa-
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miliar abstractions without impacting the costs of analyzing these policies.
In this section, we discuss a method for automatically compiling RT policies into a
format suitable for analysis by CLOUSEAU. For ease of exposition, we begin by dis-
cussing a compilation process for RT 0 policies, which support the use of unparam-
eterized roles, and prove the correctness and completeness of this process. We then
provide an intuition for how this process can be extended to support RT 1 policies
allowing the use of parameterized roles. Since other Datalog-based trust negotia-
tion policy languages are very similar toRT , we expect that equivalent compilation
procedures could be devised for these languages as well.
7.6.1 RT 0 Policy Syntax
RT 0 is themost basic language in theRT family of trustmanagement languages [83].
As in all of the RT languages, principals are identified by means of identity certifi-
cates. RT 0 roles are defined simply as strings identifying the name of the role and
cannot be parameterized. Policy statements in RT 0 are expressed as one or more
of these role definitions and are encoded as role definition credentials signed by the
author of the role definition. There are four basic types of role definition credentials
in RT 0:
Simple Member A role definition of the form KA.R ← KD encodes the fact that
principalKA considers principalKD to be a member of the roleKA.R.
Simple Containment A role definition of the form KA.R ← KB.R1 encodes the
fact that principal KA defines the role KA.R to contain all members of the
roleKB.R1, which is defined by principalKB .
Linking Containment A role definition of the form KA.R ← KA.R1.R2 is called
a linked role. This defines the members of KA.R to contain all members of
KB.R2 for eachKB that is a member ofKA.R1.
Intersection Containment The role definition KA.R ← KB1 .R1 ∩ · · · ∩ KBn .Rn
definesKA.R to contain the principals who are members of each roleKBi .Ri
where 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
These four basic types of role definitions can be used to define a wide range of ac-
cess control policies. For example, the following RT 0 role definitions express an
access control policy requiring that entities accessing a given resource be employ-
ees of a SuperGrid member organization:
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;; Template to store role membership information
(deftemplate is-member
(slot role)
(slot roleMgr)
(slot roleSubj)
(multislot credentials))
;; Code to detect role memberships via the presence of simple
;; membership policy credentials. I.e., this can prove that
;; K_A.R <- K_B
(defrule member-of
;; Match K_B’s identity certificate
(credential (id ?kb) (fingerprint ?fkb))
;; Prove that K_A says that K_B is in role R
(credential (id ?ka) (fingerprint ?fka))
(credential (id ?r) (map ?m))
(test (eq ?fka (?m get "roleMgr")))
(test (eq ?fkb (?m get "roleSubj")))
(credential-chain (credentials $?c))
(test (is-root ?ka ?c))
(test (is-nth ?r 2 ?c))
=>
(assert (is-member (role (?m get "role"))
(roleMgr (?m get "roleMgr"))
(roleSubj (?m get "roleSubj"))
(credentials ?ka ?kb ?r))))
Figure 7.8: Base policy enabling CLOUSEAU to determine role membership via the
use of simple membership credentials.
Provider .service ← Provider .partner .employee
Provider .partner ← SuperGrid .memberOrganization
If a principal, Alice, could provide credentials proving the statements
SuperGrid .memberOrganization ← AliceLabs and AliceLabs.employee ← Alice , she
could satisfy the policy formed by the above two role definitions and gain access
to the protected service.
7.6.2 Compiling RT 0 Policies
In RT 0, policies are collections of role definition credentials. Therefore, we must
preprocess the set of credentials provided to CLOUSEAU as input in order to gener-
ate the set of policy rules that CLOUSEAU will attempt to satisfy. Since CLOUSEAU
examines the actual credentials used to hold RT 0 assertions, rather than these
higher-level RT 0 assertions, we must make a few assumptions regarding the for-
mat of these credentials.
161
1. We assume that principals in the system are identified by the fingerprint of
their identity certificates. Text strings such as “ABET .accredited”will be used
during the discussion of abstract policies, although such assertions are actu-
ally shorthand for statements such as “38:1A:42:E9:00:7D:19:41:AC:
66:F2:EF:12:E6:B4:A1.accredited.” When defining CLOUSEAU policies
later in this section, we will use the notation <K A> to denote the fingerprint
ofKA’s identity certificate.
2. Simple membership role definition credentials of form KA.R ← KB are as-
sumed to have the attributes “roleMgr,” “role,” and “roleSubj” set to the val-
ues <K A>, R, and <K B>, respectively.
3. Role definition credentials are valid if and only if they are signed by the prin-
cipal identified at the head of the credential. For example, the simple mem-
bership credential KA.R ← KB is considered valid if and only if it is signed
by the principalKA.
Given the above assumptions regarding credential format, we now describe an
algorithm for generating a CLOUSEAU policy p′ that is equivalent to an RT 0 policy
p consisting of the valid role definition credentials r1, . . . , rn and the set of identity
certificates c1, . . . , cm.
1. Insert the is-member template type and the member-of rule defined in Fig-
ure 7.8 into p′. The is-member object type holds information regarding a
particular principal’s membership in a particular role. The member-of rule
asserts an is-member object if a simple membership role definition creden-
tial of formKA.R← KB can be found, along with identity certificates forKA
andKB .
2. Generate the credential objects corresponding to the identity certificates
c1, . . . cm and insert these into the working memory of CLOUSEAU.
3. For each valid role definition credential ri:
• Generate the credential object corresponding to ri and insert it into
the working memory of CLOUSEAU. Save the “id” field of this object as
the variable <id>.
• If ri is a simple containment credential of form KA.R ← KB.R1 then
insert the following rule into p′:
(defrule rule-sc-<id>
(is-member (role "R_1") (roleMgr <K_B>)
(roleSubj ?rs) (credentials $?c))
=>
(assert (is-member (role "R") (roleMgr <K_A>)
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(roleSubj ?rs)
(credentials ?c <id>)))
This rule asserts that a principal is a member of role KA.R if he is also a
member ofKB.R1.
• If ri is a linking containment credential of formKA.R← KA.R1.R2 then
insert the following rule into p′:
(defrule rule-lc-<id>
;; Find a member of R_2
(is-member (role "R_2") (roleMgr ?r2mgr)
(roleSubj ?r2subj) (credentials $?cr2))
;; find a member of K_A.R_1
(is-member (role "R_1") (roleMgr <K_A>)
(roleSubj ?r1subj) (credentials $?cr1))
(test (eq ?r1subj ?r2mgr))
=>
(assert (is-member (role "R") (roleMgr <K_A>)
(roleSubj ?r2subj)
(credentials ?cr1 ?cr2 <id>)))
This rule asserts that a principal is a member of the role KA.R if he is a
member of the role R2 defined by some member ofKA.R1.
• If ri is an intersection containment credential of formKA.R← KB1 .R1∩
· · · ∩KBk .Rk then insert the following rule into p′:
(defrule rule-ic-<id>
(is-member (role "R_1") (roleMgr <K_B_1>)
(roleSubj ?rs1) (credentials $?cr1))
...
(is-member (role "R_k") (roleMgr <K_B_k>)
(roleSubj ?rsk &: (eq ?rs1 ?rsk))
(credentials $?crk))
=>
(assert (is-member (role "R") (roleMgr <K_A>)
(roleSubj ?rs1)
(credentials ?cr1 ... ?crk <id>)))
This rule asserts that a principal is a member of the role KA.R if role
memberships for each of the roles KB1 .R1, . . . ,KBk .Rk can be found.
Note that this rule enforces the constraint that these role membership
credentials must all refer to the same subject principal.
4. Given the target role for the negotiation, sayKA.Rt, insert the following rule
into p′:
(defrule target
(is-member (role "R_t") (roleMgr <K_A>) (roleSubj ?rs) (credentials $?c))
(credential (fingerprint ?fp &: (eq ?fp ?rs)) (owned TRUE))
=>
(assert (satisfaction (resource-name "target") (credentials ?c))))
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This rule triggers the insertion of a policy satisfaction object whenever an
identity certificate with valid proof-of-ownership can be found for a member
of the target roleKA.Rt.
Intuitively, this compilation process works in a bottom-up fashion, as follows. The
member-of rule enables CLOUSEAU to conclude that a principal KB is a member
of the role KA.R if it finds KB’s identity certificate, KA’s identity certificate, and
the simple membership role definition certificate declaring KB to be a member of
KA.R. These three credentials are retained as evidence supporting KB’s member-
ship inKA.R. The rules inserted during step 3 of the compilation process can then
combine these basic role membership assertions to prove membership in roles de-
fined by more complex expressions (i.e., simple containment, linking containment,
and intersection containment).
As role membership assertions are combined by these rules, the credential iden-
tifiers stored in these role membership assertions are combined and stored in the
newly-concluded role membership assertions. Finally, the target rule inserted
into p′ at step 4 of the compilation process asserts a satisfaction object when-
ever membership in the target role of the negotiation process can be found for a
principal who could demonstrate proof-of-ownership of his or her identity cer-
tificate. This allows CLOUSEAU to conclude that the policy in question has been
satisfied and to extract the credentials used during the satisfaction process. The
Rete algorithm ensures that all paths leading to the creation of a satisfaction
object are explored during the pattern matching process, which implies that all
satisfying sets of evidence are discovered by the CLOUSEAU compliance checker.
Further, an increase in the size of the RT policy to be analyzed causes only a linear
increase in the running time of CLOUSEAU. This is a result of the fact that the size
of CLOUSEAU’s working memory is increased linearly for each credential analyzed
during the policy compilation process (i.e., we add at most one rule to CLOUSEAU
for each credential processed).
Figure 7.9 illustrates the result of applying the above compilation process to the
RT 0 access policy described in Section 7.6.1. We now make the following claim
regarding the correctness and completeness of this policy compilation process.
THEOREM 7.6.1 (Correctness and Completeness). Let R = {r1, . . . , rn} be a set of
role definition credentials, C = {c1, . . . , cm} be a set of identity certificates, p = R ∪ C be
an RT 0 policy, and let p′ be the result of compiling p using the above process. CLOUSEAU
finds the satisfying set S ⊆ (R ∪ C) of credentials for the policy p′ if and only if the RT
rules of inference can be used on exactly the set S of credentials to prove membership in the
target role.
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;; Template to store role membership information
(deftemplate is-member
(slot role)
(slot roleMgr)
(slot roleSubj)
(multislot credentials))
;; Code to detect role memberships via the presence of simple
;; membership policy credentials. I.e., this can prove that
;; K_A.R <- K_B
(defrule member-of
;; Match K_B’s identity certificate
(credential (id ?kb) (fingerprint ?fkb))
;; Prove that K_A says that K_B is in role R
(credential (id ?ka) (fingerprint ?fka))
(credential (id ?r) (map ?m))
(test (eq ?fka (?m get "roleMgr")))
(test (eq ?fkb (?m get "roleSubj")))
(credential-chain (credentials $?c))
(test (is-root ?ka ?c))
(test (is-nth ?r 2 ?c))
=>
(assert (is-member (role (?m get "role"))
(roleMgr (?m get "roleMgr"))
(roleSubj (?m get "roleSubj"))
(credentials ?ka ?kb ?r))))
;; Provider.service <- Provider.partner.employee
(defrule rule-1
(is-member (role "employee") (roleMgr ?r2mgr)
(roleSubj ?r2subj) (credentials $?cr2))
(is-member (role "partner") (roleMgr <Provider>)
(roleSubj ?r1subj)
(credentials $?cr1))
(test (eq ?r1subj ?r2mgr))
=>
(assert (is-member (role "service") (roleMgr <Provider>)
(roleSubj ?r2subj)
(credentials ?cr1 ?cr2 <id>)))
;; Provider.partner <- SuperGrid.memberOrganization
(defrule rule-2
(is-member (role "memberOrganization") (roleMgr <SuperGrid>)
(roleSubj ?rs) (credentials $?c))
=>
(assert (is-member (role "partner") (roleMgr <Provider>)
(roleSubj ?rs) (credentials ?c <id>)))
;; Provider.service is our target role
(defrule target
(is-member (role "service") (roleMgr <Provider>)
(roleSubj ?rs) (credentials $?c))
(credential (fingerprint ?fp &: (eq ?fp ?rs))
(owned TRUE))
=>
(assert (satisfaction (resource-name "target")
(credentials ?c))))
Figure 7.9: A compiled version of the RT 0 policy discussed in Section 7.6.1.
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Alice : Provider .service
AliceLabs : Provider .partner Alice : AliceLabs.employee
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Figure 7.10: An example RT 0 proof tree.
We now present the full proof of the above theorem. Readers not wishing to exam-
ine the details of this proof can skip to Section 7.6.4.
7.6.3 Proof of Theorem 7.6.1
A role membership proven using the RT rules of inference can be represented as
a proof tree in which the root node represents the target role (i.e., KA.R), interme-
diate nodes represent memberships in intermediate roles, and all leaves of the tree
represent identity certificates. All non-leaf nodes of the proof tree are labeled with
the identity of the principal whose membership in that particular role has been
proven. Figure 7.10 is an example proof tree proving that Alice is a member of the
Provider .service role as discussed in Section 7.6.1. The linking containment rule
Provider .service ← Provider .partner .employee causes the proof tree to branch: the
left branch proves that AliceLabs is a a member of the Provider .partner role and
the right branch proves that Alice is an employee of AliceLabs. Given this repre-
sentation of a role membership verified using the RT rules of inference, we now
prove the following.
LEMMA 7.6.2. LetR = {r1, . . . , rn} be a set of role definition credentials,C = {c1, . . . , cm}
be a set of identity certificates, p = R∪C be anRT 0 policy, and let p′ be the result of compil-
ing p using the process described in Section 7.6.2. If a proof tree with root nodeKC : KA.R
can be found for p using the RT rules of inference on a set S ⊆ (R∪C) of credentials, then
CLOUSEAU finds the satisfying set S of credentials proving membership in KA.R after
analyzing the compiled policy p′.
Proof. We proceed by induction on the depth of the proof tree found using the
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RT rules of inference. The base case occurs when the proof tree extends one level
beyond the root node. In this case, the proof tree is the result of a simple mem-
bership role definition KA.R ← KC . The root node of this proof tree is labeled
KC : KA.R and the leaf node of the tree signifies that KC ’s identity certificate was
obtained. The CLOUSEAU compliance checker determines that the policy p′ gen-
erated by compiling this base policy was satisfied, as follows. The simple mem-
bership credential containing the assertion KA.R ← KC , KA’s identity certificate,
and KC ’s identity certificate match the LHS of the member-of rule inserted dur-
ing step 1 of the policy compilation process (see Figure 7.8). This rule asserts an
is-member object defining KC to be a member of KA.R and stores references to
the simple membership credential, as well as the identity certificates of KC and
KA.
Assume that CLOUSEAU can determine membership in any role using the same set
of credentials as RT in all cases where the depth of the proof tree found using the
RT rules of inference is at most n. To prove that CLOUSEAU can determine role
membership using the same set of credentials as RT where the proof tree found
using the RT rules of inference is of depth n+ 1, we must consider three cases.
Case 1 (Simple Containment): In this case, the RT inference linking the first and
second levels of the proof tree will occur as a result of processing some simple
containment credential KA.R ← KB.R1. The root of the resulting proof tree has
one child node whose label is KC : KB.R1. The subtree of the proof rooted at
this child node is of depth n and thus CLOUSEAU finds the same set of credentials
proving KC ’s membership in KB.R1 (by the inductive hypothesis) and will assert
an is-member object containing this information. This will match the LHS of the
rule-sc-<id> rule inserted after preprocessing the KA.R ← KB.R1 simple con-
tainment credential during step 3 of the compilation process, which will then insert
an is-member object definingKC to be a member ofKA.R.
Case 2 (Linking Containment): In this case, the RT inference linking the first and
second levels of the proof tree will occur as a result of processing a linking con-
tainment credentialKA ← KA.R1.R2. The root of the resulting proof tree will have
two child nodes: one labeled KB : KA.R1 asserting that some principal KB is a
member of the role KA.R1, and one labeled KC : KB.R2, which asserts that KC is
a member of KB.R2. Because the subproofs rooted at these two nodes each have
a depth of at most n, CLOUSEAU will have asserted is-member objects describing
these memberships using the same set of credentials, by the inductive hypothesis.
These two objects will then match the LHS of the rule-lc-<id> rule inserted af-
ter preprocessing the KA ← KA.R1.R2 linking containment credential during step
3 of the compilation process, which will assertKC ’s membership inKA.R.
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Case 3 (Intersection Containment): In this case, the RT inference linking the first
and second levels of the proof tree will occur as a result of processing an inter-
section containment credential KA.R ← KB1 .R1 ∩ · · · ∩ KBm .Rm. The root of the
resulting proof tree will have m child nodes, each labeled to assert KC ’s member-
ship in some role KBi .Ri. Because the subproofs rooted at these m nodes are of
depth at most n, CLOUSEAU can assert is-member objects providing evidence of
KC ’s membership in these roles using the same sets of credentials, by the induc-
tive hypothesis. These m objects will then match the LHS of the rule-ic-<id>
rule inserted after preprocessing theKA.R← KB1 .R1 ∩ · · · ∩KBm .Rm intersection
containment credential during step 3 of the compilation process, which will assert
KC ’s membership inKA.R.
Since CLOUSEAU can discover the same satisfying set of credentials as RT in each
of these three cases, it can do so for any policy p′ resulting from the compilation of
an RT 0 policy p. For RT to grant access based on this proof, however, KC must
demonstrate proof of ownership of his or her identity certificate. CLOUSEAU en-
forces this same constraint by means of the target rule, which also requires a
demonstration of proof-of-ownership forKC ’s identity certificate.
LEMMA 7.6.3. LetR = {r1, . . . , rn} be a set of role definition credentials,C = {c1, . . . , cm}
be a set of identity certificates, p = R ∪ C be an RT 0 policy, and let p′ be the result
of compiling p using the process described in Section 7.6.2. If CLOUSEAU asserts a
satisfaction object containing the set S ⊆ (R ∪ C) of credentials that proves KC ’s
membership in the target role KA.R, then this membership can also be proven using the
RT rules of inference on S.
Proof. We say that a set of CLOUSEAU rules l1, . . . , lj forms a chain if an assertion
made by the RHS of l1 matches a pattern on the LHS of l2, an assertion made by the
RHS of l2 matches a pattern on the LHS of l3, and so on. Our proof then proceeds
by induction on the length of the longest chain of rules invoked by CLOUSEAU
prior to invoking the target rule. The base case occurs when one rule is invoked.
This can only occur when the member-of rule is matched by a simple membership
credential KA.R ← KC , the identity certificates of KA and KC . This will assert an
is-member object attesting toKC ’s membership inKA.R. In this case, we can use
the RT rules of inference to determine that KC is a member of KA.R, as we have
both the simple membership credentialKA.R← KB andKC ’s identity certificate.
Now, assume that theRT rules of inference can be used on the policy p to determine
membership inKA.R as long as the length of the longest chain of rules invoked by
CLOUSEAUwhen analyzing the policy p′ is less than or equal to n. To prove that the
RT rules of inference can be used to determine membership inKA.R if the longest
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chain of rules invoked by CLOUSEAU is n+ 1, we must examine three cases.
Case 1 (rule-sc-<id>): Consider the case in which the last rule in a chain to be
invoked by CLOUSEAU is an instance of the rule-sc-<id> inserted by CLOUSEAU
upon examining a simple containment credentialKA.R← KB.R1. The LHS of this
rule would be matched by a single is-member object asserting KC ’s membership
in the roleKB.R1. Since the longest chain of CLOUSEAU rules needed to assert this
object is at most n− 1, the RT rules of inference could also be used to prove mem-
bership in KB.R1 using the same set of credentials, by the inductive hypothesis.
This membership proof can be combined with the simple containment credential
KA.R ← KB.R1 to prove KC ’s membership in KA.R using the RT rules of infer-
ence.
Case 2 (rule-lc-<id>): Consider the case in which the last rule in a chain to be
invoked by CLOUSEAU is an instance of the rule-lc-<id> inserted by CLOUSEAU
upon examining a linking containment credential KA.R ← KA.R1.R2. The LHS of
this rule would be matched by two is-member objects: one proving that someKB
is a member of KA.R1 and another proving that KC is a member of KB.R2. The
longest chain of CLOUSEAU rules needed to assert either of these objects is at most
n− 1 and thus the RT rules of inference could also be used to proveKA.R1 ← KB
andKB.R2 ← KC using the same set of credentials. These membership proofs can
be combined with the linking containment credential KA.R ← KA.R1.R2 to prove
KC ’s membership inKA.R using the RT rules of inference.
Case 3 (rule-ic-<id>): Consider the case in which the last rule in a chain to be
invoked by CLOUSEAU is an instance of the rule-ic-<id> inserted by CLOUSEAU
upon examining an intersection containment credential KA.R ← KB1 .R1 ∩ · · · ∩
KBm .Rm. The LHS of this rule would be matched by m is-member objects each
proving that KC is a member of some KBi .Ri. The longest chain of CLOUSEAU
rules needed to assert any of these objects is at most n− 1 and thus the RT rules of
inference could also be used to prove KBi .Ri ← KC for 1 ≤ i ≤ m using the same
set of credentials. These memberships can be combined with the intersection con-
tainment credential KA.R ← KB1 .R1 ∩ · · · ∩KBm .Rm to prove KC ’s membership
inKA.R using the RT rules of inference.
Since the RT rules of inference can be used to find an equivalent proof of mem-
bership in the role KA.R for each of these three cases, we conclude that the RT
rules of inference can be used on the policy p to determine an equivalent proof of
membership for the principal KC in the role KA.R any time that CLOUSEAU as-
serts an is-member object when analyzing the policy p′. For CLOUSEAU to grant
access based on this role membership (i.e., assert a satisfaction object), proof-
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of-ownership of KC ’s identity certificate is required by the target rule. RT also
requires this proof-of-ownership prior to granting access, as the label of the root
node of the proof tree isKC .
Theorem 7.6.1 follows directly from Lemmas 7.6.2 and 7.6.3.
7.6.4 Supporting RT 1 Policies
The only feature that RT 1 adds to RT 0 is the ability to parameterize role defini-
tions. For example, rather than requiring Alice’s employee credential to be of the
form AliceLabs.employee ← Alice, it could instead encode other attributes regard-
ing Alice’s employment. For example, we could define Alice as the President of
AliceLabs by defining the following simple membership credential:
AliceLabs.employee(title=“President”)← Alice
RT 1 role definition credentials can also constrain role memberships based on the
values of role parameters. For example, the following simple containment creden-
tial declares that only widgets whose price is over $10 are on sale:
Acme.sale ← Acme.widget(price > 10)
Adding support for the above types of parameterizations and constraints to the
policy compilation process described in Section 7.6.2 is a relatively straightforward
process. In fact, we must only (i) provide support for storing parameters and their
values in simple membership role definition credentials and (ii) allow the various
containment role definition rules generated during the policy compilation process
to place constraints on these parameter values. To address (i), we can store the
parameters of a given simple membership credential and their corresponding val-
ues in the “map” field of the simplemembership’s CLOUSEAU credential object.
Further, the is-member object template must be extended to include this mapping
of parameter names to values.
Addressing point (ii) is a slightly more complicated process involving the gener-
ation of CLOUSEAU rules during step 3 of the compilation process. Rather than
explain each case in detail, we will instead provide one example compilation rule
and claim that the other cases can be handled in a similar fashion. As an example,
consider the following simple containment role definition credential:
AliceLabs.seniorEmployee← AliceLabs.employee(hireYr < 1995)
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This credential defines members of the “Senior Employee” role at AliceLabs to con-
tain all employees hired before the year 1995. A policy compiler could parse the
above type of role definition credential to form the following rule:
(defrule rule-<id>
(is-member (role "employee") (roleMgr <AliceLabs>) (map ?m)
(roleSubj ?rs) (credentials $?c))
(test (> 1995 (?m get "hireYr")))
=>
(assert (is-member (role "seniorEmployee") (roleSubj ?rs)
(roleMgr <AliceLabs>) (credentials ?c <id>)))
Creating this rule automatically involves an extension to the rule generation logic
presented in Section 7.6.2 that adds one test clause to the rule for every constraint
placed on an attribute value by the RT 1 role definition credential. Since the Rete
engine used by CLOUSEAU supports comparison operators such as >, <, and =,
it can support the types of constraints allowed by RT 1. As such, it is possible to
define an automated procedure for compiling RT 1 policies into a format suitable
for analysis by CLOUSEAU.
7.7 Analyzing WS-SecurityPolicy Policies
In addition to efficiently analyzing Datalog-based policy languages, CLOUSEAU
can also be used to check compliance with policies specified using less formal,
industry-standard policy languages. We now describe how trust management poli-
cies can be specified within the framework provided by the WS-SecurityPolicy [96]
standard. We then show that these policies can also be compiled into a format suit-
able for analysis by CLOUSEAU, as well as prove that the compilation procedure
that we specify is both correct and complete.
7.7.1 Basic Policy Syntax
WS-SecurityPolicy takes a token-based approach to security, in that policies iden-
tify specific security tokens that must be presented in order to gain access to a par-
ticular service. The WS-SecurityPolicy specification defines policy assertions that
can be used to require the use of Kerberos tickets, SAML assertions, and X.509
certificates, as well as other security token formats. As an example, the following
policy assertion requires the use of an X.509 certificate issued by the Better Business
Bureau’s (fictitious) security token service:
<sp:X509Token xmlns:sp="..." xmlns:wsa="...">
<sp:IssuerName>C=US/O=Better Business Bureau/CN=sts.bbb.org</sp:IssuerName>
</sp:X509Token>
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Trust negotiation policies are typically more complicated than this, however, as
they can include multiple attribute constraints. Requiring the use of multiple se-
curity tokens can be accomplished through the use of the basic policy connectives
defined by WS-Policy [48]. WS-Policy defines the ExactlyOne and All connec-
tives, which require that either one or all subclauses of a particular clause in a policy
be satisfied in order for that clause of the policy to be satisfied. Although these two
connectives can be used to express any arbitrary policy structure, the WS-Policy
specification recommends that policies be expressed in disjunctive normal form
(DNF) using a policy structure of the following form:
<wsp:Policy xmlns:wsp="...">
<wsp:ExactlyOne>
<wsp:All>
<!-- Policy assertion (1,1) -->
...
<!-- Policy assertion (1,n_1) -->
</wsp:All>
...
<wsp:All>
<!-- Policy assertion (m,1) -->
...
<!-- Policy assertion (m,n_m) -->
</wsp:All>
</wsp:ExactlyOne>
</wsp:Policy>
The ExactlyOne clause in the above policy indicates that exactly one of its child
nodes must be satisfied in order for the policy to be satisfied. Since each child node
is an All clause, satisfying this policy requires that all policy assertions (i, j) are
satisfied for some iwhere 1 ≤ i ≤ m and for all j such that 1 ≤ j ≤ n i.
Combining the security token policy assertions from WS-SecurityPolicy with the
policy connectives defined in WS-Policy allows us to specify a range of interesting
trust negotiation policies. For example, consider a service that wishes to be pro-
tected by a policy requiring that users present X.509 certificates issued by the reg-
istrar of State University and the ACM; this would indicate that authorized users
of the service need to be students of State University and members of the ACM.
Assuming that State University’s registrar and the ACM each run an online secu-
rity token service (STS) that manages the credentials issued within their respective
domains, Figure 7.11 illustrates how such a policy could be written in a standards-
compliant manner.
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<wsp:Policy xmlns:wsp="..." xmlns:sp="...">
<wsp:ExactlyOne>
<wsp:All>
<sp:X509Token xmlns:wsa="...">
<sp:IssuerName>
C=US/O=State University/OU=Registrar/CN=sts-reg.stateu.edu
</sp:IssuerName>
</sp:X509Token>
<sp:X509Token xmlns:wsa="...">
<sp:IssuerName>
C=US/O=ACM/CN=sts.acm.org
</sp:IssuerName>
</sp:X509Token>
</wsp:All>
</wsp:ExactlyOne>
</wsp:Policy>
Figure 7.11: An example trust negotiation policy requiring users to present X.509
certificates from the State University registrar, as well as the ACM.
7.7.2 Encoding Advanced Attribute Constraints
While the above, strictly token-based approach to trust negotiation policy specifi-
cation works in some circumstances, it is inadequate for others. For example, con-
sider complex credentials such as driver’s licenses that contain information about
the type of vehicles the bearer is authorized to drive and the date of birth of the
bearer, or employee IDs that indicate the employee’s rank, department, and year
of hire. The policies used in the previous section can only determine whether an
entity has an employee ID or driver’s license, but cannot constrain the attribute
fields—also known as claims—encoded in the certificate.
The authors of the WS-SecurityPolicy and WS-Trust [97] standards recognize that
placing constraints on the claims encoded in a security token is an important as-
pect of security policy specification. As such, these standards define an optional
Claims element that can be included in the security token policy assertions that
make up a given security policy. These standards do not specify the fields compris-
ing a given Claims element; to allow for maximum extensibility, third parties can
define claims dialects that specify the format and contents of these elements.
To facilitate the use of more expressive—yet standards-compliant—trust negoti-
ation policies within the WS-SecurityPolicy framework, we have developed one
such claims dialect. Our claims dialect allows policy writers to place an arbitrary
number of (attribute name, comparison operator, value) constraint triples on the
claims encoded in a security token. This format was chosen because it is suffi-
ciently expressive to represent instances of the constraint checking problem. For
example, the constraint triple (License Type, EQ, CDL) would require that the “Li-
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Element Description
/cl:Claim This element is used to encode a constraint on a claim encoded
in the security token to which it refers. These constraints take the
form of (attribute, operation, value) triples.
/cl:Claim/cl:Attribute The name of the attribute or claim to which this constraint refers.
/cl:Claim/cl:Op The operation portion of a constraint triple. Acceptable values
for this field are EQ, GT, LT, GTEQ, and LTEQ. These values denote
“equals,” “greater than,” “less than,” “greater than or equal to,”
and “less than or equal to,” respectively.
/cl:Claim/cl:Value The value field of the constraint triple.
/cl:Ownership This element is used to indicate whether proof of ownership of
the security token to which it refers needs to be demonstrated
when the token is disclosed.
/cl:Ownership/@Status This optional attribute may be set to either true or false de-
pending on whether proof of ownership is required. If this at-
tribute is not present, a default value of true is assumed.
Table 7.1: Descriptions of the elements making up our claims dialect.
cense Type” field of a particular driver’s license security token be set to the value
“CDL.” Furthermore, our claims dialect provides a mechanism through which pol-
icy writers can require not only the disclosure of a particular security token, but
also a demonstration of proof-of-ownership. This enables explicit differentiation
between credentials that must be owned by the individual requesting access to a
particular service and other supporting credentials that must be presented. The
XML elements defined by this claims dialect are summarized in Table 7.1; a more
detailed treatment of this claims dialect can be found in the XML schema defining
the dialect (see Figure 7.12).
Figure 7.13 contains a more complex version of the policy presented in Figure 7.11.
This version of the policy leverages our claims dialect to restrict service access to
graduate students of State University who have been members of the ACM since at
least 2006. The use of the Ownership element inside each of the Claims elements
requires that proof of ownership be demonstrated for both tokens.
7.7.3 Compiling WS-SecurityPolicy Policies
We now describe a compilation procedure that can be used to translate trust man-
agement policies specified using WS-SecurityPolicy into a format that is suitable
for analysis by CLOUSEAU. This translation is actually quite natural, as the token-
based approach to trust and security embodied by WS-Trust and its related stan-
dards maps directly onto the credential-based intermediate policy language used
by CLOUSEAU.
In presenting the following compilation procedure, we assume that policies are
expressed in DNF, as recommended by [48]. That is, we assume that policies are
a collection of n All clauses, each identifying one satisfying set of security tokens
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<?xml version="1.0"?>
<xs:schema xmlns:xs="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"
targetNamespace="http://dais.cs.uiuc.edu/claim.xsd"
xmlns="http://dais.cs.uiuc.edu/claim.xsd"
elementFormDefault="qualified">
<xs:element name="Claim">
<xs:complexType>
<xs:sequence>
<xs:element name="Attribute" type="xs:string"/>
<xs:element name="Op">
<xs:simpleType>
<xs:restriction base="xs:string">
<xs:enumeration value="LT"/>
<xs:enumeration value="GT"/>
<xs:enumeration value="EQ"/>
<xs:enumeration value="LTEQ"/>
<xs:enumeration value="GTEQ"/>
</xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType>
</xs:element>
<xs:element name="Value" type="xs:string"/>
</xs:sequence>
</xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
<xs:element name="Ownership">
<xs:complexType>
<xs:attribute name="status" type="xs:boolean" />
</xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
</xs:schema>
Figure 7.12: The XML schema representation of our claims dialect.
for the policy. The ith such All clause in the policy should be processed as follows.
First, a new rule will be created for this All clause:
(defrule rule-<i>
In the above rule, the <i> will be replaced with a counter indicating which All
clause the rule represents. Assume this All clause hasm Token elements. The kth
such element will be processed as follows. First, a constraint will be added to the
policy requiring that this token be presented:
(credential (id ?id-<k>) (issuer ?iss-<k>) (owned ?o-<k>) (map ?m-<k>))
If this Token’s Claims element or IssuerName element specifies that the token
must be issued by some specific issuer, <issuer>, the following test will be added
to rule-<i>:
(test (eq ?iss-<k> <issuer>))
If this Token’s Claims element contains the assertion <Ownership Status="true">,
then the following test will be added to rule-<i>:
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<wsp:Policy xmlns:wsp="..." xmlns:sp="...">
<wsp:ExactlyOne>
<wsp:All>
<sp:X509Token xmlns:wsa="...">
<sp:IssuerName>
C=US/O=State University/OU=Registrar/CN=sts-reg.stateu.edu
</sp:IssuerName>
<wst:Claims Dialect="http://dais.cs.uiuc.edu/claim.xsd">
<cl:Claim>
<cl:Attribute>Type</cl:Attribute>
<cl:Op>EQ</cl:Op>
<cl:Value>Graduate Student</cl:Value>
</cl:Claim>
<cl:Ownership Status="true"/>
</wst:Claims>
</sp:X509Token>
<sp:X509Token xmlns:wsa="...">
<sp:IssuerName>
C=US/O=ACM/CN=sts.acm.org
</sp:IssuerName>
<wst:Claims Dialect="http://dais.cs.uiuc.edu/claim.xsd">
<cl:Claim>
<cl:Attribute>MemberSince</cl:Attribute>
<cl:Op>LTEQ</cl:Op>
<cl:Value>2006</cl:Value>
</cl:Claim>
<cl:Ownership Status="true"/>
</wst:Claims>
</sp:X509Token>
</wsp:All>
</wsp:ExactlyOne>
</wsp:Policy>
Figure 7.13: A more complex example trust negotiation policy that makes use of
our claim dialect.
(test (eq ?o-<k> true))
For all other constraint triples encoded in the Claims element of this token, the
following test will be inserted. Here, <op> is either eq, <, >, <=, or >= depending
on whether the operation encoded in the constraint tuple is EQ, LT, GT, LTEQ, or
GTEQ. Similarly, <name> and <value> are placeholders for the attribute name and
constraint value identified in the constraint triple.
(test (<op> (?m-<k> get <name>) <value>))
After each Token element in the ith All clause has been processed as above,
rule-<i>will be terminated as follows:
=>
(assert (satisfaction (resource-name rule-<i>)
(credentials ?id-1 ... ?id-<m>))))
This process then repeats for each other All clause defined by the policy. Fig-
ure 7.14 shows a version of the policy from Figure 7.13 generated by using the
above compilation rules. We now present the following theorem regarding the cor-
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;; This policy is satisfied by graduate students at State University
;; who have been members of the ACM since at least 2006.
(defrule rule-1
(credential (id ?id-1) (issuer ?iss-1) (owned ?o-1) (map ?m-1))
(test (eq ?iss-1 "C=US/O=State University/OU=Registrar/CN=sts-reg.stateu.edu"))
(test (eq ?o-1 true))
(test (eq (?m-1 get "Type") "Graduate Student"))
(credential (id ?id-2) (issuer ?iss-2) (owned ?o-2) (map ?m-2))
(test (eq ?iss-2 "C=US/O=ACM/CN=sts.acm.org"))
(test (eq ?o-2 true))
(test (<= (?m-2 get "MemberSince") 2006))
=>
(assert (satisfaction (resource-name rule-1)
(credentials ?id-1 ?id-2))))
Figure 7.14: The policy presented in Figure 7.13 after being compiled for analysis
by CLOUSEAU.
rectness and completeness of this compilation procedure:
THEOREM 7.7.1. Assume that a trust negotiation policy p specified using the WS-Policy
and WS-SecurityPolicy specifications is compiled using the above procedure into a
CLOUSEAU policy p′. Given the policy p′ and a set of security tokens S, the satisfying
sets s1, . . . , sn returned by CLOUSEAU are exactly the subsets of S that satisfy the origi-
nal policy p.
Proof. Recall that the policy p is expressed in DNF form; that is, p is a disjunction of
n conjunctive clauses. Each such disjunct identifies a unique set of security tokens
that can be presented to satisfy p. For each disjunct di containing identifying mi
security tokens, the compilation process defined above creates one CLOUSEAU rule
containing mi patterns defined to match the tokens identified by di. Furthermore,
for each security token tj identified by di, the above process creates one test clause
to check each claim constraint imposed on tj by the policy p. Since no other rules
are inserted into the policy p′, CLOUSEAU cannot find any satisfying sets other than
those identified by p when analyzing the policy p′. Similarly, since one such rule
is created for each disjunct (i.e., satisfying set) in p, CLOUSEAU finds all satisfying
sets in pwhen invoked on the policy p′.
7.8 Summary
In this chapter, we described the design and implementation of the CLOUSEAU
compliance checker. CLOUSEAU was designed to efficiently solve the type-3 com-
pliance checker problem: given a set E of evidence and a policy p, determine all
subsets of E that can be used to minimally satisfy p. Previous solutions for this
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problem have had running time overheads that are exponential in the size of the
union of all satisfying sets. CLOUSEAU’s time overheads scale linearly in the size of
the union of all satisfying sets for the tests conducted in [108], and asO(NA) in gen-
eral, whereN is the number of satisfying sets for a policy and A is the average size
of each satisfying set. On average, CLOUSEAU requires only tens of milliseconds to
find all satisfying sets of credentials for a given policy.
CLOUSEAU achieves this level of performance by taking a non-traditional approach
to theorem proving. Rather than directly analyzing access control policies writ-
ten in high-level languages (such as Cassandra, RT , TPL, or X -TNL), CLOUSEAU
compiles high-level policies into an intermediate representation that specifies con-
straints on the actual credentials and other evidence that must be presented to gain
access to a particular resource. CLOUSEAU then leverages Rete, an efficient pattern
matching algorithm, to enumerate all satisfying sets. In this chapter, we showed
that policies specified in the RT and WS-SecurityPolicy policy languages can be
automatically compiled into the native rule format analyzed by CLOUSEAU, and
proved that these compilation procedures were both complete and correct. Since
all trust negotiation policies are eventually satisfied by these same types of evi-
dence, we expect that equivalent compilation procedures could also be derived for
other high-level policy languages. This allows policy writers to express their poli-
cies concisely using high-level policy languages, yet still analyze them efficiently.
Although CLOUSEAU is much more efficient than previous solutions to the type-
3 compliance checker problem, further optimization is still an important area of
future work. Spending tens of milliseconds during an interaction with their com-
pliance checker is perfectly reasonable for entities in a peer-to-peer environment
or clients in a client/server setting. However, servers that must process high vol-
umes of traffic may need several such interactions for each trust negotiation ses-
sion. An interesting direction of future work is to investigate high-level policy
language constructs that can be compiled into CLOUSEAU policies that can be an-
alyzed in a particularly efficient (or inefficient) manner. Better understanding of
the language constructs that most directly affect compliance checker performance
could help lead to the design of yet more efficient compliance checkers.
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8 Related Work
This program was made possible, in part, by viewers like you.
—PBS
The work presented in this thesis is related to a wide spectrum of topics in com-
puter science, including security, privacy, distributed computing, formal logic, and
artificial intelligence. In this chapter, we highlight the bodies of work most directly
related to the topics studied in this thesis. Section 8.1 identifies previous efforts
by members of the security, privacy, and distributed computing communities re-
lated to the authorization system state consistency topics studied in Chapters 3
and 4. Topics related to the virtual fingerprinting, identity establishment, reputa-
tion, and audit problems studied in Chapter 5 are then discussed in Section 8.2. In
Section 8.3, we overview research efforts contributing to the design and analysis
of trust negotiation systems that directly influenced the TrustBuilder2 framework
studied in Chapter 6. We conclude this chapter with Section 8.4, which discusses
previous work that led to the design of the CLOUSEAU compliance checker pre-
sented in Chapter 7.
8.1 Safety, Consistency, and Concurrency Control
The concept of safety as it relates to trust negotiation has been discussed in several
previous works, though the definitions of safety used in these works differ sub-
stantially from that considered in this thesis. Yu, Winslett, and Seamons [122] first
defined the notion of “safe disclosure sequences.” Informally, they consider a trust
negotiation safe if each resource disclosed during the negotiation was “unlocked”
(i.e., its authorization policy was satisfied) at the time that it was disclosed. Wins-
borough and Li [116] note that under this notion of safety, private information that
is not explicitly revealed during a trust negotiation can still be inferred based on the
way that an entity carries out the negotiation. They propose several more refined
notions of safety for trust negotiation protocols based on the concept of indistin-
guishability, each of which gives users stronger guarantees regarding the amount
of private information leaked during the negotiation. Irwin and Yu [62] propose
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another definition of safety based on the idea of information gain. The work pre-
sented in Chapters 3 and 4 of this thesis is orthogonal to these previous works.
Specifically, our solutions are concerned with safety problems that emerge as a re-
sult of the inconsistency of the underlying state information used during policy
evaluation, rather than those problems arising due to information leakage during
an execution of any particular trust negotiation or distributed proof protocol. It
would be prudent for system designers to consider both types of safety.
The Antigone Context Framework (ACF) provides a general-purpose framework
for incorporating contextual data—such as room occupancy or a server’s process-
ing load—into authorization policy enforcement systems [87]. The ACF allows
policy writers to incorporate contextual assertions into policies without requiring
that the policy language include support for obtaining this data from the external
world. Users of the ACF can write plug-ins for the framework that obtain this con-
textual information, which can then be accessed as policies are evaluated. These
plug-ins could be used to enforce consistency constraints such as those discussed
in Chapters 3 and 4, although it is unclear how one would enforce consistency con-
straints that depend on all contextual facts used in a given policy. By contrast, this
thesis shows several ways in which the underlying authorization system can be
used to enforce these types of constraints without requiring any involvement by
policy writers.
Another area of closely related work is that of concurrency control and consistency
enforcement in distributed systems, distributed databases, and distributed shared
memory. Each of these areas has a rich body of literature, surveys of which can
be found in [110], [31], and [1], respectively. In general, these problem domains
assume that multiple entities will be updating values stored at multiple locations
within the system and as such, maintaining data consistency is of concern to ev-
eryone. Therefore, solutions to transaction management in these domains typi-
cally involve the cooperation of multiple entities, as every entity has an incentive
to cooperate. However, as was discussed in Sections 3.1 and 3.2.1, groups of en-
tities have no incentive to cooperate in solving the view consistency problem for
trust negotiation and distributed proving since this problem is of concern only to
a particular resource provider evaluating a particular policy. Therefore, the solu-
tions developed in the distributed systems, distributed databases, and distributed
sharedmemory literature are unsuitable for our problem domain; the solutions that
we develop in this thesis require only the cooperation of, at most, the two parties
participating in the authorization protocol.
A final area of related work is the collection of system state snapshots in distributed
systems. Collecting consistent snapshots that can be used to evaluate stable pred-
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icates over the system state is a well-known problem, to which an elegant solu-
tion was presented by Chandy and Lamport [32]. This algorithm is not directly
applicable to the problem addressed in Chapters 3 and 4, however, due to the un-
stable nature of credential and fact statuses. There exist algorithms for collecting
distributed state snapshots that can be used to evaluate unstable predicates (for
a survey, see [4]), though these algorithms have very high overheads and make
assumptions about process cooperation that are unreasonable given our highly-
adversarial problem domain.
8.2 Audit and Reputation
Current research in reputation systems is orthogonally related to the problem solved
by the Xiphos system in Chapter 5. While this area is too broad to survey in gen-
eral, papers such as [51; 65; 85; 107] address the design of reputation systems for
peer-to-peer and ad-hoc networks. These types of systems assume that entities
have a single established identity in the system. Often times, these systems also
suffer fromwhitewashing and ballot-stuffing attacks. To address false claims being
inserted into the reputation system, the authors of [100] recommend designing rep-
utation systems that require that non-repudiable evidence of a transaction be shown
prior to inserting a reputation claim into the database. While this certainly prevents
an entity from registering multiple claims, it requires that the underlying system
(e.g., the grid computing system in our evaluation) support certified transactions.
In Chapter 5, we presented a means of determining unique user identifiers in open
systems where identity information is not always explicitly present and used these
derived identifiers as a foundation for the Xiphos reputation system. To calculate
the actual reputation values for entities in the system, we used equations similar to
those defined in [85], though virtual fingerprints could be used in conjunction with
any reputation calculation method. The nature of the virtual fingerprints derived
using our method limits the damages that can be caused to Xiphos by the afore-
mentioned attacks and does not require non-repudiable transaction support from
the underlying system.
Other authors have also addressed the privacy versus trust trade-off that was dis-
cussed in Section 5.4. Anonymous credential schemes such as those presented
in [29; 33; 34] assume that privacy is more important than any trust that can be
established through history-based mechanisms (e.g., reputation systems). These
systems provide a means for a credential issued to a given entity to be used under
different pseudonyms to prevent transactions carried out by a single entity from
ever being linked. In [106], the authors discuss this trade-off in detail and show
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how entities can explicitly use multiple identities and allow linkages between these
identities to be revealed to other parties to establish trust when needed. In Chap-
ter 5, we allow system designers to balance this trade-off by choosing an appropri-
ate deployment strategy for the Xiphos system. In addition, if Xiphos is used in
systems supporting user-specified obligations, users can further limit the dissem-
ination of their personal information, making the privacy versus trust trade-off
more tunable.
A final area of work related to the discussion in Chapter 5 lies in the use of on-
tologies in trust management systems. In [80], the authors discuss how ontologies
can be used to ease policy specification and administration in trust negotiation sys-
tems. In addition, they discuss how ontologies can be used to determine when
certain types of information are being requested without need-to-know. In [85],
the authors use service ontologies to add a context dimension to reputation rat-
ings registered in their system. In our evaluation of Xiphos, we propose the use
of credential ontologies while defining the γ(·) function used in our system. This
use of ontologies is orthogonal to those presented in [80] and [85] and provides
another way in which ontologies can simplify the management and strengthen the
expressive power of trust management systems.
8.3 System Support for Trust Negotiation
As mentioned in Chapters 2 and 6, several research groups have developed im-
plementations of trust negotiation systems. Winslett et al. developed the Trust-
Builder system, which was the first such implementation [118]. TrustBuilder uses
the IBM TE compliance checker for the TPL policy language [57] and supports the
use of X.509 certificates [61]. Later, Bertino et al. implemented the Trust-X sys-
tem [20], which expresses policies and credentials in the X -TNL language [19].
Over time, this system evolved into the PP-Trust-X system described by Squiccia-
rini et al., which supports additional privacy-preserving features [109]. Koshutan-
ski and Massacci [67] describe a trust negotiation implementation designed for the
web services environment that supports the use of X.509 certificates and SAML
assertions [30] during the trust negotiation process. The common characteristic
among these early trust negotiation implementations is that they all support a lim-
ited number of negotiation strategies, credential formats, and policy languages.
This is in contrast to TrustBuilder2, which was designed to be a framework for trust
negotiation that could be extended by its users to support any number of strategies,
credential formats, policy languages, and other features.
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The implementation most directly related to TrustBuilder2 is the system described
by De Coi and Olmedilla [38]. As in this thesis, De Coi and Olmedilla came to the
realization that a more unified architecture for trust negotiation systems is neces-
sary to advance the trust negotiation state of the art. The authors examined the
PEERTRUST [98] and PROTUNE [25] systems in an effort to derive a set of common
requirements that should be supported by any trust negotiation implementation,
and then implemented a framework embodying these requirements. While flex-
ible, their system provides only a subset of the functionality embodied in Trust-
Builder2. The reason for this is that the requirements for their system were derived
by attempting to unify two existing systems, rather than by considering the trust
negotiation problem space as a whole. As a result, the requirements derived by
De Coi and Olmedilla are a subset of those derived in Sections 6.3 and 6.4 of this
thesis. At present, we are involved in a collaboration with Olmedilla to develop
a standard wire-level protocol for trust negotiation systems. Our hope is that by
defining a standard communication protocol for these types of systems, we can fur-
ther advance trust negotiation systems research by providing a means to develop
interoperable trust negotiation implementations.
While developing implementations of trust negotiation systems is a necessary first
step towards the eventual adoption of this approach to authorization, it is not the
only barrier. Several research groups have investigated ways in which trust nego-
tiation approaches to authorization can be integrated with existing protocols and
distributed systems. Perhaps the most detailed study in this area was carried out
by Hess et al. [58]. In this work, the authors investigated how the SSL/TLS proto-
col [45] could be extended to support trust negotiation natively. Such an extension
would allow seamless integration of trust negotiation facilities with secure web
browsing. This, in turn, would enable the use of increasingly expressive authoriza-
tion and privacy policies on the World Wide Web. The authors show that only mi-
nor changes are needed to the SSL/TLS protocol standard to facilitate support for
trust negotiation. They further provide a TLS implementation that supports trust
negotiation natively by integrating the PureTLS [102] TLS implementation with the
TrustBuilder trust negotiation system. Since this initial study, other groups have
experimented with prototype trust negotiation systems in domains such as mobile
computing [112], web services [39; 101], and grid computing [8; 40].
Unfortunately, directly modifying existing protocols to support trust negotiation is
often a time-consuming and bureaucratic process, which will certainly hinder the
adoption of this approach to authorization. To address this problem, Lee et al. de-
scribe Traust, a third-party authorization service that leverages the strengths of ex-
isting prototype trust negotiation systems [78; 79]. Traust acts as an authorization
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broker that issues access tokens for resources in an open system after entities use
trust negotiation to satisfy the appropriate resource access policies. The Traust ar-
chitecture was designed to allow Traust to be integrated either directly with newer
trust-aware applications or indirectly with existing legacy applications; this flexi-
bility paves the way for the incremental adoption of trust negotiation technologies
without requiring widespread software or protocol upgrades.
Lastly, we consider research efforts aimed at providing systems support for trust
negotiation approaches to authorization. One problem that has been addressed in
the research literature is that of credential management, as users often own multi-
ple computing devices. Replicating credentials across multiple machines is prob-
lematic because it increases the probability that sensitive credentials will be stolen
or leaked, and also requires users to keep several repositories up to date. In [8],
Basney et al. propose to address this problem through the use of the MyProxy cre-
dential repository [7]. MyProxy was initially developed to manage the X.509 proxy
certificates used in grid computing environments and provides a natural creden-
tial management system for the grid. As a further refinement of this approach,
van der Horst and Seamons propose Thor: The Hybrid Online Repository [111].
Thor provides an intuitive user interface that allows users to securely manage their
credentials by leveraging existing credential repositories, such as SACRED [56].
A final area in which researchers have investigated systems support for trust ne-
gotiation approaches to authorization is in responding to denial of service attacks.
The existing research literature has focused on attacks resulting from the inclu-
sion of spurious credential chains in the trust negotiation process [81; 104]. In
Section 6.8.2 of this thesis, we showed that denial of service attacks can also be
launched by taking advantage of the disparity between the cost of sending a policy
to a remote party and the cost of actually analyzing the policy to determinewhether
it is satisfied. In [104], Ryutov et al. discuss a mechanism to make trust negotiation
systems more adaptive in response to these types of attacks. They show that it
is possible to integrate the TrustBuilder trust negotiation system with the Generic
Authorization and Access-control API (GAA-API). The GAA-API can measure the
system “context” through sensors such as intrusion detection systems (IDSes) and
alter access control policies in response to changes in this context. Ryutov et al. ar-
gue that when an attack has been detected, changing the types of trust negotia-
tion policies being used can help increase system availability. By leveraging more
stringent policies during times of attack, questionable negotiations can be triaged
earlier, thereby increasing the overall throughput of the authorization system.
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8.4 Policy Compliance Checking
Over the years, the problem of checking compliance with security policies has be-
come increasingly complex. Early access control, trust management, and network
administration systems relied on type-1 compliance checkers that simply return
a Boolean value indicating whether the policy in question is satisfied. Compli-
ance checkers for the PolicyMaker [22; 23] and KeyNote [21] trust management
systems are included in this first category, as the non-iterative nature of these sys-
tems makes the discovery of why a particular access was permitted superfluous;
simply knowing that the compliance checker can construct a formal proof of au-
thorization is sufficient. The CPOL compliance checker [26] is a highly-optimized
compliance checker designed to enforce access policies on centralized resources
in high-throughput environments, such as location-detection systems. CPOL uses
aggressive caching and other optimizations to achieve incredible performance, but
does not return evidence supporting the binary decisions that it makes. Lastly,
the compliance checker for Ponder [42], which is used for policy-based network
administration, also falls into this first category.
Recall that type-2 compliance checkers return one satisfying set of credentials in
addition to a Boolean value, in the case that a policy is found to be satisfied. The
compliance checker used by the REFEREE system [37] is capable of returning such
justifications, though it need not do so. The ability to associate at least one satisfy-
ing set of credentials with a compliance checker decision is required by the trust ne-
gotiation process, as otherwise individuals could not determine which credentials
should be sent to their negotiation partner after they determine that a remote pol-
icy can be satisfied. The compliance checkers for the XML-based policy languages
X -TNL [19] and the IBM Trust Policy Language [57] fall into this category, as do
compliance checkers for existing logic-based trust negotiation policy languages,
such as Cassandra [17] and the language presented by Koshutanski and Massacci
in [68].
Type-3 compliance checkers extend the functionality provided by type-2 compli-
ance checkers by returning everyminimal set of credentials that can be used to sat-
isfy a particular policy. Until now, no trust negotiation compliance checkers have
been developed expressly for this purpose, although significant strategic benefits
could be recognized by such a compliance checker. In [108], Smith et al. discuss
several important uses of this type of compliance checker and describe the Satisfy-
ing Set Generation (SSgen) algorithm for discovering all satisfying sets for a given
policy using a type-2 policy compliance checker. They show that when policies are
expressed in disjunctive normal form (DNF), then a number of clever optimizations
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can be made to prune the state space that must be searched for satisfying sets of
credentials. They then evaluate the performance of an implementation of the SSgen
algorithm that used the IBM TE compliance checker [57] as the base type-2 com-
pliance checker. As shown in Chapter 7, CLOUSEAU presents a significant advance
over this approach by formulating the compliance checking problem as a pattern
matching problem. Efficient pattern matching algorithms can then be used to take
a controlled forward chaining approach to policy compliance checking, which re-
sults in orders of magnitude better performance.
Recent work by Bauer et al. on the Grey system has also leveraged the advantages
of forward chaining [13]. The Grey system is a prototype distributed proof system
deployed at Carnegie Mellon University. One of the insights gained through the
deployment and use of the Grey system is that the process of actually construct-
ing a distributed proof can, at times, be very time consuming and cause delays
that are unacceptable to the human user of the system. To increase the efficiency
of the proof construction process, Bauer et al. have adopted a hybrid approach.
Participants in the system use a forward chaining algorithm to determine all con-
sequences of the facts in their local knowledge bases in an offline manner. At run-
time, this pre-computed local knowledge is used in conjunction with a standard
backward chaining prover to efficiently construct distributed proofs of authoriza-
tion without requiring redundant local processing or the exploration of local “dead
ends” in the proof process. CLOUSEAU differs from this work in three ways. First,
the forward chaining done by CLOUSEAU is restricted in scope to the particular
goal being proven. This provides an additional benefit over the approach in [13],
since in our case, we are not interested in all facts that can be derived. Second,
CLOUSEAU considers only proofs of authorization that can be constructed locally,
while the theorem prover in [13] attempts to construct distributed proofs of autho-
rization. Third, CLOUSEAU finds all ways that a particular policy can be satisfied,
while Grey tries only to find a single proof of authorization. This is a result of the
fact that credentials are not considered sensitive in the Grey system, so there is no
advantage to discovering all possible proofs of authorization.
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9 Conclusion
This is not the end. It is not even the beginning of the end. But it is, perhaps,
the end of the beginning.
—Winston Churchill
Recent years have seen the Internet become an increasingly open system in which
users and resources from differing security domains have significant incentives
to facilitate interactions with one another. The secure operation of such an open
system requires an effective means of determining whether a given user is autho-
rized to carry out the actions that he or she requests. Traditional approaches to
the authorization problem rely on the use of identity-based access control lists to
identify—by name—the users that are authorized to perform certain actions in the
system. This approach works well in closed distributed computing environments
that have well-known sets of users and resources. In open systems, however, re-
source owners do not necessarily know the users requesting access to their services
and thus have no immediate way of inferring the attributes ascribed to a particular
user when they learn his or her identity. As a result, identity-based approaches to
authorization are ill-suited for use in open systems.
Researchers have addressed this shortcoming by developing decentralized and
attribute-based access control (ABAC) approaches. Techniques such as trust nego-
tiation and distributed proof construction allow user attributes and environmental
context to be discovered at runtime and incorporated into the access control process
on the fly. These approaches to authorization even allow users to protect their sen-
sitive attributes from inadvertent disclosure and enable the establishment of bilat-
eral trust between users and resources. To date, researchers have studied important
aspects of decentralized ABAC approaches, including languages for expressing ac-
cess control policies, strategies and tactics for constructing proofs of authorization,
logics for reasoning about the outcomes of these types of protocols, and formal
treatments of the information leakages that can occur during protocol execution.
This research has developed a very strong theoretical foundation for distributed
ABAC approaches to authorization, but has only scratched the surface of the mul-
titude of systems-level problems that will accompany the eventual deployment of
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these types of systems.
In this thesis, we showed that safely and securely adopting decentralized ABAC
approaches to authorization requires careful consideration of the formal properties
of these systems, as well as practical issues surrounding their deployment. To ad-
dress the wide range of topics that must be considered, we answered a progression
of important questions related to the safety analysis, deployment, implementation,
and optimization of these types of systems. In the remainder of this chapter, we
will first describe the contributions of this thesis in detail and show that our work
has helped bridge the gap between the theory and practice of decentralized ABAC
approaches to authorization. We then consider important avenues of future work.
9.1 Summary of Contributions
The majority of decentralized ABAC research to date has focused on building a
strong theoretical foundation for these types of systems. As a result, the logical
starting point for this thesis was to ask, “Do existing theoretical models of trust nego-
tiation and distributed proof protocols faithfully model asynchronous open systems, such
as the Internet?” A careful exploration of this question was the subject of Chapters
Chapters 3 and 4, which led us to make the following contributions:
(1a) In Section 3.1, we presented a novel class of attacks in which an attacker can
exploit the asynchronous nature of the Internet in combination with the au-
tonomy granted to participants in decentralized ABAC protocols to subvert
these protocols in ways not captured by the existing theory. In the scenarios
that we describe, the attacker can steer the protocol execution so that the pol-
icy evaluator samples an inconsistent view of the system. This can result in
an access control decision being made based upon incorrect user attribute or
system context data. The net effect of this class of attacks is that accesses to
system resources can—in certain circumstances—be permitted by decentral-
ized ABAC protocols that would be denied by any centralized access control
system.
(1b) In Section 3.2, we presented the first formalization of the view consistency
problem for decentralized ABAC systems. By rigorously defining the notion
of a system view, we were able to isolate the root causes of the above types of
attacks, namely credential expiration, inter-credential dependencies, external
events causing premature credential revocation, and unstable environments.
(1c) In Section 3.3, we defined four increasingly-stringent view consistency levels,
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each of which is suited for different applications. The incremental consistency
condition (Section 3.3.1) ensures that all credentials were valid when they
were received by the policy evaluator. This level of consistency is sufficient
for guaranteeing a transactional policy satisfaction semantics if the policy be-
ing satisfied consists exclusively of stable predicates. However, most policies
contain unstable clauses (e.g., role memberships that may expire over time).
The internal consistency condition (Section 3.3.2) addresses this by ensuring
that there exists some time during the execution of the protocol at which all
credentials were simultaneously valid. The endpoint consistency and interval
consistency conditions (Section 3.3.3) are more stringent still, requiring that all
credentials be valid simultaneously at the decision point of the protocol or
throughout the entire protocol, respectively.
(1d) In Section 3.4, we developed lightweight distributed algorithms that can be
used to enforce each of our view consistency levels in practice. We then
proved the soundness of each of these algorithmswhen used in asynchronous
and adversarial environments. In Sections 3.4 and 3.5, we further proved that
these algorithms embody various privacy-preservation characteristics, have
low computational and communication overheads, and can be used in con-
junction with existing decentralized ABAC proposals.
(1e) Chapter 4 generalized the results from Chapter 3 to enforce view consistency
conditions in decentralized ABAC systems in which the full details of a given
authorization proof may not be available to the principal evaluating the sat-
isfaction of the policy. An example of such a system is the distributed proof
system developed by Minami and Kotz [90], in which portions of a proof
tree can be hidden by confidentiality policies or inferences conducted over
encrypted facts.
(1f) Sections 4.3.3 and 4.4.4 developed the notion of sliding windows of consis-
tency. Given a user-defined window length ∆, this consistency condition
allows the truth values of the facts making up a proof of authorization to
fluctuate over time, so long as all facts are simultaneously true at least once
in any given ∆ time units. Sliding windows of consistency are useful for en-
forcing access control conditions over long periods of time in systems where
some degree of fluctuation or uncertainty is expected. This is appealing in
pervasive computing environments in which the context of the system may
fluctuate often around some acceptable baseline.
(1g) As in Chapter 3, we proved the soundness of each consistency enforcement
algorithm developed in Chapter 4. Furthermore, each algorithm was imple-
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mented as an extension to the Minami-Kotz proof system and shown to have
minimal runtime overheads (Section 4.5) and proven to maintain the seman-
tics of the original proof system (Section 4.4).
The above contributions demonstrate that although the existing decentralizedABAC
theory does not account for all of the nuances of asynchronous distributed systems,
they can be accounted for in practice. We showed that existing decentralized ABAC
protocols can be wrapped with consistency enforcement code that accounts for this
gap between theory and practice without imposing heavy computation or commu-
nication overheads.
After showing that existing decentralized ABAC protocols can be safely deployed
in asynchronous systems, we considered the impacts of deploying these types of
authorization systems on existing audit practices. Specifically, we asked “How can
users be held accountable for their actions in a system without concrete user identities?”
Chapter 5 focused on developing a scalable means of tracking and auditing users
in decentralized ABAC systems. To this end, we made the following contributions:
(2a) In Section 5.2, we showed that the set of credentials disclosed by an individ-
ual during a decentralized ABAC protocol forms one unique description of
that individual. As a result, two overlapping descriptions necessarily refer to
the same individual and thus can be used to audit the actions taken by this in-
dividual over time. Since a user’s credentials are often considered sensitive,
however, descriptions should not be used to audit actions taken by a user
across multiple domains, as this could lead to privacy violations. To over-
come this barrier, we developed the notion of virtual fingerprints, which are
opaque identifiers derived from user descriptions that can be used in interdo-
main audit scenarios without leaking a user’s sensitive attribute information.
(2b) To demonstrate the utility of services based on virtual fingerprints, we devel-
oped Xiphos, a reputation system that is keyed on virtual fingerprints instead
of traditional user identities. In Section 5.3, we described how Xiphos can be
deployed as a centralized, totally decentralized, or hierarchical (super-peer)
reputation service. In Section 5.4.1, we explored the privacy and performance
trade-offs that these deployments allow system designers to balance.
(2c) In Section 5.4.2, we showed that the use of Xiphos makes certain attacks
against reputation systems difficult to carry out for habitual cheaters. Specif-
ically, the whitewashing, slander, and self-promotion classes of attacks are
prevented due to the difficulty of establishing new virtual fingerprints. Fur-
thermore, the Sybil attack is mitigated to a great extent, as users cannot create
an unbounded number of identities within the Xiphos system.
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(2d) Section 5.5 evaluated the scalability of audit services based on virtual finger-
prints by examining the performance of Xiphos in simulated grid comput-
ing systems ranging in size from 10,000–70,000 nodes. We showed that query
throughput remained high and local reputation database sizes remainedman-
ageable even in the largest of these systems. This demonstrates that despite
having a highly expressive identity matching semantics, systems based on
virtual fingerprints remain scalable in non-trivial usage scenarios.
Our study of virtual fingerprints shows that the actions of users in decentralized
ABAC systems can be audited over time, even in systems spanning multiple orga-
nizational domains. When coupled with our previous results describing a mecha-
nism for facilitating the deployment of trust negotiation systems in legacy environ-
ments [78; 79], this indicates that decentralized ABAC systems are well-suited for
test deployments in existing distributed systems.
At this stage of the thesis, our focus shifted to more practical issues surrounding
the implementation and optimization of trust negotiation systems. To begin our
study of this area, we asked, “What are the key systems and architectural characteristics
of the trust negotiation process, and what are their impacts on the performance of an or-
ganization’s authorization infrastructure?” In Chapter 6, we studied this question in
detail and made the following contributions:
(3a) In Section 6.3, we carried out a detailed use case analysis to study several po-
tential deployment scenarios for decentralized ABAC systems. In Section 6.4,
we used the characteristics of these systems to derive a set of functional re-
quirements for trust negotiation systems. We showed that existing trust ne-
gotiation systems provide support for less than one third of the requirements
that we identified.
(3b) In Section 6.5, we describe the TrustBuilder2 framework for trust negotiation,
which was designed to meet the functional requirements uncovered during
our use case analysis. TrustBuilder2 makes use of an extensible data type
hierarchy and a flexible communication protocol to become the first fully-
configurable framework for the design, deployment, and analysis of trust
negotiation protocols. The design of TrustBuilder2 demonstrates that a large
number of trust negotiation proposals in the research literature can be unified
under a single system architecture.
(3c) TrustBuilder2 demonstrates that adding a high degree of flexibility to ad-
vanced authorization frameworks does not necessarily lead to high runtime
overheads. In Section 6.7, we showed that the time spent handling the indi-
rection needed to support user plug-ins and other extensions amounts to less
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than 0.2% of the total execution time.
(3d) Studies conducted using TrustBuilder2 led us to identify the primary bottle-
necks in the trust negotiation process (Section 6.7) and uncover a novel class
of denial of service attacks against trust negotiation systems in which the cost
of policy analysis is exploited (Section 6.8.2).
The analysis that we conducted using TrustBuilder2 showed that checking com-
pliance with ABAC policies is the most expensive portion of the trust negotiation
process. This led us to pose the question, “Is it possible to increase the efficiency of the
compliance checking process without altering its completeness or correctness properties?”
We explore this question in Chapter 7 andmake the following contributions during
our study:
(4a) We showed that the inefficiencies of the compliance checking process stem
from the fact that, for historical reasons, the policy compliance checking prob-
lem is often formulated as a theorem proving problem. When analyzing de-
centralized ABAC policies, it is beneficial to find all proofs of authorization so
that a locally-optimal choice can be made to advance the state of the autho-
rization protocol. While a theorem-proving approach to policy compliance
checking is very natural, it carries with it undesirable overheads, as theorem
provers are generally used to find a single proof of each target theorem. As
a result, compliance checkers based upon theorem provers tend to perform
poorly for generating multiple proofs of authorization.
(4b) In Section 7.4, we developed the CLOUSEAU compliance checker, which uses
a pattern matching formalism to efficiently find all ways in which a policy
can be satisfied. The evaluation conducted in Section 7.5 showed that this
approach outperforms existing theorem-proving approaches to compliance
checking by orders of magnitude. As a concrete point of comparison, the
compliance checker analyzed in [108] takes over 10 seconds to find two over-
lapping satisfying sets containing a total of 20 credentials, while CLOUSEAU
finds the same satisfying sets in approximately 40 ms.
(4c) CLOUSEAU improves not only the efficiency of the trust negotiation process,
but also its utility. By determining all satisfying sets for a given policy,
CLOUSEAU uncovers the entire “next-step” state space for any given trust
negotiation. This allows negotiation strategies to make more intelligent deci-
sions regarding how to proceed.
(4d) In Sections 7.6 and 7.7, we demonstrate that existing policy languages can
be compiled into a format suitable for analysis by CLOUSEAU. Section 7.6
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describes a compilation process for the RT 0 policy language and provides a
formal proof of correctness and completeness for CLOUSEAU when operat-
ing on compiled RT 0 policies. In Section 7.6.4, we show that this compilation
procedure can be extended in a very natural manner to support RT 1 policies,
which allow for the definition of parameterized roles. Section 7.7 describes a
compilation process for policies written in the WS-SecurityPolicy language,
and again provides a proof of correctness and completeness. These compila-
tion procedures imply that policy writers can take advantage of the existing
policy languages that best meet their needs without negatively influencing
the runtime characteristics of trust negotiation implementations.
Recall from Chapter 1 that our goal in this thesis was to provide adequate evidence
to justify the following thesis statement:
It is possible to develop extensible and efficient decentralized
attribute-based access control systems that can be safely deployed in
large-scale asynchronous distributed environments.
Contributions (1a)–(1g) provide proof that decentralized ABAC approaches to au-
thorization can safely be used in asynchronous distributed environments. Contri-
butions (2a)–(2d) show that despite a relaxed notion of user identity, the actions
taken by users in systems relying on decentralized ABAC systems can, in fact, be
audited without leaking sensitive attribute information. When coupled with the
results in [78; 79], this implies that decentralized ABAC systems can be deployed
without breaking compatibility with existing services and best practices. Contri-
butions (3a)–(3d) show that flexible and extensible decentralized ABAC systems can
be developed without imposing high overheads. Finally, contributions (4a)–(4d)
show that these systems can be greatly optimized to provide an efficient and expres-
sivemeans of access control for open systems.
9.2 Future Work
This thesis focused on bridging the gap between the theory and practice of de-
centralized ABAC systems. The long term success of these systems depends on
a number of other issues, however. First and foremost, test deployments of these
types of systems are necessary to uncover future research challenges relating to
the adoption of these systems. At Carnegie Mellon University, researchers have
deployed the Grey distributed proof system [11] and have identified a number of
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important topics related to the efficiency, usability, and management of distributed
proof systems. To date, no such study has been conducted involving the use of
trust negotiation protocols. Our hope, however, is that the TrustBuilder2 frame-
work that was developed in this thesis will provide the necessary system support
for such a study to take place. Along the same lines, it is important to investigate
the deployment of multiple approaches to trust negotiation and examine the inter-
operability issues that will inevitably arise. As mentioned in Section 8.3, we are
currently involved in an effort to develop a standardized wire-level protocol for
trust negotiation systems to facilitate the development of such interoperable trust
negotiation implementations.
With respect to the deployment of decentralizedABAC systems, it is also important
to examine the scalability of these systems under heavy load. As was discussed
in Chapter 6, the trust negotiation process can take multiple rounds of commu-
nication and hundreds of milliseconds to complete; this is much more expensive
than simply checking the correctness of a username/password pair. If decentral-
ized ABAC approaches are to be successfully deployed in open systems with large
numbers of users, approaches to improve the throughput of these systems must be
examined. One possible approach to solving this problem involves delegating re-
sponsibility for carrying out the interactive portions of these protocols to multiple
helper nodes. After a successful protocol execution, a helper node could then gener-
ate a receipt for the interaction that includes the target policy that was satisfied, as
well as the collection of credentials used to satisfy the policy. This receipt can then
be passed to the reference monitor for a particular resource, which will permit ac-
cess if and only if the correctness and validity of the receipt can be verified. As was
shown in Chapter 7, an optimized compliance checker can check the correctness of
such a receipt in tens of milliseconds or faster. The use of multiple helper nodes in
conjunction with a load balancing system could thus greatly increase the through-
put of decentralized ABAC systems, provided that a safe and restricted means of
delegating the usage of credentials to helper nodes can be developed.
Perhaps the most important barrier to the eventual success of decentralized ABAC
systems is their usability. Studies have shown that users have a difficult time us-
ing even a single digital certificate correctly [114]. However, in trust negotiation
and distributed proof approaches to authorization, users must manage a large col-
lection of certificates attesting to their various attributes and capabilities. The cre-
dential management systems discussed in Section 8.3 are a good first step towards
addressing this problem, but further user studies are necessary. A related problem
that must be addressed is that of policy specification and management. Very few
computer users are likely to possess the mathematical sophistication to correctly
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author and interpret Datalog-based security policies. Developing intuitive inter-
faces for specifying, editing, and deploying policies will be an interesting challenge
likely to require experts from both the security and human-computer interaction
fields. A particularly challenging aspect of this problem will lie in quantifying and
explaining the differences between versions of a policy as it is being modified by
the user. Ensuring that seemingly-benign policy modifications do not have unin-
tended consequences will surely be a challenging area of future research.
Another important area to investigate is the development of more flexible models
of access control and authorization. In trust negotiation and distributed proof sys-
tems, access to some resource R is granted if and only if the policy protecting R is
satisfied exactly. While such requirements provide very strong guarantees regard-
ing the conditions under which accesses are granted, this requires that the policies
protecting any given resource consider every possible situation under which access
should be granted. A recent report by the JASONProgramOffice shows that within
the intelligence domain, access control policies often do not (and cannot) consider
all such cases [63]. As a result, people fail to use existing access control and doc-
ument classification systems properly, as doing so would hinder their ability to
carry out their jobs. In response to this realization, the notion of risk-based access
control has been proposed to help prevent systems from blocking authorized users
during unexpected circumstances [35; 63]. Risk-based access control addresses this
problem by quantifying the risk associated with access to a particular piece of data.
Organizations then receive risk budgets that they can allocate to their employees
to allow them to purchase information that they would not normally be allowed to
access, using risk tokens.
While this approach is interesting, there are two major difficulties that must be
overcome. First, it is not obvious how to price access to information resources.
Second, these systems do not have the notion of a formal proof of authorization
that is present in distributed proof and trust negotiation systems. To address these
two problems, we are just beginning to study ways in which risk-based access con-
trol approaches can be unified with decentralized ABAC approaches to authoriza-
tion. This approach will combine the formal guarantees of decentralized ABAC
approaches with the ability to utilize risk-based economic models that enable the
“fuzzing” of access control policies to account for unpredicted, yet authorized,
flows of information. Such an approach would allow principals to build approx-
imate—rather than strict—proofs of authorization when they attempt to access a
given resource. Dynamic pricing models would then be used to quantify the differ-
ence between the expected proof of authorization (as defined by the access control
policy) and the proof generated by the requesting principal. If the cost of access is
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determined to be below a certain threshold, the requesting principal would then
have the opportunity to purchase access to the resource using risk tokens. Such an
access control model still produces formal proofs of authorization (which will be
useful for a posteriori audits) while also allowing for some flexibility in unexpected
situations. We further hope to show that pricing the difference between proofs of ac-
cess will be an easier task than pricing access to data in general, as the pricing
strategy can incorporate the approximate proof that was generated.
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